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Preface: The Most Important Aspects of Life — 
 Ethics, Mysticism and Religion 
Ulrich Arnswald 
The aspects of things that are most important for 
us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—
because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real 
foundations of his inquiry do not strike a person 
at all. — And this means : we fail to be struck by 
what, once seen, is most striking and most power-
ful.  Wittgenstein, PI § 129 
The essays collected in this volume explore some of the themes that have 
been at the centre of recent debates within Wittgensteinian scholarship. 
This book is an attempt to express the difficult nature of ethics, mysti-
cism and religion, their problematic status in the modern world, and the 
possible justifications for ethical and religious commitment. Naturally, 
it also discusses some of the main ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. His very 
personal and often aphoristic way of writing cannot simply be restated 
or interpreted. However, his philosophy is in need of interpretation, and 
interpretations are—as we all know—often rather controversial. 
The collected contributions aim, therefore, at bringing new insight 
into the essence of Wittgenstein’s ethical and religious beliefs by under-
standing his concepts of thought and language in a more detailed way. In 
opposition to what we are tentatively inclined to think, the articles of this 
volume invite us to understand that our need to grasp the essence of 
ethical and religious thought and language will not be achieved by 
metaphysical theories expounded from such a point of view, but by 
focusing on our everyday forms of expression. The articles have in 
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common an understanding of Wittgenstein as not proposing meta-
physical theories, but rather showing us the way to work ourselves out 
of the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing. Thus, 
the authors show from a Wittgensteinian perspective that the standard 
modern approaches to ethics cannot justify traditional moral beliefs. 
The number of books and articles on Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
extraordinarily large, and due to this, in this volume no attempt has been 
made to record all debts and disagreements. This anthology is written 
with the conviction that the structure of Wittgenstein’s ideas on ethics, 
mysticism and religion and the connections between them owe much to 
an imagination that is required for philosophy but can also very easily 
lead us nowhere. 
On the basis of a Wittgensteinian approach the authors put forward an 
alternative account of ethics and religion that avoids this contradiction 
and recognises that the central issues in the ethical and religious fields 
cannot be resolved by conceptual analysis alone. By following this alter-
native account, we become aware of ethical theories and belief justifica-
tions that rest on overly simple accounts of the essence of human life.  
The articles that have emerged are published in English for the first 
time and criticize more recent standard interpretations of Wittgenstein’s 
work within the Anglo-Saxon academic community. This book is in-
tended to be of interest both to those who are professional philosophers 
and those who are not. Works cited from Wittgenstein’s writings are 
quoted in their published English abbreviations. At the beginning of the 
book a list of abbreviations of frequently cited references can be found.  
This volume is a result of a project of the European Institute for Inter-
national Affairs. The European Institute for International Affairs was 
founded as an independent, non-profit and non-partisan scholarly orga-
nisation whose main task includes encouraging the exchange of ideas and 
research in the domains of the social sciences and the humanities. This 
volume came together under the auspices of the University of Karlsruhe 
and the European Institute for International Affairs, Heidelberg. 
I am grateful to the EuKlId-series editors, Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter 
Schütt and Prof. Dr. Bernd Thum, both of the University of Karlsruhe, 
who invited me to publish this book in their series. My gratitude also ex-
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tends, of course, to all the contributors to this volume for having ac-
cepted the invitation to think about Wittgenstein’s ideas on ethics, 
religion, and mysticism. I am also indebted to Regine Tobias, Brigitte 
Maier and Sabine Mehl, at Universitätsverlag Karlsruhe, as well as Prof. 
Lawrence K. Schmidt at Hendrix College, Arkansas, for their support 
and suggestions. Finally, I would like to express my special gratitude to 
Jutta Gemeinhardt who gave assistance during the preparation of this 
volume.  
 
Heidelberg / Karlsruhe, July 2009 
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The Paradox of Ethics — ‘It leaves everything as it is.’ 
Ulrich Arnswald 
[…] if a man could write a book on Ethics which 
really was a book on Ethics, this book would, 
with an explosion, destroy all the other books in 
the world. Ludwig Wittgenstein, LE 
This essay attempts to approach Wittgenstein’s ethics with reference to 
its different facets. Perhaps, it is better to say with Wittgenstein that 
“[t]he same or almost the same points were always being approached 
afresh from different directions, and new sketches made.” (PI Preface). 
The aim is not only to trace Wittgenstein’s footsteps by walking through 
the “landscape of ethics”, but at least, too, to sketch out the radical na-
ture of Wittgenstein’s ethics. In the first part of the enquiry, the focus 
is on the question of the ultimate justification for ethical theories and 
their epistemological truth; and, by contrast, in the second part, empha-
sis shifts to the question of the connection of ethics and mystics. Part 
three explores whether Wittgenstein’s ethics is metaphysics. In the 
fourth and final part, the relationship of ethics and religion is traced, to 
conclude with an outline summary of those special qualities, as observed 
in Wittgenstein’s ethics. 
I. Against Universal Ethics 
“What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. 
Only something supernatural can express the Supernatural”, Wittgen-
stein wrote in Culture and Value (CV 1929, 3). In this instance, ethics 
is almost placed on a religious plane, a fact that already emerges from 
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Wittgenstein’s reflections in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, namely, 
that on the basis of the limit of language, it makes no sense to refer 
actions to ethical dimensions. 
This project already assumes a specific understanding of ethics, based 
as it is, neither on an academic conception of individual moral directives 
for action, nor on a theoretically devised scheme, but on an ethical 
impulse. That impulse is dismissed by ethics as a normative theory or 
doctrine that, nonetheless, “by clarifying the status of ethical proposi-
tions, expresses the view that human action is not to be philosophically 
justified […], or qualified, but rather to be taken as given” (Kroß 1993, 
128). In Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, this supposed paradox dissolves 
into a myriad of possible ways of acting, into the plurality and the un-
foreseen nature of human speech acts, that is, into the multiplicity of the 
grammar in its expressions of “good” and “evil”. 
The rejection of ethics as a formative doctrine or theory means that 
the ethical dimension is treated as transcendental, as it were, neither in 
need of an ultimate justification, nor with the capacity to make such a 
thing possible. For Wittgenstein, an ethical theory or doctrine can only 
be nonsensical. In the Tractatus, he justifies that view philosophically in 
the elucidations for the proposition 6.4 “All propositions are of equal 
value”, by stating: 
So it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can 
express nothing that is higher. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. 
Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same).  
(TLP 6.42, 6.421) 
Moreover, the ethical dimension is extracted from the field of facets 
that are described in words. That leads to the paradox that acting in the 
world cannot contain any statements on the ethical quality of action, 
although the ethical dimension is meant to be linked to the sense of 
action and the actor’s status. This aspect can be explained by the fact that 
the same action can be performed by any number of different “selves”, 
that is to say, the same action can be described at one time as “evil” and at 
another as “good”. 
The significance of the “self” for ethics is particularly clear in Wittgen-
stein’s Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein emphasizes to Friedrich Wais-
The Paradox of Ethics — ‘It leaves everything as it is.’ 
3 
mann that “[a]t the end of my lecture on ethics, I spoke in the first 
person”. This is “quite essential”, since “I can only appear as a person 
speaking for myself.” (LE, 16) 
In his lecture, Wittgenstein uses the term ethics in a sense that, on his 
conviction, also incorporates the greater part of aesthetics. As already 
noted in the Tractatus, he repeats the expression that “[t]here are no 
propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or 
trivial” (LE, 6), but adds by way of illustration that he meant “that a state 
of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which we can describe, is in no 
ethical sense good or bad.” (LE, 6) Here, the aforementioned plurality of 
“selves” is explicitly reflected in the possibility to describe the same ways 
of acting as “evil” and “good”. 
Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics is further founded on the considera-
tion that the ability to define ethical propositions requires a theory of 
ethics. Yet this would only be possible, if there were a criterion or 
measure to prove the propositions as either suitable or unsuitable, as 
possible or impossible. To evaluate such propositions, they would have 
to be part of a system of self-referential statements, for only that kind of 
system can demonstrate a criterion with a logically justifiable basis. 
Hence, propositions only make sense, if they make statements about 
facts in the world. As in the natural sciences, a theory would have to 
describe these facts in propositions that are systematically ordered (Kroß 
1993, 138). From this departure, Wittgenstein forces the destruction of 
the philosophical idea of a book of the universe, an idea that leads in his 
late philosophy to the recognition of a multiplicity of behavioural 
patterns, the plurality and heterogeneity of life forms. The lecture 
illustrates this as follows: 
And now I must say that if I contemplate what Ethics really would have to be 
if there were such a science, this result seems to me quite obvious. It seems to 
me obvious that nothing we could ever think or say should be the thing. That 
we cannot write a scientific book, the subject matter of which could be in-
trinsically sublime and above all other subject matters. I can only describe my 
feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics which 
really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all 
the other books in the world. Our words used as we use them in science, are 
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vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural 
meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will 
only express facts [...]. I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned 
there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc. (LE, 7) 
Wittgenstein confirms by that flow of thoughts what he already called 
the transcendental nature of the ethical in his Tractatus: namely, that the 
ethical dimension is only revealed by its exclusion from articulate ex-
pression, that is, the absence of a state of affairs that can be described. For 
him, in our world of facts and states of affairs, no “absolutely right road” 
can be recognized with the coercive power of a judge, as it were, an abso-
lute ethical power of creating acts and evaluating actions. He writes: 
Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, “the abso-
lutely right road.” I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it 
would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And 
similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one 
which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessar-
ily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that 
such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I 
would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge. (LE, 7) 
Even if it were possible to imagine an absolute and normative ethics as 
given, it could not possess the coercion of an absolute judge, for that 
power would still remain an indescribable state of affairs. A consensus in 
the definitions would obtain, yet it does not follow that this consensus 
would extend to the judgements. By rejecting the “the coercive power of 
an absolute judge” Wittgenstein destructs the universality claim of 
ethics, by conceding that the decision whether the demand to take “the 
absolutely right road” or the de facto remark “This is the absolute good!”, 
accepted by individuals, exclusively depends on an individual’s practical 
approach. Since every demand to adopt a certain way of seeing things 
always implicitly presupposes that there is another possibility, every idea 
of an absolute is a delusion. 
Despite this sobering analysis, Wittgenstein recognizes a “drive” that 
is manifested in man’s continued attempt to create ethical theories. These 
ethical theories are interpretations of human actions. That the number of 
such theories seems infinite is to be explained by humanity’s wish to 
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undertake such interpretations. In his early works, particularly the Trac-
tatus, Wittgenstein attempted to research this wish by devising an objec-
tive philosophy. He confines his belonging to this life form, by writing: 
I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I 
had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was 
their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the 
world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and 
I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or 
Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against 
the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs 
from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the 
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not 
add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the 
human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would 
not for my life ridicule it. (LE, 11f.) 
Whilst Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, on the one hand, destructs the 
idea of a higher or “absolute judge” and justifies the inaccessibility of 
theories in ethics, his reflections permit, on the other hand, the definition 
of “self” as hanging ethics on the peg of “subject/self” and not linking 
that connection to the prevailing state of affairs in the world. By using 
the phraseology “saying I” in his Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein makes 
it a fait accompli that demonstrates certainty; and, in that sense, the point 
is reached where ethics and religion unavoidably collide and, for the “I-
saying” Wittgenstein, become one. In terms of ethics, the “self” obtains a 
special significance. 
In that way, the quest for an ultimate reason, as well as the definition 
of the highest aims in human life make no sense in Wittgenstein’s context 
of an ethical theory. His philosophical investigations remain devoid of 
ethical determinants for human action and without a final justification, 
since instead of a unified, ultimate truth, what emerges is a plurality and 
heterogeneity of life forms and a respective variety of behaviours that 
could contain a multiplicity of truths. In this regard, Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy could also be described as “linguistic relativism” (cf. Machan 
1981, 359), in which case, however: 
Ulrich Arnswald 
6 
[…] Wittgenstein’s relativism, used as an instrument of critical objection to 
the metaphysical content of epistemology, is itself not motivated by epistemo-
logical factors; its basis is precisely not a sceptical dismissal of the possibility 
of statements claiming truth, but rather the rejection of that truth claim, as it 
could be guaranteed with the assistance of the theory of knowledge (Kroß 
1993, 145). 
Ethics can neither be an ultimate source of reason, nor a guarantee for 
epistemological truth. As a matter of course, ethical determinants for hu-
man actions remain without a conclusive justification.  
Now the question arises as to what motivates an individual to take 
ethical action, in view of the lack of conclusive justification, or guaran-
teed truth for the correct way of acting. In the following section, atten-
tion is focused on whether the mystical dimension substitutes for Witt-
genstein the epistemological motivation for ethical action. 
II. The Mystical Dimension of Ethics 
At the end of 1919, Wittgenstein wrote to Ludwig von Ficker, the editor 
of the periodical Der Brenner (“The Torch”) about the Tractatus: 
You see, I am quite sure that you won’t get all that much out of reading it. 
Because you won’t understand it; its subject-matter will seem quite alien to 
you. But it isn’t really alien to you, because the book’s point is an ethical 
one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there 
now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key 
to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists 
of two parts: the one presented here plus all I have not written. And it is 
precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to 
the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that 
this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that 
where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put 
everything firmly into place by being silent about it (von Wright 1982, 83). 
The tension at the core of the book manifests itself in the concept of 
“showing” that Wittgenstein uses to expose the illusion of an intrinsic 
link between the ethical obiter dicta and the coherent logical and empiri-
cal philosophy of language that forms the overwhelming part of the book 
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(cf. Edwards 1982, 19). Wittgenstein therefore distinguishes between 
showing in the sense of representational language and showing, to 
“climb up the ladder” to a right view of the world. The former can be 
shown with a symbolic system, whilst the latter cannot be shown, but 
must reveal itself. Wittgenstein identifies this with the mystical: “There 
are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical.” (TLP 6.522) 
The content of the treatise reveals itself to the reader, therefore, not 
only by its explicit meaning, but also by what is not said. What is 
essential here, that is, ethics, only commences beyond the limits of lan-
guage, namely, at the point where silence begins. The limits of language 
are drawn within language. All other aspects (such as ethics, aesthetics, 
religion) do not belong to the sphere of articulate sense. These things 
remain inarticulate and can only be shown by the mystical realm. 
The difference between “showing” and “showing itself” corresponds 
to the distinction between the representational language of theoretical 
philosophy and the practical drive, to discover an essential way of thin-
king and means of confronting the deepest human concerns of life. These 
aspects, in turn, do not concern representable and contingent facts, but 
necessities of human life, such as the question of eternity, of “good” and 
“evil”, of the will that changes the world etc. A key aspect of the Tracta-
tus is the ethical deed, even though this viewpoint is worked out in a 
theoretical work that rather contradicts these formal reflections (cf. 
Edwards 1982, 27). The medium is contrary to these thoughts, as it can-
not be assumed that the underlying insights into the nature of subjec-
tivity, of ethics, and religion could be articulated by logical analysis. 
Rather, these aspects show themselves in the form of a philosophy that 
runs against the limits of language and so endeavours to say what cannot 
be said. For that reason, it is extremely difficult to identify the link of 
logic and ontology in the treatise and the transcendental insights that 
Wittgenstein viewed as the real content of the book (cf. Stern 1995, 70-72). 
Hence, Wittgenstein also promises encouragingly that those who are 




My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw 
away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)  
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 
(TLP 6.54) 
Naturally, this recognition cannot be verified, since it lies beyond what  
is the knowable. A person, having surmounted the propositions of the 
Tractatus and having “seen the world rightly” will no longer try to ex-
press their recognition, knowing, as he does, that it cannot be expressed 
(cf. Anscombe 1971, 171). All questions of human life and ethical values 
are thereby effectively seperated from the sphere of scientific research. 
Hence, it can be argued, that everything that is a matter of human con-
cern—whether ethics, aesthetics, religion or even philosophy itself—
fall into the category of the mystical for Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, at 
the very least, a general knowledge can be derived from the Tractatus, 
namely, that whatever can be known does not exhaust reality, that there 
are things in life that cannot be discussed (cf. Maslow 1961, 162). 
In a strict sense of experience, one cannot communicate exactly what 
one experiences. This is not to say that Wittgenstein rules out commu-
nal feelings, or communication of impressions. We can exchange im-
pressions and values, we can even partake of the same moral values, we 
can follow the intuitions of other people—yet, all this, only to a certain 
degree, given that we cannot experience exactly the same sense data and 
content. 
The meaning of life cannot exist within the boundaries of the world, 
but rather: “The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the 
world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: 
in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value. [...]” 
(TLP 6.41) However, Wittgenstein advocates the thesis that we can have 
intuitions whose transcendental character cannot be put into words and 
is based on mystical feelings, whose reality is recognized, as it were, 
beyond space and time. This supra-natural element is for Wittgenstein 
“[t]he solution of the riddle in space and time that lies outside space 
and time.” (TLP 6.4312) And further: 
The Paradox of Ethics — ‘It leaves everything as it is.’ 
9 
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.  
(Is not the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt 
that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what 
constituted that sense?) (TLP 6.521)  
By reaching such knowledge of the problem of life that drives us to 
“climb up the ladder”, then the problem as such disappears. It fades, 
since it must fade, since the solution to the problem of life lies precisely 
in its disappearance. It is questionable, whether the disappearance is the 
reason why the solution cannot be spoken, or whether the solution, the 
“climbing of the ladder”, or the disappearance, from the outset, repre-
sent, an expressible experience. Even Wittgenstein cannot give an answer 
to the question, although he concludes that precisely this incommuni-
cable dimension must amount to what we call mystical and that in this 
respect what cannot be put into words is shown. 
For Wittgenstein, the answer to the question of the meaning of life 
resides in oneself. Attention has to be directed to oneself since the power 
to change the world only lies in the power to change one’s own attitude 
toward the world. This power is a mystical force and, as such, mystic 
becomes the last bastion of things in life that mean the most to us: name-
ly, all ethical conceptions, all things that we cannot express and that are 
nonetheless of fundamental significance for us (cf. Maslow 1961, 160). 
Hence, the ethical intent of the Tractatus does not appear as an arbitrary 
by-product of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and thought. Since 
“[l]ogic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world” 
(TLP 6.13), the treatise’s logic and the language philosophy only proves 
the philosophical incompetence of atomistic, logical-empirical philoso-
phy of language. Because of this, it shows that silence can be the only 
medium for the revelation of the mystical force. Silence is the outcome 
of recognition for those who “throw away the ladder after [they have] 
climbed up it.” 
As a consequence, the subject matter of ethics, for Wittgenstein, 
significantly differs from what most people think ethics is about. 
Neither theorizing about certain behaviour patterns, nor researching 
the problems of behaviour amongst others can be at the heart of ethical 
enquiries. Rather, the fundamental question in ethics must be a preoccu-
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pation with being-in-the-world and the meaning of life. Individuals can 
only know how to live in this world by understanding the meaning of 
being-in-the-world and life itself. It is crucial to distinguish these widely 
diverging conceptions of ethics. To Wittgenstein, ethics has no special 
task in discourse amongst different people, whilst we treat ethics as a 
whole as a field of inter-subjective discourse (cf. Diamond 1991, 9).  
Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics is scarcely to be distinguished 
from a religion, as each discipline is concerned with the meaning of the 
world and life. That Wittgenstein says nothing about how to live one’s 
life, is justified by his theory that “[t]he world is independent of my 
will” (TLP 6.373). This rules out being judged for doing something de-
liberately, and as a consequence our usual understanding of the ethical 
cannot any longer be applied. According to TLP 6.423, “[i]t is impos-
sible to speak about the will […] as […] the subject of ethical attributes”, 
and “the good or the bad exercise of the will […] can alter only the limits 
of the world, not the facts […]” (TLP 6.43). Ethical significance can only 
be traced back to the ethical will, not to the world at large. The ethical 
will alters the limits of the world by changing the attitude one takes 
toward the world. In that way, the ethical will also changes the percep-
tion of how one sees the world. Only oneself can change the limits of 
one’s world by directing one’s attention to the ethical will, without 
which it is impossible to allow the development of good will. This atten-
tion can only be experienced in the mystical, where the meaning of life 
can be shown. The significance of ethics, which cannot be put into words, 
can only lie in a praxeological context, that is to say, in the way in which 
the individual’s attitude to the world is to be changed and not his basic 
conviction, in order to learn how to lead one’s life and give it meaning 
(cf. Edwards 1982, chapt. 2). 
The ladder that we are meant to climb up and then throw away in the 
Tractatus helps us to achieve a view of the world sub specie aeternitatis. 
At this point, the mystical is shown. The meaning of life is to be revealed 
in the mystical realm that is devoid of space and time. In the timelessness 
of the experience of an event, timelessness means the same as eternity. In 
this sense, a view of the world and of the individual life can be obtained 
sub specie aeternitatis. This holds true “if we take eternity to mean not 
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infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to 
those who live in the present.” (TLP 6.4311) 
For Wittgenstein, ethics is an instrument for giving meaning to one’s 
own being-in-the-world. Since this meaning can only be achieved 
through one’s own ethical will, every kind of ethical impulse is based on 
a mystical experience, or on an experience of showing. To assess the 
importance of the mystical dimension for Wittgenstein’s ethics, it is ne-
cessary to elaborate the extent to which the mystical corresponds to the 
metaphysical dimension, or whether, using mysticism as a prop, Witt-
genstein merely wants to convey a metaphysical theory of meaning 
that lies outside of our experience.  
III. Ethical Mysticism without Metaphysics 
For Wittgenstein, there is a human “drive”, to devise a “picture of the 
world” that gives life meaning and helps to explain the world. That is, so 
to speak, to provide a kind of certainty on the basic questions of our 
existence. This “drive” in human beings corresponds to a “metaphysical 
need”, a striving for ultimate truths and securities. 
That anything exists at all, this fact carries the great fascination that 
preoccupies Wittgenstein. The sudden meaningfulness of this fact is a 
known experience in the sphere of mystics and it again occurs as such 
in Wittgenstein’s work. Already in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 
this “basic question of metaphysics”, that is, why anything exists at all, 
is described as mystical: “It is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical, but that it exists.” (TLP 6.44) 
However, although Wittgenstein pursues the question of existence for 
his entire life, he never touches the secret nature of “the basic question 
of metaphysics.” He does not even try to clarify this question. Already 
in proposition 6.5 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains why he will 
never confront this “basic question”, even if the underlying experience, 
namely the sense of wonder about existence, is extremely significant: 




The riddle does not exist. 
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it. (TLP 6.5) 
Wittgenstein’s mysticism is not metaphysical, since it is not about a 
theory of the “meaning of the world” outside of our experiences. For 
him, the ethical questions of philosophy as doctrine belong to metaphy-
sics, his own project of ethics as activity, or the quest for the ethical life 
is, however, post-metaphysical, so to speak, not related to the experi-
ence of mystical knowledge and not appealing to metaphysics to assist 
with his answers. Mystics can neither be expressed in statements, nor 
can it name any sort of truth. “True” or “false” are not relevant catego-
ries to mystics. The fact that he tolerates the clarification of the “question 
of the meaning of being”, the sense of wonder about existence, does 
not stop him from producing a critique of metaphysical questions and 
answers. 
Wittgenstein exposed the fact, in a paradoxical way and by negation, 
that every natural language is underpinned by its own ontology. Every 
“natural” or not “formalized” language must possess a particular meta-
physics that is identical with its “meta-language”. For Wittgenstein, 
philosophical propositions are not within the limits of language, de-
fined again by its inner structure. Rather, philosophical propositions, 
that is, propositions of metaphysics, are inevitably and incurably spe-
culative, since they transcend the limits of language and also the limits 
of the world, because: “The limits of my language mean the limits of 
my world.” (TLP 5.6) 
Since, however, according to TLP 5.61 “logic pervades the world” 
and “the limits of the world are also its limits”, there can be no legiti-
mate metaphysics, since there is, next to the sphere of substantive em-
pirical propositions and that of “nonsensical” propositions of logic, no 
further legitimate sphere. As in TLP 4.022, a proposition shows “how 
things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.” For that 
reason, a proposition in which a state of affairs is expressed, not only 
contains “the truth-possibilities of a proposition” (TLP 4.431), but at 
the same time, it is “the expression of its truth conditions” (TLP 4.431). 
That is to say that the proposition is an expression for the fact that 
whoever expresses it holds the view that his truth conditions are 
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fulfilled. In any case, “no proposition can make a statement about it-
self, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself [...]” 
(TLP 3.332). Thus, it is virtually inherent to the essence of metaphysics 
that “the distinction between the factual and conceptual investigations” 
is blurred and at the same time it is the task of “philosophical investiga-
tions” to make this explicit. In Zettel, it is stated: “Philosophical inves-
tigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphy-
sics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual inves-
tigations.” (Z 458) 
Nevertheless, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein almost commits the same 
mistake of intending to state something metaphysical, that is, to mean 
to say something that cannot be said in words. As Wittgenstein’s philo-
sophy of language endeavours to say things that cannot be put into 
words in an empirical way, he finally has to end the project of explai-
ning the world—yet not without satisfying his own “longing for the 
transcendent” (CV 1931, 15), by his “propositions—as steps—to climb 
up beyond them” (TLP 6.54). Only by “throwing away the ladder” 
does Wittgenstein succeed in not sliding into the metaphysical realm. 
The turnabout at the last minute leaves the “transcendent”, that is to 
say, the view of the world sub specie aeternitatis, in the sense of propo-
sition 6.522 of the Tractatus, as “things that cannot be put into words” 
and therefore as “mystical”.  
Wittgenstein’s thought is a constant reversal at the limits of traditio-
nal philosophy: 
Wittgenstein attempts to bring a philosophy to an end, namely, philosophy 
as doctrine, of which it is often said that it is ‘the’ philosophy. His thought 
makes it possible to observe the history of this philosophy from the peri-
phery, as the history of wonder about the existence of the world and of the 
need to gain clarity about this astonishing world and the role of human beings 
within it. (Kroß 1993, 181) 
His work stands for a philosophical description, instead of attempts at 
metaphysical elucidation. His philosophy consists of a variety of philo-
sophical perspectives and standpoints. It wards off metaphysics that pre-
sents itself as being rational. Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics also 
showed two points at the same time: 
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Firstly, as theoretical options, scepticism and relativism are still based on 
false, quasi-metaphysical ideas of what we can actually know. Secondly, 
metaphysical pictures already place a burden on many of our everyday no-
tions, even leading astray in “small” cognitive situations. We can become 
objectivizing metaphysicians everywhere, even against our will, when under-
standing any sensible action. (Rentsch 1999, 144) 
The question of “being itself” and the end of “metaphysics” are one and 
the same. “The mystical” that Wittgenstein speaks of is not a way of 
being, but rather a situatively chosen life form. The “mystical” is there-
fore not a “metaphysical zero point”. From this point, a new attack 
against metaphysics as striving for the “meaning of being” cannot com-
mence Sisyphus-like. Rather, it is an enduring end to philosophy as 
doctrine and a beginning of a philosophy as activity. Human language 
practice is ahead of every philosophy as doctrine, so that it cannot be 
overtaken. Hence, ‘the’ philosophy recedes behind life. What emerges 
instead of systematic observation is “differential observation of human 
life and practice.” (Kroß 1993, 65). 
In the Tractatus, “sense” is used as a terminus technicus. To say that a 
statement makes “sense” is the same as the observation that the state-
ment relates to objects in the world and that it is contingent. By the 
same token, to say that a statement is nonsense is only to state that it is 
not about such a statement. The category “nonsense” largely serves in 
the Tractatus to differentiate and is not a tool of critique. Wittgenstein’s 
concept of “nonsense” bears no relation whatsoever to the everyday 
use of the term. In this regard, it follows that the view of philosophical 
statements as nonsense is not synonymous with their absurdity or 
nonsensical character. Because it is impossible to make sense about 
what ultimately is to be “reasoned”, it can only be shown. Since  
[…] the “riddle of existence” (is) […] no riddle like any other that might be 
dissolved into some other methods still available today. Rather, it is a riddle 
that is essentially without resolution. If it belongs to the conditions of 
suitability for a question that the possibility of an answer cannot be excluded 
on principle, then “the basic question” is, in this sense, at least “nonsensical”. 
(Birnbacher 1992, 135) 
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Metaphysical projects, for Wittgenstein, are “nonsense”, since they lead 
beyond the sphere of “meaningful statement”. However, this nonsense 
is, for many people, a highly meaningful nonsense that is to be respect-
ted; and, hence, metaphysics is not primarily a “nonsensical” chaos, but 
rather an attempt to domesticate that entity. Wittgenstein undertakes 
an enduring destruction of metaphysics, since after its fall, that is, the 
release from a “generality that is already to be assumed”, there is no lon-
ger any danger of falling back into it, given that the destruction of the 
dogma of generality “creates a situation of openness and also contributes 
to a tentative new order.” (Kroß 1999, 186).  
The question of sense is a basic characteristic of ethical questioning 
and also forms the basis of the desire for metaphysics. Wittgenstein 
shows, however, that ethics must not also be understood metaphysically. 
The “mystical” that Wittgenstein proposes as the ethics of the indivi-
dual is not a way of being but a life form. In that sense, it is false to claim, 
as some do, that Wittgenstein even intensifies the metaphysical inter-
pretation of ethics, by associating ethics with mystical and religious 
experiences. Neither mystics nor religion are based on a “generality that 
is already existing”, a viewpoint that is rather a criterion of metaphysics. 
In the following section, emphasis is on the link of religious and ethical 
language in Wittgenstein’s view. 
IV. Ethical Feeling and Religion 
Wittgenstein’s ethics is rooted in “wonder about existence”, in the fas-
cination “that something exists at all.” An ethical feeling results out of 
the wonder of being-in-the-world that is equally the basis of religion 
and aesthetics that also emerge from the mystical that manifests itself in 
a world-view sub specie aeternitatis. In the diaries, the following entry 
occurs: “The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and 
the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the con-
nexion between art and ethics.” (NB, 7.10.16) The connection of ethics, 
religion and aesthetics is especially striking in Wittgenstein’s work. 
Each element is based on the experience of an event that cannot be 
articulated in the form of logical-empirical propositions. Rather, it is an 
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event of mystical character, in the sense of an observation of the world 
following from outside and, as a result, leading to a change of perspec-
tive on the world. 
Ethics and religion are attempts to draw a sense out of life and they are 
nothing other than answers to the “astonishment about the existence of 
the world”. In this context, it is understandable that individuals lend 
meaning to their being in the world, by claiming to know their action 
as ethically considered and often being able to understand their exis-
tence as part of a religious whole. For Wittgenstein, this is nothing more 
than “significant” nonsense, even if it is to be respected. Neither ethics 
nor religion requires language for belief, since neither can be rejected as 
“true” or “false”. They are expressions of a striving for meaning, a 
hope for the experience of an event that shows itself-in-the-world in 
the form of mystical knowledge. The knowledge lies, namely, in the 
event that can exclusively be perceived as an unspeakable power of the 
mystical. It could also be said with Wittgenstein that we can name this 
“[...] meaning of life, that is, the meaning of the world […] God.” (NB, 
11.6.16) Such mystical experiences must necessarily be experienced by 
the self, for “propositions about God, good and evil, the meaning of 
life etc. are false propositions and these themes therefore point to the 
sphere that cannot be put into words, just like all propositions that 
show no facts.” (Weiberg 1998, 45) Statements about God and religion 
therefore lose every meaning that they cannot convey in words. The 
meaning of belief is not discredited in that way, for “How things are in 
the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God 
does not reveal himself in the world.” (TLP 6.432) 
The rule of silence also holds true for ethics (as well as aesthetics), 
namely, the assertion of inexpressibility “in the limits of language that 
are the limits of our world”. Here, the religious aspect of ethics comes 
to light, for the definition of what we call God is one and the same as 
striving for an ethical life, for a meaning in life and in the world that 
manifests nothing other than a life in the sense of God. 
Yet how does an individual arrive at faith? Wittgenstein can imagine 
a number of possibilities: faith can be accepted through education. In 
this case, faith is only a part of what a child learns to believe, since “the 
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child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to 
these beliefs.” (OC, 144) It is also plausible that individuals are con-
vinced of the correctness of an intuition by simplicity or symmetry (cf. 
OC, 92). Furthermore, there is the conscious possibility of deciding for 
a particular system: 
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate 
commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s belief, it’s really a 
way of living, or a way of assessing life. (CV 1947, 64) 
This turn towards religion can be seen as synonymous with the turn to 
a world-view or a particular world image, since whatever is perceived 
as truth, after the decision, is independent of the system of values that 
one decides to support. For that reason, in any system of values, it is 
possible to see those respective foundations of the house on which one 
builds one’s convictions: “I have arrived at the rock bottom of my 
convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are 
carried by the whole house.” (OC, 248) 
Wittgenstein is not critical of faith, but rather of the attempt to justify 
faith scientifically. It should not be judged, whether someone believes in 
religious pictures and symbols or not, but an attempt to prove the exis-
tence of God by the means of reason appears dishonest. Shortly before 
his death, Wittgenstein writes: 
A proof of God’s existence ought really to be something by means of which 
one could convince oneself that God exists. But I think that what believers 
who have furnished such proof wanted to do is give their ‘belief’ an 
intellectual analysis and foundation, although they themselves would never 
have come to believe as a result of such proofs. (CV 1950, 85) 
To persuade others of the existence of God with proofs, as supplied by 
the Church and believers, is an attempt doomed to failure. In Wittgen-
stein’s view, this matter is known to Christianity, since it is based on 
“historical narratives”:  
Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) 
narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief 
appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, 
which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, 
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don’t take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! 
Make a quite different place in your life for it.—There is nothing paradoxical 
about that! (CV 1937, 32) 
Wittgenstein’s thought on religion and ethics are in stark contrast to 
the world-view of science. They have quite different modes of thought, 
whose foundations are neither to be justified nor reasoned. Whoever 
develops an ethical feeling or accepts a faith no longer needs an answer 
for this, since he has already reached the foundation of his faith. The 
foundation of faith or ethics is a system of values that cannot be 
questioned, since they are either recognized as “true” or not. Wittgen-
stein writes: “At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is 
not founded.” (OC, 253) 
For Wittgenstein, truth is not the primary aspect, but rather “truthful-
ness”—truthfulness in the attempt to give meaning to individual life. 
Above all, that is a question of personal style, because ethics can be 
judged as little as truthfulness, although it remains the basis of the mea-
ning that an individual desires in life. Here, Wittgenstein also sees a 
consensus of ethical striving with the Christian religion: “I believe that 
one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all use-
less. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.)” 
(CV 1946, 53) 
The language itself suggests that the validity of ethics and religion is 
worthy of generalization, yet that also obscures the fact that it cannot 
be found in propositional statements. By contrast, it is worth remem-
bering: 
[…] that there is not a religious language-game shaping the entire discourse 
of a religious individual, but a religious world-view that forms the basis of 
his thought and action in a way that cannot be questioned. The differences 
between religious and non-religious individuals manifest themselves primari-
ly not in language, but in an individual life. (Weiberg 1998, 141) 
In the broadest sense, neither ethics nor religion can be distinguished, 
since both disciplines exclusively fall within the realm of human action. 
However, Wittgenstein differentiates between both these forms of 
faith, by lending different weight to each. Religious faith represents a 
The Paradox of Ethics — ‘It leaves everything as it is.’ 
19 
higher level of belief, whilst ethical faith can be described as on a lower 
level. The difference that Wittgenstein means to summarize is: 
[…] that in the first case, the individual feels ill and in the second case merely 
imperfect. In each case, quite different attitudes to life are outlined, as far as 
dealing with problems are concerned and with the independent initiatives of 
individuals. Whoever feels imperfect regards himself as guilty of this state, he 
fights with his own self, with his own character (like Wittgenstein), whereas 
a religious believer, who feels ill, is not conscious of any guilt. He puts his 
fate in good faith into the hands of his doctor—that is, God—and hopes for 
recovery (from outside)—and in that way he behaves more passively. 
(Weiberg 1998, 163f.) 
Whoever takes Wittgenstein seriously, is hardly likely to be engaged in 
theology or the philosophy of religion, but either to limit his research 
to the description of a religious language-game, or “only” to believe. 
The search for truth in the sense of an academic discipline is, after its 
destruction, nonsensical. Such a quest cannot resolve the problems. Only 
religion as activity can help individuals in the search for the meaning of 
life. Religion, like philosophy, cannot be treated as a doctrine, since it 
is a practice, whose significance can only be shown, by acting accor-
dingly. By contrast to ethics, in its constant relation to the quest for the 
meaning of life, the religious believer achieves certainty for himself, 
since “[t]o believe in a God means to understand the question about the 
meaning of life. [...] To believe in God means to see that life has a mea-
ning.” (NB, 8.7.16) All doubts on the problem of life are ruled out for 
the believer and faith is so strong that he no longer tries to question or 
prove his faith with the aid of reason. In this case, what holds true of 
the deeply devout believer is that “[r]eligion is, as it were, the calm bot-
tom of the sea at its deepest point, which remains calm however high 
the waves on the surface may be.” (CV 1946, 53) 
V. At the End of Ethics — A New Beginning 
The idea of ethics is related, in philosophy, to the attempt to establish a 
canon of norms and methods to vouchsafe the universality of ethical 
concepts and rules for action. These norms and methods are directed at 
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ethical questions, conflicts and problems of inter-subjective behaviour 
that are to be resolved by ethics, by developing these issues into a nor-
mative science of generally legitimate propositions. This theory of ethics 
can be seen as a science of the justification of ethical decisions, so to 
speak, a theory that is identical to the teleology of academic ethics that 
often makes Being, in a circular way, out of the principle of duty and, 
ultimately, derives again that principle from an artificially constructed 
Being. Universalist ethics is, for that reason, largely characterized by 
the disappearance of the distinction between Being and a sense of moral 
obligation. 
Briefly to recapitulate the central results of “these hikes through 
Wittgenstein’s ethics”: For Wittgenstein, it makes sense neither to search 
for an ultimate legitimacy to ethics, nor to seek guarantees for truth as a 
theory of knowledge. Ethical theories for human actions must remain, 
for him, without a final justification. In place of an ultimate truth, Witt-
genstein posits, as a philosopher of pluralism, a multiplicity of life 
forms and ways of behaviour that each contains their respective truth. 
Ethical knowledge can only be achieved in the mystical sense. Accor-
ding to Wittgenstein, philosophical ethics cannot promote the meaning 
of life, but only working on one’s individual self, that is to say, the 
quest for an ethical sense is an instrument of the individual’s being-in-
the-world and the desire to find meaning in life. As this meaning can 
only be found through one’s own ethical will and, in turn, its expression 
lies in the experience of the perception of the mystical, every kind of 
ethical belief rests on a mystical experience of showing. This question 
of meaning is not only a basic feature of ethical, but also metaphysical 
enquiry. Yet Wittgenstein supplies examples to demonstrate that the 
ethical impulse cannot nearly be considered as metaphysical, since “the 
mystical” element that is proposed as the ethics of the individual is not 
a way of being, but a life form. It is a praxeological concept, whose goal 
is to understand philosophy as action. Furthermore, Wittgenstein shows 
that ethics and religion can only occur through the sphere of action and 
the doctrine of faith is to be rejected just as a philosophical doctrine of 
ethics, for neither can solve problems. Religion as activity may help indi-
viduals in their quest to find a purpose in life. By contrast to the ethical 
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explorer, who is constantly searching for the meaning of life, the reli-
gious believer has already achieved certainty in relation to the meaning 
of life. 
What is the outcome for the traditional conception of ethics as an 
academic tradition? Wittgenstein adopts quite a different idea than phi-
losophers of what ethics can and should achieve. He intended not to 
solve the problems of philosophy, but those of his own existence. Hence, 
he lays no claim to ethics in the sense of a scientific theory. As a philo-
sophical discipline, ethics can achieve nothing, since every attempt to 
create an objective and absolute claim is bound to fail for problems that 
cannot be summarized in a general theory. As a result, Wittgenstein 
strove, by his praxeological individual ethics, for a complete destruction 
of scientific ethics: “I think it is definitely important to put an end to all 
the claptrap about ethics—whether intuitive knowledge exists, whether 
values exist, whether the good is definable.“ (WVC, 68f.) Yet his goal 
was not to forbid such statements, but to expose their “valuelessness” 
and to achieve a paradigmatic change in the picture of ethics. 
The meaning of ethics for human life cannot be derived from any 
scientific basis. It cannot be treated as a research field that can be ma-
stered by scientific methods. Ethics cannot be reduced to a system of 
propositions that establish a code for the phenomena of our world in 
analogy to scientific theories. Ethics is essentially bound to the “sub-
ject/self”. An external, “higher being”, or an “absolute judge” does not 
exist in Wittgenstein’s view. Any experience of value is always the ex-
perience of the individual subject.  
The question of ethics is always a subjective one about the right way 
of living. That can only be determined by each individual on his own 
account and, for that reason, ethics cannot be stated in universally valid 
terms. The discipline can neither be a science, nor act as a doctrine of the 
right way of living, since it is more or less beyond the bounds of 
theory, not within the range of generally valid maxims or moral ap-
peals. Wittgenstein therefore avoids formulating a binding doctrine of 
virtue and duty, as well as falling foul to an ethical relativism, by deve-
loping an alternative philosophy as activity, as it were, the praxeological 
concept of an individual “clarification” of life conduct. Hence, the ethical 
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will directing ethical conduct as a practice in relation to the question-
able nature of life is turned into the decisive factor of a successful life. 
The individual world-view determines ethics and every individual 
must answer the question of the right conduct, without concrete refe-
rence to philosophical theories, in accordance with his own life situation; 
and that questioning is not an exception, but rather the continual activity 
that endures throughout his lifetime. Ethics can therefore be seen as 
working through things for the individual self. At the close of the Trac-
tatus, this view is stated more explicitly: 
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer. (TLP 6.52) 
In the belief that he had solved the scientific problem of ethics, Witt-
genstein also recognized that little is achieved by solving that philoso-
phical problem. The actual ethical matter, the meaning of one’s own 
existence, is to be confronted anew, as though it were a perpetuum mo-
bile, time and again. In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein already 
noted: “And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in 
which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is 
achieved when these problems are solved.” The problem of life remains 
the individual’s permanent search for ethical sense. 
The question of sense in life can never be answered. In a way, life is 
the quest for an ethical meaning and life is in toto also the answer. 
Ethics is a doing, the achievement of individual principles and the con-
stant reflection of the self-consciousness of “subject/self” and the 
individual view of the world. How we live shows who we are. The prac-
tice of searching for a meaning of life is ethical action in itself. In the 
diaries this thought is described as: “The will is an attitude of the subject 
to the world. [...] The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is 
the action itself.” (NB, 4.11.16) Action cannot be ethically judged, since 
it presents the self-elected life form of a person that cannot require 
justification. The fact that others’ actions may not be judged ethically 
by Wittgenstein’s viewpoints may be unsatisfactory. Yet academic 
philosophy cannot offer more, since as Wittgenstein aptly commented: 
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Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in 
the end only describe it. 
For it cannot give it any foundation either. 
It leaves everything as it is. (PI §124). 
 
Translated by Suzanne Kirkbright 
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“There are, indeed, things 
that cannot be put into words.” (TLP 6.522) 
Wittgenstein’s Ethics of Showing  
Dieter Mersch 
Es gibt nichts Gutes, außer man tut es.  
Erich Kästner 
I.  
Bertrand Russell is attributed with an anecdote that originates from the 
time, before World War One, of his friendship with Wittgenstein. In a 
state of extreme agitation, Wittgenstein was said to have come to Russell 
one night and paced up and down the room in silence. Russell asked him: 
“Wittgenstein, do you think about logic, or about your sins?” “About 
both!” was his reply (cf. McGuinness 1989a, 48). Evidently, the prob-
lems of logic and ethics meant the same to him. As with two sides of 
the same coin, when every attempt to influence one side also brings 
about a change of the other, Wittgenstein promised himself just as much 
an answer from the solution of logical questions as ethical ones.1 Two 
puzzling remarks from the Tractatus make the connection clear: “Logic 
is transcendental.” (TLP 6.13) And: “Ethics is transcendental.” (TLP 
6.421) The first remark is preceded by: “Logic is not a body of doctrine, 
but a mirror-image of the world.” (TLP 6.13); the second by: “The 
sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything 
is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value 
exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.” (TLP 6.41) The 
latter remark, in turn, implies the conclusion: “So too it is impossible 
                                          
1 Cf. McGuinness’s answers in Mersch 1991, 85f. 
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for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing 
that is higher.” (TLP 6.42) Furthermore, a no less erratic diary entry from 
the time of the production of the Tractatus records: “Ethics does not 
treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.” 
(NB, 24.7.16) And one week later, like an exclamation follows: “But this 
is really in some sense deeply mysterious!” (NB, 30.7.16)  
II. 
Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the 
quintessence of the puzzle is mainly a book about logic, about the rela-
tionship of sentence, thought and fact, as well as about basic propositions 
and the isomorphology of language and world. Nevertheless, the slim 
volume of discontinuous propositions is challenging; and Wittgenstein 
claimed that the truth of these propositions was “unassailable and defini-
tive” and “to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the 
problems”— though admittedly adding: “And if I am not mistaken in 
this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work consists 
is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” 
(TLP Preface) Even if insights into ethics only emerge sporadically and 
in a few dark passages at the end, the Tractatus is indeed a perfect mirror 
of both sides of the coin. In a letter to friend and publisher Ludwig von 
Ficker, Wittgenstein had written that the meaning of his book was ac-
tually an ethical one: 
I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are 
not in it, which, however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key 
for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which 
is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second 
part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, 
by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be 
delimited in this way. (LvF, 94-95) 
That means: the work cannot be interpreted by its explicit content. In 
proportion as it contains what can be said by logical analysis, it also 
implies the inexpressible. It refers it to the place of a silence. It already 
belongs as a gesture to what it remains silent about: on silence, its basis, 
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only silence remains. For that reason, the second part does not contain 
an unwritten “secret doctrine”; rather, it is simultaneously evident in 
what is written: it marks what, according to the final sentence, “we can-
not speak about” (TLP 7), that is, it compels an ascetic of speech. Witt-
genstein calls it “the mystical” (TLP 6.522). The ethical belongs to it. 
The thought is as striking as it is strange: the essential factor withdraws 
itself; the ethical begins at the point where language falls silent. The 
restriction of speech by logical analysis of language encloses what cannot 
be said like an inner space, lending it its shape; everything else, like 
ethics, but also metaphysics and aesthetics, is excluded, not submitting 
to the structure of science. They are not discursive, not propositional, 
therefore, they also contain no knowledge, no statements, no definitions 
to be decided upon. In this sense, it is claimed that the Tractatus sets a 
limit of thought, or rather: a limit of the linguistic “expression of 
thoughts”. The limit is drawn inside language, as a boundary for what-
ever makes sense by the predicative proposition, whilst everything else 
belongs to the field of nonsense (TLP 4.113, 4.116, 5.61). And Wittgen-
stein says about the predicative proposition, which he understands as an 
image, as an injective function (TLP 3.318) that he has the facts as argu-
ment that, in turn, can be judged by yes-no-standpoints: “A propo-
sition is a picture of reality.” (TLP 4.01) “A proposition must restrict 
reality to two alternatives: yes or no.” (TLP 4.023) “To understand a 
proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.” (TLP 4.024) 
Thus, what can be sensibly expressed coincides with whatever can be 
expressed in true and false propositions: “The general form of a propo-
sition is: This is how things stand.” (TLP 4.5) Accordingly, Wittgenstein 
only allows scientific speech to be valid (cf. TLP 6.53). It is isomorphic 
to the possible world order. Therefore, language is encircled by what is 
logical as the possible, just as the world is encircled by the logical: 
“Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.” 
(TLP 5.61) 
By contrast, the nonsensical refers to whatever cannot exist in true-
false disjunctions, whatever does not attribute meaning to the signs 
within a proposition, whatever consequently has no object that it refers 
to. If the meaning of two propositions lies in its “agreement and dis-
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agreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of 
affairs” (TLP 4.2), then the nonsensical or aporetic speech does not 
permit such a decision; it stays in the realm of the systematically 
undecidable. It is not a question of forbidding such talk, but certainly 
of identifying its undecidability and hence its “valuelessness”. Not 
only metaphysical statements fall into that category, insofar as they do 
not refer to states of affairs, but also all totalizing discourses, like 
speaking about logic, about language—or the propositions of the Trac-
tatus itself. Hence, it is also stated: “Logic is transcendental” (TLP 6.13) 
as equally “Ethics is transcendental” (TLP 6.421), or “My propositions 
serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical […]” (TLP 6.54). For the 
transcendental nature of logic lies in the fact that it is “prior to every 
experience—that something is so” (TLP 5.552), as with the transcenden-
tal nature of ethics that the significance of anything existing at all must 
lie beyond the world. Logic must assume existence as a precondition 
that admittedly withdraws from experience; ethics must assume the sense 
of existence that, in turn, cannot be expressed: “It is clear that ethics 
cannot be put into words.” (TLP 6.421) Ultimately, the nonsensical na-
ture of such statements is described as a vehicle, in order that “when he 
has used them—as steps” it is possible to climb beyond them. The 
individual “must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the 
world aright.” (TLP 6.54) 
Nevertheless, as the “Logico-Philosophical Treatise” itself hardly 
leads in this way ad absurdum, the nonsensical per se proves equally less 
excluded. Rather, it fulfils its function in showing. That does not mean 
that the nonsensical shows itself in every case: there are infringements 
of syntax or semantics that have no reference or indicative character 
whatsoever; and yet, there is something that can be expressed as equally 
as shown (cf. Mersch 1999). It might be said that the region of the 
nonsensical—not of the senselessness that is exclusively reserved for 
logical syntax, tautology and contradiction2—is further to be subdivi-
ded into areas of the merely confused and: of outlawing whatever is 
                                          
2 Cf. TLP 3.33, 4.0312, 4.461–4.462, 6.1, 6.11, 6.2. 
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shown. The latter refers to the “whole” of logic, language and world. 
These aspects—such as language and world—cannot be spoken about in 
meaningful propositions, at best, by way of them, by betraying some-
thing that remains removed from their propositional content: 
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent 
what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent 
it—logical form.  
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to 
station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say 
outside the world. […] What expresses itself in language, we cannot express 
by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They 
display it. (TLP 4.12f.) 
In other words, language exposes its structure, as equally as its reaction 
to the world in speaking and every attempt to say this as well inevitably 
becomes entangled in a paradox. Hence, “what can be shown, cannot be 
said.” (TLP 4.1212) 
At the same time, there is a characteristic difference between the show-
ing of language through speech and the showing of the world in it. By 
virtue of speaking, language reveals how it is: it reveals as a practice its 
form; whilst from the fact of the world in which language is spoken 
about, it emerges that language is: it discloses its existence. Hence, it is 
said of logic that it “is prior to the question ‘How?’, not prior to the 
question ‘What?’” (TLP 5.552), whilst the existence of the world pre-
cedes its question “what”: “It is not how things are in the world that is 
mystical, but that it exists.” (TLP 6.44) Since language only deals with 
the states of affairs in the world in true-false oppositions, a statement 
about its existence would not be a sensible proposition; it would refuse 
the expressible, insofar as the question “that” names no possible fact: 
“Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something 
can be the case?” (TLP 5.5542). Instead, the facticity of “that” signifies 
the inexpressible: it shows itself at the point where language does not 
reach: it lights up in silence as happening (Ereignis). For that reason, 
Wittgenstein also speaks of “wonder”: the expression is also in the 1914–
1916 diaries, as later in the Lecture on Ethics that was held between 
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1929 and 1930 (NB, 20.10.16; LE, 8). In the Tractatus, it is connected as 
such with the mystical (cf. TLP 6.44, 6.522). What is not meant is: the 
inexpressible exists as a transcendent or inexplicable entity beyond lan-
guage; rather, it happens first and foremost from the opposition between 
what can be said and shown. The mystical represents the place where 
every definition of the question of “what” or “how” ceases and only the 
pure presence in relation to absence manifests itself. That means: the 
world, as the self-revealing entity, “is” only in the event.3 
Nevertheless, in view of the showing of language and world, it is still 
necessary to distinguish between positive and negative mystics. The 
former refers to the indefinite nature of logical form, the latter to the 
mystery of existence. Positive mysticism includes the Tractatus in terms 
of content and its impossible undertaking to speak about something on 
which silence is the only possibility. In every sense, the perspective of 
the expressible is, in that case, a prior condition. That is determined by 
the postulate of the isomorphology of thought, speech and world that, 
in turn, gives preference to an ontology of logic, in order, ultimately, to 
progress to the inexpressibility of its structure. Accordingly, at the 
close of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein again returns, in mirror-like fashion, 
to the beginning: since the proposition “shows how things stand if it is 
true”, but it “says that they do so stand”; whereas in the proposition 
that the world is, by the act of speaking about it, it is shown how it is 
(cf. TLP 4.022, 6.44). The proposition therefore speaks about some-
thing, yet not “about its own speaking”. A later insight corresponds to 
that proposition, insofar as language blocks its reflection as much as its 
totalizing.4 “What is spoken can only be explained in language, and so 
in this sense language itself cannot be explained.” That is the gist of an 
                                          
3 The expression “event” or “happening” (Ereignis) implies that the distinction 
between what can be said and not said is not accessible: it is not a constructive 
effect of a discourse: it happens. It is therefore also not, as Derrida and J. Butler 
meanwhile seem to infer, marked arbitrarily and, by that, not transferable. 
4 In his 1975 dialogue with a Japanese, Heidegger calls, with good reason, his 
dialogue “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache”—a conversation of (von), not 
“about” (über) language. 
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analogous remark from Philosophical Grammar that anticipates Witt-
genstein’s late philosophy: “Language must speak for itself.”5 According 
to that idea, there is no exhaustible philosophy of language that might 
not essentially reduce it—a consequence that Wittgenstein ultimately 
drew in his merely “exemplary” proceedings of the Philosophical In-
vestigations by the fact that he no longer speculated “about” the question 
of the “what” and the “that” of language and nor “about” the difference 
of saying and showing. Rather, he allowed these aspects to flow into 
the method of description itself, by only demonstrating partial language-
games as “critical models of comparison” that explain themselves by 
example (PI §23; PG, 61-63.) It can therefore be said: the Investigations 
no longer proceed logically, but in an explanatory fashion; language, or 
to be more exact: a plurality of language-games shows itself by its use; it 
fulfils itself in the act of performance. By contrast, the “that” of reality 
can only appear where language falls silent: “I am only describing lan-
guage, not explaining anything.” (PG, 66) 
On the other hand, negative mystics already reaches into that sphere 
of the inexpressible that for Wittgenstein coincides in the same measure 
with the exclusion of metaphysics, as with the ethical and the aesthetic 
dimension. In the Tractatus, no corresponding mention is made of them 
anywhere, not even in the form of speech, of the absence of speech. 
However, their essential indifference is not only a symptom of their in-
expressibility, but above all, of that sound, with which they themselves 
touch the secret of existence. Admittedly, only a vague “feeling” an-
nounces that “experience par excellence” (cf. TLP 6.45; LE, 8). It is 
shielded from silence like a taboo: “God does not reveal himself in the 
world.” (TLP 6.432)6 
                                          
5 PG, 40. That the difference between saying and showing is a sign of the 
continuity of the early and late philosophy, so that it is plausible to take this sign 
as pointing to the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is also studied by Watzka 
2000, 23f. 
6 “How things are in the world is God”, is the context of an unnumbered remark 
form the time of writing the Tractatus; [cf. TLP Critical Edition, 255]. In this 




Meanwhile, the 1914–1916 diaries as well as the 1932–37 Lecture on 
Ethics and parallel notes from 1929–30 by Waismann of the Vienna 
Circle contain a series of references that give a deeper insight into what 
is meant.7 The reflections contain a loose collection of thoughts on the 
will, death, as well as the “meaning of life” and “the whole of the 
world” that extend beyond the cryptic propositions in the Tractatus 
and allow them to be deciphered. The consistent link of ethics, aesthetics 
and religion is especially noteworthy. The Tractatus already postulates 
their connection with the brief remark: “It is clear that ethics cannot be 
put into words. […] (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)” 
(TLP 6.421) The suggested connection endures at least until the 1930s 
and probably forms one of the basic positions of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. Thus, almost fifteen years later, it is stated in the Lecture 
on Ethics: “Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider 
sense, in a sense in fact which includes what I believe to be the most 
essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics.” (LE, 4) Moreover, 
the following entry is noted in the diaries: “The work of art is the object 
seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub 
specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between art and ethics.” (NB, 
7.10.16) 
Spinoza’s doctrine echoes in the formulation. The view sub specie 
aeternis is a step out of reality; the viewpoint of eternity warns of depar-
ture from the world.8 That also means: the ethical as well as aesthetics 
do not refer to the existence or non-existence of facts, that is, to objects 
of science. Therefore, they are also not capable of being articulated in 
                                          
7 Cf. NB; LE ; WVC ; MT. In the war years, above all, the confrontation with 
death is decisive, just as the diary entries end with the definitive view that suicide 
is the original sin (NB, 10.1.17). See especially McGuinness 1988, 331ff., 349ff., 
who cites above all Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief, but also Lichtenberg and 
Schopenhauer, as references for Wittgenstein’s ethics. 
8 Spinoza 1996, (Ethics, V/P29 & P30) particularly highlights that to observe things 
according to the species of eternity means to see them, insofar as the Being of 
God incorporates their existence. 
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sentence form; 9 moreover, it is neither a case of establishing “laws” nor 
of justifying criteria or norms. Rather, the ethical and aesthetic dimen-
sions require a change of attitude. Time and again, Wittgenstein outlines 
the point that there is no transition from the logic of language to ethics 
or aesthetics, because they owe their existence to the break with dis-
course. They literally occupy the place—like religion10—of the Other of 
the discourse. Hence, it is disputed in the Lecture on Ethics whether a 
factual statement can “ever be, or imply, a judgement of absolute value”: 
even a book including all possible descriptions would still contain “no-
thing that we would call an ethical judgement or anything that would 
logically imply such a judgment.” (LE, 6) That also means: there can be 
no scientific ethics: “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural […]”. (LE, 
7) In this way, Wittgenstein not only says that the ethical falls out of 
the domain of the factual, hence leaving no conclusion from being to 
duty, but he refers the ethical principally into another context. In other 
words, there is no “translation” between the expressible and the inex-
pressible of the ethical or aesthetics, but only a “leap”—just as Heidegger 
said in Identity and Difference that the sentence makes a “sentence” in 
the sense of a “leap”.11 However, we only leap in an abyss, as is further 
stated, as long as the logos, that is, the predicative speech and therefore 
the perspective of the world are posited in the absolute sense, yet not, 
where “we leap and release ourselves” (Heidegger 1978, 20). 
One way of such a release, for Wittgenstein, lies in the proposition 
“[t]o view the world sub specie aeterni […] as a whole—a limited whole.” 
(TLP 6.45) To keep something as “whole” demands an outside view, as 
especially characteristic for aesthetic experience. This is impossible as 
                                          
9 “Aboutness” in this sense is not a definition of art, as Arthur Danto states in The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. 
10 In the 1930–32 and 1936–37 diaries, it is stated in this sense: “Believing begins 
with belief. One must begin with belief; from words no belief follows.” (MT 
27.1.37) 
11 Note: Heidegger’s usage rests on a word play on the ambiguity of the German 
“Satz” and “Sprung” that can mean ‘sentence’ or the initiation of a ‘leap’ or ‘jump’. 
This word play is difficult to render in English. 
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view, because it would presume taking the “whole” into view from a 
position that is already vacated, that is, remaining beyond the limit first 
conditioning its possibility. However, it is decisive that such a guaran-
tee transforms the view,12 pointing to whatever presently conceals itself 
within the whole: the uniqueness of its existence. The following remark 
was entered in the diary under the date, 11 June 1916: 
I know that this world exists. 
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field. 
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning. 
That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it. 
That life is the world. (NB, 11.6.16) 
In that entry, the connection between ethics and aesthetics is also expres-
sed: the view sub specie aeternis draws attention to the sudden nature of 
the “that”. It is the experience of the moment (Augen-blick). The pers-
pective of eternity and timelessness of the moment mean the same thing:  
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, 
then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. (TLP 6.4311)13  
The distinction of the moment is, then, not a typical characteristic 
for mysticism; 14 rather, conversely, it springs forth from the moment 
of the “turn”, which secures the existence of the world as ekstasis, as 
presence. That is to say it coincides with the experience of the ekstatic 
present itself, the moment that “leaps forward” that again does not 
describe a point in time, but out of time. Its experience implies abstaining 
from the world—and therefore from the whole. The unity of aesthetics 
with the ethical emerges from the interconnection of contemplation and 
                                          
12 The diary contains the following remark about this: “The usual way of looking 
at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie 
aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as back-
ground.” (NB, 7.10.16) 
13 Similar remarks are also in NB, 8.7.16 and MT 15.2.[37]. 
14 McGuinness suggests as one feature of mystics the turn to the moment, cf. 
1989b, 167, 180f. 
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abstinence. The mystical forms its bridge: “Feeling the world as a limi-
ted whole—it is this that is mystical.” (TLP 6.45) 
The thought is Schopenhauerian in kind, 15 since after all, Schopen-
hauer’s philosophy left manifold traces in the diaries. At the same time, 
Wittgenstein gives it a different emphasis. The Otherness of the dis-
course, the dimension of inexpressibility that is adopted in the ethical is 
founded in the extraordinary experience of existence as presence: Witt-
genstein introduces in his Lecture on Ethics the fact “that […] I wonder 
at the existence of the world” alongside feelings of being “absolutely safe” 
and “guilt” as “the first and foremost example” for what he understands 
by “absolute value” (LE, 8). “That” something “is” this “only fright-
ful” in Heidegger’s words (Heidegger 1984, 2) forms, in this sense, the 
basis of ethical feeling. It classically coincides with the beginning of 
meta-physics itself. That something is and not nothing— therein lies 
proof, for Leibniz, of that original trouble that Schopenhauer also des-
cribed as the “balance wheel” and as “the watch of metaphysics that 
never runs down”. (Schopenhauer, II, 171). Together with the Platonic-
Aristotelian “wonder” (thaumazein) that forms the “basic attitude” 
(Heidegger) of thinking as such.16 For Schelling, that attitude stands at 
the beginning of all philosophy: appearance of that transcendence that 
points to the “unpremeditated” and “the inexpressible” that, as in 
Wittgenstein’s work, is similarly claimed only to “show” itself.17  
Aesthetically, the experiences of aura and the sublime correspond to 
that attitude. Both are related. Whilst the world is guaranteed in its 
entirety, the view also emerges as more alien. Becoming estranged by 
destroying every measure in intuition is, for Kant, one feature of the 
sublime that also confronts the present with the aspect of presence 
itself.18 In precisely this way, Benjamin exemplified the phenomenon 
of aura in the paradigm of the answering look: “deriving the concept of 
aura as a projection of a social experience amongst humans in nature: the 
                                          
15 Schopenhauer I, 178ff. (§ 34). Similar ideas are in Kierkegaard (1952, 49). 
16 Heidegger speaks especially of a fundamental question of metaphysics, cf. 1965, 42. 
17 Schelling 1977, 167; TLP 6.522. 
18 Cf. Kant 1957, 328ff. (A 73ff.). 
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look is requited.” (Benjamin 1974a, 670). The passage illuminates the 
non-intentional character of the aura-like entity; what plays a role is not 
the seeing that sees something, but the reciprocal experience of a “look” 
as “moment” (Augen-blick).19 That something looks back emphasizes 
its ulterior nature and therefore opens the play of near and far that, for 
Benjamin, belongs to the constituent features of the concept of aura: 
The trace is the appearance of nearness, as far away as might be what is left 
behind. The aura is the appearance of a distance, as near as might be what it 
calls to mind. We grasp the matter in the trace; in the aura it overcomes us.20 
In that sense, the implication is the inaccessibility of existence as the 
uniqueness of a presence, which affords distance, as blindingly and self-
effacingly in proportion as it captivates the look. It enables us, too, to 
draw nearer to the “face” of reality, its irreducible otherness that first and 
foremost lies in the fact that it “is”. Wittgenstein means nothing else 
when he speaks of a view sub specie aeternis: “Aesthetically, the miracle 
is that the world exists. That what exists does exist.” (NB, 20.10.16) 
When Wittgenstein therefore speaks of ethics, he rises to something 
that moves him, aura-like, as the “wonder of existence.” The function of 
aesthetics in that process is as a point of entry and metaphor, just as the 
religious dimension increasingly functions later.21  
                                          
19 The word “look” includes the reciprocal effect of looking and being looked 
upon. Benjamin refers in this context to Paul Valéry: “The things which I see 
also see me just as I see them.” Cf. Benjamin, “Analecta”, 193, 194, quoted after 
Benjamin 1974a, 647. A note from the context of the Lehre vom Ähnlichen also 
underlines: “Are there earthly beings as well as things looking down from the 
stars? Are they actually first beginning to look from the sky above? Are the 
celestial bodies with their faraway look the primeval phenomenon of aura?” 
(Benjamin, 1977, 958) 
20 Benjamin, 1982, 560. In a letter to Adorno of 9.12.38, the opposition of trace and 
aura is expressly developed as the key to comprehending the concept of aura. 
Cf. Benjamin 1974b, 1102. 
21 Religious uncertainties almost exclusively dominate in the 1930–32 and 1936–37 
diaries. Cf. also Watzka 2000, 82ff. However, from the start, the reflections on 
the Tractatus accompany religious — and not just aesthetic — metaphors. More-
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Both correspond to each other, describing related experiences. They 
find their most intense roots in the uncanny nature of the “that”. 
Brecht already objected to Benjamin that a mystical aspect is implied in 
accordance with the aura (cf. Brecht 1974, 14). The theological element 
is certainly the most consistent motif in Benjamin’s thought, as a 
fragment of the Passagenwerk underlines: “My thought relates to 
theology as blotting paper to ink. It is completely absorbed by it.”22 
However, Wittgenstein, who felt himself moved by a similar sentiment, 
tries not to articulate it in the first place: existence itself, as well as the 
“whole”, cannot be put into words. At best, what can be shown is the 
“that” and, specifically, in the form of an indirect indication, as a 
reference to the riddle. To put it into a word anyway, to express it, as 
stated in the Lecture on Ethics, is to approach “misusing language”. 
(LE, 8) Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes that religion, as previously 
ethics and aesthetics, reaches a “quite different level” that can neither 
be affirmed nor negated; rather, it proves to be “significant nonsense”, 
that ultimately requires no words. 23  The expression “significant 
nonsense” evokes, by its paradoxically unfathomable nature, the whole 
ambiguity between impossible speech and necessary transgression. 
What counts is not to reject it per se, but certainly to support it with 
asceticism. Wherever it still speaks, its function lies in the allusion. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein rejects its status as a simile, as similes 
would still stand “for something”, they would project a picture in place 
of the missing concept and, in that way, they would emphasize its omis-
sion: “And yet I am reluctant to use these images & expressions. Above 
all these are not similes, of course. For what can be said by way of a 
                                          
over, the reconstruction of the aesthetic from the dimension of aura already 
reveals its genuinely religious meaning. 
22 Benjamin 1982, 588; Mosès 1994, 92, also emphasizes that the mystical or theo-
logical motif is the “most constant” in Benjamin’s work. 
23 In the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious 
Belief, Wittgenstein also professes on religious faith: “I can’t say. I can’t contra-
dict that person.” (LC, 55) That statement is no evidence of his own faith, even 




simile, that can also be said without a simile.”24 It is therefore not a 
question of rhyming or poetry; and yet, this qualification does not auto-
matically exclude any metaphorical meaning. Rather, the word “misuse” 
refers to a “catechrestic process”. Mystical speech is always accomplished 
in catachreses; its function lies in the expression of otherness. By causing 
a break in language, or by opening a gap, they turn around at the limit of 
what can be put into words and in this way they open themselves to 
the inexpressible. In the list of rhetorical tropes, it is a case of figures of 
“deconstruction”: they find their fulfilment in breaking the discourse. 
That explains their incomprehensibility, absurdity, or systematically 
nonsensical character. In one of Wittgenstein’s lectures on religion from 
around 1938, it is noted: “Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: 
not only that it is not reasonable, but that it is folly. Not only is it not 
reasonable, but it doesn’t pretend to be.”25  The religious catachresis 
crosses the zone of “falling silent”, yet in such a way that what is actually 
said no longer matters. Rather, something has to occur at its limits, 
which is no longer saying, but which allows experience to happen.26 
In this respect, on several occasions, Wittgenstein returns in the Con-
versations with the Vienna Circle to the Kierkegaardian motif of a futile 
“running against the paradox” (cf. Kierkegaard 1952, 42f.):  
                                          
24 MT 15.2.[37]; cf. also LE, 9. 
25 LC, 58; likewise, it is stated in the Conversations with the Vienna Circle: “Is tal-
king essential to religion? I can well imagine a religion in which there are no 
doctrinal propositions, in which there is no talking. Obviously the essence of 
religion cannot have anything to do with the fact that there is talking. […] Thus 
it also does not matter at all if the words used are true or false or nonsense.” 
(WVC, 117) The triplet of true, false or nonsensical even emerges from a logic of 
triple value, the failure to acknowledge the tertium non datur. 
26 The 1930–32 and 1936–37 diaries contain the following reference: “A sentence 
can appear absurd & the absurdity at its surface be engulfed by the depth which 
as it were lies behind it. This can be applied to the thought concerning the 
resurrection of the dead & to other thoughts linked to it.” (MT 1.12.[36]) 
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Astonishment about the fact of the world. Every attempt at expression leads 
to nonsense. Man has the tendency to thrust against the limits of language. 
This thrust points to ethics (cf. WVC, 6827).28 
Nevertheless, this failure does not seal their inferiority, but on the con-
trary, the Lecture on Ethics concludes with a special tribute: 
I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I 
had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was 
their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the 
world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency 
and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or 
Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against 
the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs 
from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the ab-
solute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not 
add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the 
human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would 
not for my life ridicule it. (LE, 12) 
IV. 
Wittgenstein’s ethics is rooted in the experience of the “that” of exis-
tence as existence. It includes the emptiest thing qua language because 
no proposition leads to it and no proposition results from it; and yet, it 
contains qua experience the utmost sense of being shattered, the confron-
tation with the ultimate riddle. The discord is revealing: the ethical 
feeling emerges from this sense of being shattered; it means being 
moved by the puzzling nature of the “that”, yet without saying anything 
sensible about it and that also means without the ability to instruct. For 
that reason, for Wittgenstein, ethics emerges from a turn to the mystery 
                                          
27 Note: suggested translation. 
28 Cf. further WVC, 69: “In ethics, we are always making the attempt to say some-
thing that cannot be said, something that does not never will touch the essence of 




that is to be achieved in each individual case. That seems little, if any-
thing at all. The conclusion of the Tractatus seems to imply a similar 
message: 
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer. (TLP 6.52) 
And he adds: 
(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt 
that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what 
constituted that sense?) (TLP 6.521) 
In a curious way, nonetheless, the fragmentary remarks coincide in the 
concepts of the “mystical”, the “world as a whole”, as well as “life”, 
“sense” and “will”. Their relation that is yet to be deciphered relates to 
the ethical. Direct, ethical doctrines are to be distinguished from that 
dimension, or normative morals with their registers of directives for 
action, maxims and rules, or what Hegel called ‘ethical life’. Rather, 
Wittgenstein’s primary concern is the search for the basis and foun-
dations of another form of reference. It is to be described by the unity 
of mystics, wholeness of the world and sense of life. Again, the way 
that their connection is created and takes effect as a unified link con-
firms their specific “relation”—their religio. It might be said: Wittgen-
stein’s ethics is mystical, his mystics an ethical one. 
(i) Wholeness of the world: once again, the starting and key point is 
represented by reference to the elementary experience of “that”, through 
which the world as a whole is placed in question. The whole identifies 
no order, no structure of things; rather, it permits the questionable 
nature of existence to emerge. Hence, what appears relevant for the 
ethical is not the whole “as” a whole entity, as a kind of “care” about the 
world, not even what it “is” or “might be”, neither its poverty nor vul-
nerability, as conversely, its hopes, a utopian perspective, but merely the 
fact “that” there is a world and that in it, as stated in the Tractatus, 
“everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen” (TLP 
6.41). In this respect, the puzzle of its existence does not pose a que-
stion that could be answered with a proposition, a plan or a task, but 
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rather it touches the “intangible” itself. By exposing the uncanny aspect 
of the “that”, Wittgenstein thinks from intangibility. In particular, he 
explains its ethical significance by the example of Christianity. In the 
Conversations with the Vienna Circle, he answers Waismann’s question 
whether the being of the world is connected with the ethical: 
Men have felt a connection here and have expressed it in this way: God the 
Father created the world, while God the Son […] is the ethical. That men 
have first divided the Godhead and then united it, points to there being a 
connection here. (WVC, 118) 
The passage explains the connection in religious metaphors. The intan-
gibility of existence is associated with the name of “God”, where the 
metaphor “God the Father” stands for the creation itself, 29 the “Son” 
for humility in view of the contingence of what cannot be done—the 
simple fact that it is not within man’s powers to determine the “that” in 
the sense of being (ex-sistere). It names what is given in the sense of 
absolute gift.30 Wittgenstein dresses it up with a theological meaning; yet 
this meaning contains an ethical dimension, because the ethical first 
emerges from the relationship in the sense of a relation to the gift. 
(ii) Sense of life: the meaning of “sense” is also elucidated from this 
standpoint. The expression that seems to include a totality raises the 
suspicion of an objectification. However, the guarantee of intangibility 
implies looking back to the individual life. Wherever the “that” is 
placed in question, the issue of “sense” also arises—not as an issue of 
expression or interpretation, but as the puzzle-like figure of that 
experience of contingency from which the groundlessness and instabi-
lity of the whole becomes evident. To put the matter differently: it is 
                                          
29 In this sense, a diary entry of 15.3.37 reads: “But formerly you saw God perhaps 
in the creation, that is, in the world.” (MT 15.3.[37]). 
30 Here, “gift” is not to be understood as though “something” would be that 
would “give” it —that would be theology. In this regard, it is illuminating that, 
from the outset, Heidegger connected the “ontological difference” between 
Being and being (Seiendes) to the difference between “It is […]” and “There is 
[…]”, where “There is Being” and “There is being” (Seiendes) are used with a 
different meaning; cf. Heidegger 1962, 212, 214, 226ff., 230, 316. 
Dieter Mersch 
42 
the abyss of reality that again succeeds in opening a perspective on the 
sense of life as an “absolute value”. For that reason, in the early diaries, 
“world” and “life” are identified with one another in the first place: 
“The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.” 
(NB, 11.6.16) Whilst the connection appears implausible, in so far as 
the guarantee of groundlessness of “that” should also evoke a parallel 
experience of “absolute value”, thus, implying the “most nihilistic” as 
the “highest”; and nonetheless, the implication warns of the insight that 
we hold in our hand the “world as a whole” as little as we ourselves. 
Rather, together with the world, we are given up to the realm of intangi-
bility. From that position alone is life to succeed in winning sensitivity 
for the “sense”. 
As a result, what “sense” means is shown by the turn to the intan-
gible realm: “To believe in a God means to understand the question 
about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the 
facts of the world are not the end of the matter.” (NB, 8.7.16) In that 
case, “sense” would be a category that can be interpreted first and 
foremost from the perspective of the puzzle of the whole. That is to 
say it refuses an intentional construction. Sense is neither produced as 
discourse, nor guaranteed by acts of symbolizing or understanding; 
rather, we must commit ourselves in each case with our entire life. You 
could say: the intangibility of the “that” denotes that outrage that we 
can neither overcome nor answer, because we always answered it with 
our life. Life is finite from the location of its mystery: it draws its special 
value, its meaning from that location. In that case, sense would be an 
event that is awakened by the puzzle of “that” and passes through it, 
responding to it. Then ethics refers to the way of responsiveness as the 
form of a practice. It is rooted in the absolute difference that conditions 
the unavoidable character of answering. The sense of the ethical 
emerges from this unavoidability. To think and act from the intangible, 
that is, from that location that we cannot reach, from what we cannot 
even name or distinguish—ultimately that represents Wittgenstein’s 
self-imposed burden, which he was never to overcome in a lifetime. 
In this way, the connection of logic and ethics, as noted in the 
introduction, can be more deeply appreciated. All thought emerges as 
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ethical, and wherever that is not so, there would be no thought worthy 
of respect. For that reason, philosophy means for Wittgenstein a self-
imposed restriction. To him, it meant to work at himself. That holds 
true both for the initial silence accompanying the discontinuity of the 
Tractatus,31 as well as for the later quietist phase, the feeling of the 
inviolability, the singularity of phenomena, whose inexpressible dignity 
could only be “felt”. These elements embody a respect towards the 
world and towards being that resembles the attitude of “serenity”: 
“[Philosophy] leaves everything as it is.” (PI §124) 
(iii) Life as will: to give life a sense means, as follows, to connect it with 
the experience of the intangible, or it means to answer a basic feeling of 
“powerlessness”. The intangible is confronted with what is not made, 
what cannot be made; correspondingly, an entry in the diaries reads as 
follows: “I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am 
completely powerless.” (NB, 11.6.16) And further: “The world is given 
me, i.e. my will enters into the world completely from outside as into 
something that is already there. […] That is why we have the feeling of 
being dependent on an alien will.” (NB, 8.7.16). That is matched by the 
proposition from the Tractatus: “The world is independent of my 
will.” (TLP 6.373) However, precisely in this idea lies an original 
responsibility (Ver-Antwortung). This does not refer to whatever can 
be taken on board in each case; it does not mean accepting the con-
sequences of a particular action, rather the actual sense of responsibility 
lies in the necessity of the responsiveness. I cannot avoid answering the 
state (Ge-Gebenheit) of the whole; rather, with the “gift” of being a 
sphere of human power is appealed to that is absolutely withdrawn. 
                                          
31 We approach a point that ought to be more closely investigated. The propo-
sitions of the Tractatus stand monolithically next to one another, like additions 
that are placed; they reject both a discursive structure as well as a nexus of 
causality. That means that the textual ordering of the Tractatus consists of 
discontinuous sections; it operates itself according to the difference of saying and 




Wittgenstein also describes this as “the higher”.32 Ethics finds its relation 
from this behaviour to the withdrawal. It means the way of being as a 
whole and of behaving towards the whole. It therefore does not 
tolerate any instruction; it reaches fulfilment in doing. It is a practice: it 
shows itself. 
On that basis, the ethical has its function in the performative. Here, 
performance means fulfilment in life. During the phase of the Trac-
tatus, Wittgenstein characterizes this under the direct influence of 
Schopenhauer as “will”. The Schopenhauerian will is, however, not 
subjectively weighted; it refers to the act as such, beyond all categories 
of the subject. It corresponds in that sense to the ekstasis of the “that” 
(quod) in Schelling’s work, which is one reason why Schopenhauer—
and later also Nietzsche—interprets will in an ekstatic sense. He disco-
vers it as an absolute entity that posits a hypothetical principle beyond 
the sphere of mere subjectivity that is also effective in nature: as “blind, 
irresistible urge” or “blind impulse, an obscure, dull urge, remote from 
all direct knowableness”.33 By that token, it is a striving that wants 
nothing other than its own life. It is the “will to life” that wills nothing 
other than to will, that is, “will to will”. Hence, it also does not know 
what it wants, but still only wills itself and by willing also brings forth 
itself. “The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the source of all those 
phenomena. Its self-knowledge and its affirmation or denial that is then 
decided on, is the only event in-itself.” (Schopenhauer I, 184). Every 
special expression of the will of the subject finds its relation from that 
context: as “law” of a groundless, aimless and senseless desire that 
permeates all being.  
Wittgenstein adopts this conception, yet in such a way as “will” 
names the whole of the act of completion. He no longer characterizes a 
metaphysical principle, but the “attitude of the subject to the world.” 
(NB, 4.11.16) Will thus becomes a position that first brings life qua 
practice into relation with the questionable nature of being. In this 
                                           
32 Here lies the meaning of such cryptic references as: “Propositions can express 
nothing that is higher.” (TLP 6.42) 
33 Schopenhauer, I, 275 (§ 54) and I, 149 (§ 27). 
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respect, the ethical can neither be represented nor confirmed by a 
theory nor by thinking; it is solely in acting.34 For that reason, it is 
stated in the preface to the Tractatus, as previously mentioned, that this 
shows how “little is achieved when these problems are solved”: the 
emphasis of the formulation lies, in this instance, not on an intended 
response to philosophical questions, but in doing as the other, un-
spoken side of the treatise. The practice that is thus in parenthesis is not 
absorbed in the sum of single references; they are not determined by 
the individual actions of a subject, but they emerge from the “whole of 
life” as an indefinite entity. 35  In other words, it is constituted in 
relation to the intangible, to the absolute “gift” and to the location that 
this assumes in the individual’s action (and thought). This gift can 
never be excluded, because even the act of non-relating would be a 
form of relationship. Hence, it is also stated: “Things acquire ‘signifi-
cance’ only through their relation to my will.” (NB, 15.10.16). Only by 
that means do the world and things achieve “sense”. That means: the 
manner in which the puzzle of existence appears or conceals itself, how 
it is accepted or rejected, worshipped or rejected, enjoyed or annihilated, 
is first and foremost an anchor for what is called the ethical. It is also 
influenced by the way in which the secret appears in our life and finds 
a place. Everything depends on how the intangible affects us, how we 
                                          
34 The connection is an immediate one in the diaries: “The act of will is not the 
cause of the action but is the action itself. One cannot will without acting. […] 
willing is acting.” (NB, 4.11.16); and likewise further, MT 6.5.[31]: “But an ethical 
proposition is a personal act. Not a statement of fact.” 
35 Here, he borrows a similar figure that was also leading for Heidegger: the whole 
of life emerges in this case from the ‘anticipation of death’ (Vorlauf zum Tod), 
cf. Heidegger 1962, 255ff. (§§ 52, 53). What is meant is no fatalistic turn towards 
death, but rather the opposite, thinking from the “approach” of the future of 
death as an intangible entity, which only life and its understanding refers to its 
necessary “finitude”. That death is the future of every “mortal” implies that its 
undeniable approach originally provokes a standpoint on morality and therefore 
on the whole of life. The relation between “striving for the absolute” and depar-
ting “to battle through life toward death” is also to be found in Wittgenstein’s 
later diaries, MT 20.2.[37]. 
Dieter Mersch 
46 
invite it into our doing, whether we try to give it dignity, or to refuse it 
to ourselves. In this sense, the modesty, reserve or unwillingness, 
which Wittgenstein prefers from the beginning, can also be viewed as a 
gesture of answering. 
Now it is also clear why Wittgenstein, as already suggested at the 
outset, calls the ethical as well as the logical “transcendental”, that is, a 
“condition of the world” (NB, 24.7.16) The structure of facts, the 
grammar of language and the form of answering, as well as acting, 
correspond to each other. That is the essential insight of his late 
philosophy: as we see the world, so too, we live, we view things and 
speak of them: 
I mean: mustn’t it then have implications for your life, commit you to 
something? […] After all, another life shifts completely different images into 
the foreground, necessitates completely different images. […] That does not 
mean that through the other life one will necessarily change one’s opinions. 
But if one lives differently, one speaks differently. With a new life, one 
learns new language games. (MT 15.3.[37], 4.2.[37]) 
Thus, a correspondence of language, life and being is professed. The 
ethical contains nothing else: the practice of answering the withdrawal 
of the world is reflected in the “interweaving” of life forms with language--
games and produces that unified “band” (religio) that, in a real sense, 
amounts to its religious nature and ethics of silence. This continues 
until the late philosophy and is a further proof of the continuity of 
Wittgenstein’s style of thinking. 
V. 
Wittgenstein’s notes on ethics are of a very personal and private nature. 
They carefully avoid every hint of preaching or pathos. It is notable 
that no general value judgment is made anywhere, no instruction 
emerges, not even any general recommendations are expressed. At the 
most, subjective standpoints are defended, partly construed in secret 
code or supported by reprimands and the rigour of self-imposed 
accusations in the style of a confession. Wittgenstein possesses no 
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ethics in an actual sense, no practical philosophy, no moral message. 
He neither formulates obligations nor does he assert duties, virtues or 
universal commands. Also, Wittgenstein does not demand anything of 
others, yet he demands all the more of himself. In that respect, his 
rhapsodic reflections develop their relevance only in self-reference to 
his own life. With respect to his Lecture on Ethics held at the same 
time, he expressly notes in the Conversations with the Vienna Circle: 
At the end of my lecture on ethics I spoke in the first person: I think that 
this is something very essential. Here there is nothing to be stated any more; 
all I can do is to step forth as an individual and speak in the first person. 
(WVC, 117)36 
To what extent is that so? In the first instance it is the case because the 
ethical in Wittgenstein’s work has nothing to do with general concepts 
or justifications, but solely with subjective life forms; and further, 
because these aspects derive from how, in each case, they unmistakably 
relate to the puzzle of existence, to the experience of the “that”. The 
restriction to the first person perspective therefore indicates that we are 
alone with our answer in the ethical sphere—and that this answer must 
always turn out to be different, unique. 
That does not mean: the structure of answering is a matter of 
individual choice. If Wittgenstein occasionally allows himself an inspi-
ration from Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard, it is neither a philosophy of 
life nor existentialism. Rather, the special tone of his writing is an 
indication of the concrete, historical crisis, the historical collapse and 
the dissolution of traditional ethics as well as traditional value systems 
in the inter-war period. Neither Christian faith nor the rational ethics 
of responsibility from the Enlightenment hold true—Wittgenstein is 
also at point zero of the ethical. In the groundlessness of devalued time, 
he strives to win back a root, a new sense of stability. He does this with 
his own radical approach. At the same time, he feels intensively the 
                                          
36 It is further stated: “[…] And here it is essential […] that I am speaking for 
myself.” (WVC, 118) 
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“ash of culture” 37 , the decline of the epoch and the loss of self-
anchorage like a rod through the centre of his personality. He suffers 
that process as an inner torment of the soul and a torturous feeling of 
guilt. At times, they carry the indelible face of despair: “Our age is 
really an age of the transvaluation of all values. (The procession of 
humankind turns a corner & what used to be the way up is now the 
way down etc.)”, he noted in October 1930 in his diary (MT 
22.[10.30]). And in 1945, shortly before the end of the war, he spoke of 
a new “darkness” (PI Preface): a catastrophe without healing. 
The only thing that then remains is to throw the weight of the 
individual person in the balance of time, to withstand its lack of healing 
power. In that case, Wittgenstein found solace during the 1914–1916 
war years, above all, in works of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, but also in 
Augustine and mystics like Angelus Silesius and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. They ultimately helped him to what he felt was his own, 
very personal answer to the riddle of life, which he in no way intended 
to recommend as exemplary: the attempt to bring himself and his own 
life “into the clear”, that is, into an equilibrium. For that reason, it 
could be said that Wittgenstein’s own project lies in the persistent 
striving for an identity as equilibrium. In the diaries, however, this 
balance is described as an agreement with aspects that suggest a 
conception of the whole (NB, 8.7.16). Such agreement appreciates the 
“dependence”; it avoids intervention, it lets “be”. The ethical position 
that Wittgenstein therefore achieved for himself then consisted of an 
attitude of balancing, of measure. However, just as there is lastly no 
criterion for the right balance, which is rather consistently under threat 
of falling to one side or the other, there is also no measure for the 
measure: this is shown. 
At the same time, a new paradox emerges in that respect, which 
Wittgenstein again preferred not to see in his entire approach and 
tendency: it excludes reading into his ethics more than merely a very 
private striving for integrity. Turning away from the world, refusal, 
                                          
37 MT 8.10.[30]. On the context of the history of ideas cf. also Janik and Toulmin 
1987; as well as my introduction, Mersch 1991, 24ff. 
“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.” 
49 
which first permits the attitude of non-intervention, is lastly rooted in 
the negation of the other. Therefore, in his solution lies a reversal and 
betrayal of what is precisely a constituent part of the ethical problem. 
Ethics beyond the question of alteriority remains blind; it forfeits, to 
think radically, its status as ethics. Ultimately, Wittgenstein was in 
default of an answer to this problem: his ethics of showing was solely 
restricted to the individual; it resigned to personal deed; for that 
reason, an answer to the individual “puzzles of life” also conditioned 
not answering the puzzle of others. 
 
Translated by Suzanne Kirkbright 
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‘If there is any value that does have value, it must lie 
outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the 
case.’ (Tractatus 6.41) 
Liam Hughes 
The above quotation is part of section 6.41 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 
which marks the beginning of a discussion of ethics and the mystical. 
In what follows, I shall try to understand and assess the idea that all 
that is of value lies outside the world, in terms of the Tractarian 
philosophy. I shall also use the Notebooks 1914-1916, where many of 
the key points are to be found in a more extended form. Given that the 
remarks on ethics in the Tractatus are of a piece with the rest of the 
philosophy expressed there, it is interesting to speculate on how much 
of it would be abandoned in the light of his later changed views on the 
nature of language. I devote the concluding paragraphs to such 
speculation. 
Wittgenstein’s ethical ideas are difficult to articulate for several 
reasons; they are difficult in their own right and the gnomic character 
of the expression adopted in the Tractatus does not help one. They are 
unlike what typically passes for discussion in ethics, and finally, not 
least, because Wittgenstein himself says they are inexpressible. Certainly, 
Wittgenstein never held a moral theory—indeed his efforts in this area 
were designed to put a stop to such theorising. When discussing 
Schlick’s book on ethics Fragen der Ethik Wittgenstein asks:  
Is value a particular state of mind? Or a form attaching to some data or other 
of consciousness? I would reply that whatever I was told I would reject and 
that not because the explanation was false but because it was an explanation.  
If I were told anything was a theory, I would say, No, no! That does not 
interest me. Even if this theory were true, it would not interest me—it 




The view expressed here is like a leitmotiv for Wittgenstein’s early 
views of ethics. Although the Tractatus is essentially concerned with 
the ethical, a point Wittgenstein insists on in the Preface of the book—
the sense of “the ethical” here is not straightforward. In a book on 
ethics one might expect to find discussion of how one should live one’s 
life (albeit couched in abstract terms), the goal of existence; what 
counts as valuable; how one can justify one course of behaviour over 
another; whether moral principles are generalisable and so on. 
Moreover, at a certain point the ethical views propounded will have to 
take account of the wider society and their impact on social and poli-
tical arrangements. One finds little of this in the Tractatus (Griffiths 
1976, 97). Wittgenstein’s concern there was quite different. He wanted 
to make clear the boundaries of what could intelligibly be said. To this 
end, approximately five-sixths of the book deals with questions of 
logic—how language relates to the world, how it is possible to say 
anything at all. It turns out that all that concerns value falls outside 
what can be said. However, there is an indication that though what is 
of value cannot be expressed, it is shown by for instance, the manner in 
which one lives one’s life—one’s attitude to suffering, adversity and 
especially one’s death. Value can also be revealed through the Arts—
music, drama and literature. 
I. 
What sense can we make of the claim that value lies outside the world? 
To understand this we need to grasp Wittgenstein’s rather special use 
of the word “world”. The Tractatus opens with: 
The world is all that is the case. 
The world is the totality of facts, not things. (TLP 1, 1.1) 
A proposition depicts a fact; it is a picture or model of reality. If we 
understand it we know that such and such is the case, if it is true—and 
not the case, if it is false. Just as notes on the stave of a musical score 
show how the piece of music is to be played—is a representation of the 
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music; similarly, the proposition shows its sense. If one can read music, 
theoretically, one can play an entirely new piece—it is a matter of 
understanding a system of musical notation. Likewise, if one under-
stands a language, one can comprehend an entirely new proposition. 
A proposition shows its sense.  
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And says that they do so 
stand. (TLP 4.022) 
Now, if we consider some moral injunction such as, “You should 
consider the feelings of others” or a more generalised statement like 
“Infidelity is wrong” we can see that these do not describe any state of 
affairs. They do not picture any fact and in short say nothing about the 
world. The same applies to judgements of aesthetic value—if we say, 
“This symphony is greater than that one” we may be able to support 
what we say by reference to form or structure; however, we will not be 
able to say in what the value of the music consists. Wittgenstein asks: 
What is valuable in a Beethoven sonata? The sequence of notes? No, it is 
only one sequence among many, after all. (WVC, 116). 
Indeed as with ethics Wittgenstein will countenance no explanation of 
the value of a piece of music—it does not reside in the composition or 
the circumstances surrounding its creation—the thoughts, feeling and 
emotions of the composer. One can follow Wittgenstein’s reasoning 
here, once one accepts his terms. The judgements above do not say 
anything about the world—they do not say how things are. They in 
fact introduce another level—a notion of comparison and difference, 
grading and appraisal—an idea of hierarchy. But “All propositions are 
of equal value.” (TLP 6.4) and later on “Propositions can express 
nothing that is higher” (TLP 6.42). “It is clear that ethics cannot be put 
into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and 
the same)” (TLP 6.421). 
What status therefore do these ethical and aesthetic judgements 
have? On Wittgenstein’s account we are, strictly speaking saying 
nothing when we say such things. They are nonsensical. They attempt 
to say what can only be shown. It is important to understand that these 
statements are not nonsensical in the sense of being gibberish—like ill-
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formed sentences or nonsense verse. The fact that they are nonsensical 
does not mean that they do not have a point. If we consider the 
propositions of logic, which are really tautologies and therefore have 
no content they say nothing but none the less, show something about 
the world. They represent the scaffolding of the world. It is important 
to bear this in mind, lest we conclude that all that is important can be 
spoken about and thus ethics, religion, metaphysics and whatever else 
that cannot be caught within the scientific net may be consigned to the 
philosophical scrap-heap. Paul Engelmann remarks: 
Positivism holds—and this is its essence—that what we can speak about is 
all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all 
that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view we must be 
silent about. (Engelmann 1967, 97) 
This is clearly a cautionary reminder of the extent to which 
Wittgenstein’s work was misunderstood by his contemporaries. For 
instance, those who used the Tractatus to attack metaphysics, but in so 
doing entirely missed the ethical point of the book (cf. Janik and 
Toulmin 1973, 169). It is essential that one treats the Tractatus as a 
complete philosophy which deals with logic; revealing its character and 
drawing a boundary around what can be said, thus making manifest the 
ethical which must remain unsaid. The hope is that if one thinks 
through this, one is able to view the world aright and hence the ethical 
function of the book will be achieved. 
“Logic is transcendental” (TLP 6.13). It is important to bear in mind 
that logic is not part of the world. It is rather, a transcendental 
requirement of our being able to speak about it. To bring out part of 
this point consider the examples: “This rose is red” and “Venus is the 
morning star” the logic of the word “is”, is different in each case—that 
of “predication” and “identity”, respectively (cf. Mounce, 1981, 28). 
One can know this only from knowing what it makes sense to say and 
this is determined by the logic of the language. Logic determines all 
possibilities but for this reason says nothing about the world. It shows 
itself as a kind of scaffolding necessary for the projection of meaning.  
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The method of projection is not expressed in what is said, but 
without it nothing could be said. So far we have noted the delimiting 
function of logic—it prescribes the sayable. Thus it is not part of the 
world. The ethical too stands outside the world, which consists of 
facts. So like logic, ethics is transcendental. Given that we can make 
sense of the role of logic—to what extent can we elucidate the ethical? 
It is a characterisation of the ethical to say that what is of value is 
inexpressible, though a minimal one. Fortunately, Wittgenstein does 
provide further comment in scattered remarks, which elaborates on 
that skeletal account. 
II. 
One of the consequences of all propositions being equal (being on the 
same level) is that agency as we ordinarily understand it disappears. 
The human being becomes simply part of the phenomena of the world. 
Qua phenomena, human occurrences are of no more significance than 
anything else that happens in this world; than the lives of beasts and 
insects, the falling of the leaves. Wittgenstein writes somewhat 
startlingly:  
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. (TLP 
5.631) 
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to 
include a report on my body and should have to say which parts were 
subordinate to my will, and which were not etc., this being a method of 
isolating the subject, or rather showing that in an important sense there 
is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book. 
Peter Winch in his essay on  “Wittgenstein’s Treatment of the Will” 
(1972, 112) quite rightly notes tensions and inconsistencies in the 
passage above. If I distinguish those occurrences which are under the 
control of my will from those which are not, in order to isolate the 
subject (i.e. the distinction between being able to walk at will, and for 
instance, perspiring, which is not under our control), then it seems odd 
to say that this shows that in an important sense there is no subject. If 
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one accepts that there is no subject then one seems forced to draw the 
conclusion that the distinction in the first place was bogus and those 
things I do, and what happens to me, are on the same level. Perhaps, 
Wittgenstein is struck by the fact that there is a similarity between 
what we do and what merely happens to us. It might be said that our 
capacities are just natural historical facts about us, about which we 
have neither choice nor control. In any case, it is not the thinking “I” 
or the “I” of psychology that is the subject of ethical attributes but the 
metaphysical “I”. This raises the question what the metaphysical “I” is, 
which I hope will emerge as we develop Wittgenstein’s account. The 
metaphysical “I” is synonymous with some notion (as yet unclear) of 
the will. Thus, Wittgenstein writes: “[I know] […]that my will penetrates 
the world. That my will is good or evil.” (NB, 11.6.16) For Wittgen-
stein, “There are two godheads: the world and my independent I” (NB, 
8.7.16). The task of life is bringing these two into harmony; but how is 
this to be done? One can find something of an existential slant in 
Wittgenstein’s way of thinking about the problem. We are thrown into 
the world—a world that exists before our coming, a world which is 
alien and in which we are powerless. “That is why we have the feeling 
of being dependent on an alien will.” (NB, 8.7.16). At this point in his 
reflections Wittgenstein seems to equate the world with God or at least 
the sense of the world. “How things stand, is God. God is how things 
stand.” “What we are dependent on we call God.” (NB, 1.8.16) Later 
he makes the point explicitly: “In this sense God would simply be fate, 
or what is the same thing; The world which is independent of our 
will.” (NB, 8.7.16). This equation between God and the world helps 
make some of Wittgenstein’s remarks clearer (cf. Zemach, 1966). The 
good life is quite simply the happy life. Being happy or unhappy 
depends on my attitude to the world. The world itself is neither good 
nor evil—such valuations arise with the entry into the world of the 
metaphysical “I”. I must therefore simply accept everything that 
happens in the world—including the misery of the world because I 
cannot change it. The good will then is related to acceptance. Our free-
dom exists in recognising and embracing necessity. We can however 
make ourselves independent of fate. In a revealing sentence, Wittgen-
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stein writes: “I can only make myself independent of the world—and 
so in a sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings.” 
(NB, 11.6.16)  
One could see such renunciation as submitting to the will of God. In 
practical terms, having a good will is not a simple matter. We must live 
a life of knowledge, which is the only bulwark against the misery of the 
world. We need to be indifferent to “the amenities of the world” and if 
we are blessed by having them, we should treat them as “so many 
graces of fate” (NB, 13.8.16). We become involved in unhappiness once 
we wish things were otherwise. This arises when one thinks one can 
alter or affect the world—that one’s desires or wishes are somehow 
privileged. Anything that we do, including what we think, is just part 
of the world and happens not as a result of our will but according to 
the laws of nature. Given that the only necessity is logical necessity and 
there is no logical necessity between will and world there can be no 
guarantee that what we will is successful. Even “the supposed physical 
connection” (which Wittgenstein regards as a fiction) is not something 
in our power to will (cf. NB, 5.7.16).  
To understand our position in the world we must view it sub specie 
aeternitatis—as a limited whole. That is to say, no part of the world is 
privileged or preferred to another. No state of affairs is more desirable 
than another. It is not the way the world is that is important but that it 
is. When one views the world in this way, no longer in the midst of 
things; the psychological agent becomes no more important than any 
other part of the world. One’s life is seen as if from beyond. Looking at 
the world in this way changes nothing in the world—it does not alter 
the facts. However, in another sense, one’s whole world changes—it is 
the sense of the world that changes: “The world of the happy man is 
different from that of the unhappy man.” (TLP 6.43) 
Wherein does the difference lie? It cannot be just in respect of their 
happiness or unhappiness. Neither can it reside in the fact that one has 
a happy optimistic disposition while the other tends to have a depres-
sive one. These would be merely features of the world with which we 
must come to terms. Rather, their lives are different in that the happy 
person is in agreement with the world. This means being free from fear 
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and hope—the two great enemies of happiness. Both of these propel 
the subject into the future with all its uncertainties. Thus by being 
afraid of what will or may happen at some future date, we destroy our 
present happiness through anxiety; while hoping for something in 
particular to happen may wreak havoc on our equilibrium if the hope 
is unfulfilled. “To be happy one must live in the present. For life in the 
present there is no death” (NB, 8.7.16). Under such circumstances one 
is “in agreement with that alien will, on which I am dependent. That is 
to say I am doing the will of God” (NB, 8.7.16). Thus, “[f]ear in the 
face of death is the best sign of a false i.e. a bad life” (NB, 8.7.16). On 
this view, being happy—though it certainly seems to involve content-
ment—is also to do with understanding life and having a certain view 
of our position in the world. 
Here clearly it is the metaphysical “I” which looks at the world in 
this way, since the “I” of psychology is itself just part of the world. 
The metaphysical “I” is not part of the world or in the world, but a 
boundary of it (NB, 2.8.16). This “I” is transcendental, it is not an 
object. “I objectively confront every object. But not the I.” And later 
on in the same entry: “The I makes its appearance in philosophy 
through the world’s being my world.” (NB, 12.8.16). It is my world in 
that for there to be a world there must be consciousness. It is to this 
centre of consciousness, which we call the “I” that the world is given. 
Hence, it is my world. 
One of several difficult points in understanding Wittgenstein’s 
ethics—is how something outside the world can be the subject of 
ethical attributes and related to this how in the absence of agency the 
issue of ethical attributes can arise at all. One might say that if one does 
not act, a fortiori, one does not act well or badly. Moreover, we judge 
people by what they do and not merely by their attitude to life, though 
what they do will obviously be informed by it. I do not think that 
Wittgenstein can answer this difficulty within the framework of his 
Tractarian philosophy. I shall however, explore one line of explana-
tion, which ultimately fails though I hope in an instructive manner. 
One needs to distinguish the person or subject qua phenomenon in 
the world, the subject of psychology and the metaphysical subject. The 
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former disappears like the Humean self becoming, not as in Hume’s 
work, impressions, but part of the world of facts. However, the subject 
is not captured exhaustively in descriptions of its factual nature. The 
spiritual or metaphysical part lies in the life of knowledge, reflection 
and judgement. One has the feeling that Wittgenstein separates the fac-
tual nature of actions from their meaning or significance. Or perhaps, 
we can say that actions under a merely factual description have no 
significance. Objectively speaking they have no meaning. 
Accordingly, in his Lecture on Ethics written some years after the 
Tractatus but still very much in its spirit, he argues that any judgement 
of value that can be re-described in terms of factual propositions, is 
merely a relative judgement and belongs to the world. While those that 
could not be so described were true ethical propositions and expressed 
absolute value. Wittgenstein makes the point firstly, that the word 
“good” can be used in a relative and an absolute sense. If we say, “this 
is a good knife” we are saying that it serves its purpose well. Similarly, 
if we say, “X is a good runner” we can explain the sense of “good” by 
the use of other terms, such as “X can run a mile in such and such a 
time” (cf. LE, 6). 
So to come to Wittgenstein’s own example, he imagines someone 
saying of an other that he does not play tennis well, to which the other 
replies that he does not want to play any better. This would be the end 
of the matter and the critic might say; “Well, that’s all right then.” This 
judgement depends on what the individual wants. Consider the example 
where someone has told a preposterous lie and the critic says: “You’re 
behaving like a beast” and he says “I know but I don’t want to behave 
any better”, could he then say “Ah, then that’s all right.”? Certainly 
not; he would say “Well, you ought to want to behave better” (LE, 5). 
When we speak of what the critic “could” say here, we are drawing 
attention to a grammatical feature of such judgements—that is to say, 
we are drawing attention to what it makes sense to say in such cases (cf. 
Rhees 1970, 97). This is an absolute judgement and it cannot be 
couched in other terms. It is not relative to the individual’s wants. The 
grammar of the absolute or ethical judgements makes it impossible for 
them to be re-phrased in factual terms or explained in such terms. 
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Given, that ethical judgements are judgements of absolute value for 
Wittgenstein, one may ask; to whom or what are they attributable? The 
short answer is the metaphysical subject, but this requires explanation. 
Just as there two senses of subject—the psychological and the 
metaphysical, so there are two corresponding senses of “will”—though 
Wittgenstein is rather unclear about this. The ‘will’ which, belongs to 
the world, is presumably the will that we share with animals and the 
rest of nature. Part of the phenomenal world à la Schopenhauer. It 
encompasses all our psychological strivings, appetites, desires and 
actions considered as phenomenal events. Then, there is the ethical will, 
which seems to relate to the ordinary will in a similar way as the 
metaphysical subject relates to the psychological. Put simply, these 
pairs of distinctions are just different characterisations of the same 
thing. The metaphysical will or subject is that which endows meaning 
to actions and the world. 
Wittgenstein makes an important distinction between “wishing” and 
“willing”. Unlike “wishing” which may precede or accompany an 
action, “willing” is the action itself. He reaches this break-through 
(which pre-figures his discussion of the will in the Philosophical Inve-
stigations) towards the final entries in the Notebooks. But an action 
takes place in the world, so how does the ethical enter? Perhaps we can 
say that an action qua event in the world has no ethical character; 
however, the sense of the action namely, what it is I intend to do, does. 
Let us consider the example of cutting someone’s leg off—if the 
intention in this case is to save the person’s life, the moral character of 
the action will be different than if done from other motives, i.e. malice. 
Whichever motive or intention the agent has will not alter the 
“factuality” of what takes place. Thus the ethical will is the character of 
the action given by the intention of the agent. 
However, when we analyse such examples we realise that they will 
not do the job we require of them. What I want, or intend just 
collapses into the ordinary psychological notion of the will. Whenever 
one tries to draw the distinction, one ends up, either falling back into 
the ordinary and rejected notion of the will or evacuating the concept-
tion of the metaphysical will of sense. 
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In the Notebooks, we see Wittgenstein struggling with these difficul-
ties regarding just what role he can assign to the will. He is drawn to the 
idea that the phenomenal will—the will as commonly understood—
has some foothold on the world and has some connection with ethics. 
In the Tractatus, he presents a more clear-cut and decisive view. The 
notion of ethics there, is more or less forced on him by his concept of 
the will and world being radically divided—the former located outside 
the world and therefore can do no real work and the latter, which 
consists entirely of “facts”. The Lecture on Ethics shows an interesting 
departure from the austere pronouncements of the Tractatus and 
importantly, the beginning of the use of examples. These examples 
though not all serving the same function, throw light on the problems 
we have been examining.  
Like in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wants to show that what is most 
important in life—that which is of value—cannot be expressed. One 
example he uses of absolute value is the concept of “feeling absolutely 
safe”. But as he himself points out, one can only be safe from this or 
that under such and such circumstances. The idea of absolute safety no 
matter what happens, is not an intelligible one—so far as our language 
allows. There is a tendency in our nature to say such things, which 
Wittgenstein recognises and regards as worthy of respect. This tendency 
can be described as pushing against the boundaries of language. 
Analogies could be drawn with Socrates when he says “[…] no evil can 
happen to a good man either living or dead […]” (Plato 1970, 516). 
That a good man cannot be harmed uses a notion of “harm” that is not 
any ordinary one. Nothing that we normally regard as harm touches 
him. It expresses a particular attitude to adversity such that whatever 
happens his integrity will not be destroyed. Or again, the biblical 
reminder; “What does it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose 
his soul?” These remarks all point to an ethic that is not of this world 
(cf. Winch, 1972). 
When Wittgenstein speaks of wondering at the existence of the 
world he makes explicit a paradox with which we have been struggling. 
He asks how it is possible that something that is dateable, an expe-
rience, could have absolute value. In one way, he is tempted to reject 
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the idea as pure nonsense. However, he knows that he has had such 
experiences and that they are entirely real. He even tries to address the 
paradox by suggesting that another way of expressing his feeling is 
seeing the world as a miracle. This point is elaborated by his observing 
that if what we call a miracle were to occur, namely, something that has 
never been encountered before (a person spontaneously growing the 
head of a lion); once we began to reduce it to various facts and regarded 
it scientifically, then the miracle would vanish. Basically, he wants to 
emphasise that the world of ethics is incompatible with the world of 
facts and the scientific viewpoint. The idea that the ethical is not borne 
by the psychological subject is reiterated in a spirit reminiscent of an 
example that we have already discussed, when he remarks: 
If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with 
all its details physical and psychological the mere description of these facts 
will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder 
will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of 
a stone. (LE, 6)  
This seems quite a difficult position to sustain. For one thing, descri-
bing the act as murder introduces an ethical dimension. It points to an 
unlawful killing, which is not ethically neutral. Secondly, since it 
includes psychological detail e.g. about intention and motivation we 
are in a position to assess guilt to some extent. We know that some 
behaviour is under our control while other is not. Thus murdering 
someone is not at all, on the same level as the falling of a stone. If a 
murderer were to use such an analogy as his defence in court, he would 
be laughed to scorn. What exactly is Wittgenstein saying here? He is 
saying that there can be no ethical propositions, simpliciter. What 
people do from the point of view of their physical and psychological 
states is on precisely the same footing as, a stone falling, a change in the 
weather, fruit ripening or whatever. To examine the first point, let us 
agree with Wittgenstein that there will be no ethical propositions in 
such a description, still nothing precludes the appearance of recognis-
ably ethical thought and reflection in such a book. The murderer’s 
motivation may be revealed to us—he decides to commit murder to 
avenge a perceived wrong done to his family. He may see the killing as 
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an unpleasant duty he is called upon to perform. However, after the 
deed he sees things very differently and suffers intense remorse. He 
comes to realise that he should never have done such a thing and seeks 
punishment for his crime. (It should be noted that each of the italicised 
words involves ethical notions) Clearly, one does not have to look far 
to find books, which raise and treat such ethical issues, such as 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet or Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment. 
(Wittgenstein’s book ”The World as I found it” is something quite 
different). Whether or not one can find examples of ethical 
propositions in these works is beside the point, though I believe one 
can. The point is that if people did not live lives in which ethical 
matters were fundamental such books would not be the great works 
they are. And unless people lived such lives the concerns expressed 
there would be unintelligible. 
The second point is related to the above discussion and can be 
disposed of quickly. The idea that in this book (Wittgenstein’s) 
descriptions of psychological and physical states, which include human 
actions such as murder, could be on the same level as natural events is 
untenable. If someone were to write such a book as a kind of 
modernist experiment it would be unlike any book ever written. To 
put the point more strongly it would be scarcely intelligible because it 
would not describe anything that was recognisably human. Wittgen-
stein is committed to the view that the book in question could contain 
feelings of pain and rage. However, if these higher-order concepts are 
used as opposed to, for instance, purely scientific descriptions in 
physical or neurophysiological terms—these then bring with them a 
range of human reactions. For instance, reactions to the pain of the 
victim; questions about the appropriateness of the rage and to whom 
the rage was directed and so on. In other words, we are dealing with 
quite a different set of considerations from those, which would arise in 
connection with a natural occurrence. As noted above considering the 
actions of others as natural events is something that we cannot do, 
apart from in the most exceptional circumstances (cf. Strawson, 1974). 
Leaving these difficulties aside it is nonetheless true that the Lecture 
on Ethics shows important developments from the period of the 
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Notebooks and the Tractatus. There is the use of examples, which was 
to become an essential feature of his later works. We see Wittgenstein 
attempting to give expression to his ethical and religious experiences 
whereas to do so during the Tractatus period would have been seen as a 
kind of profanation of what we must pass over in silence (cf. Nieli, 
1987). As in the Tractatus he is looking for some essential feature, a 
commonality in these experiences which links them together. Two of 
his examples, namely, “the feeling of absolute safety” and “wondering 
at the existence of the world” he shows to be nonsense when analysed 
in terms of our normal concepts. They seem to function like similes, 
which however cannot be rephrased in literal terms. One of the 
examples, as we have seen, brings out a quite legitimate logical or 
grammatical difference between judgements of relative and absolute 
value. 
III.  
One feels the ethics of the Tractatus is the result of profound inner 
questing—an ethic of one individual trying to come to terms with the 
misery of life. It is an essentially inward-looking ethics, emanating as it 
does from an austere and rigorous view of language, with the world 
being the realm of facts. Given the further fact of the agent not being 
part of the world, it follows that ethical value can have no place there.  
If Wittgenstein were to write on ethics in the spirit of the Philoso-
phical Investigations, one would expect quite a different picture. The 
conception of the will and thus agency is different. A person knows 
what he intends to do without recourse to any evidence. I can tell 
someone that I am going to raise my arm in one minute and do it. 
Others know about my behaviour inductively. This has important 
implications for agency and responsibility. In the Tractatus there was 
only a problematic connection between what you wanted or willed and 
what happened. Given that there was no logical connection it seemed 
that the only connection there could be, was an inductive one. This 
meant that the resulting action was entirely contingent and one was, so 
to speak, at the mercy of fate. But the relation between “willing” and 
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“doing” is an internal one. The world is not independent of my will. I 
act in and on the world. What I do and fail to do makes a difference 
and it is not merely the attitude, which I have to it that matters. 
Just as the later Wittgenstein brought out how language was an 
essentially social phenomenon and not the property of any individual; 
so too ethical concern can only arise because of the existence of others. 
Language games emerge and develop with the social practices people 
engage in. In order to understand the various language games, inclu-
ding talk of right and wrong, we must understand the practices and 
forms of life in which these are embedded. Ethical and aesthetic 
judgements take place in particular historical circumstances. What may 
be a moral issue in one society may not be one in another. Or what 
may be a moral dilemma for one individual in a given society may not 
arise for someone else of the same society. To understand these ethical 
issues or in some cases to even understand them as ethical issues may 
require considerable background and filling out of the context. For 
these and other reasons, Wittgenstein would insist on the use of exam-
ples to elucidate such problems. 
However he would not have changed his view on the radical distinc-
tion between “fact” and “value” and that one could not derive an 
ethical conclusion from any factual argument. Again, on his view, the 
idea that a system of ethics, for instance, the Christian one, could be 
right or wrong, does not make sense, unless it means simply that one 
agrees with it or accepts it (cf. Rhees 1970, 101). Consequently, there 
could not be a science of ethics. Wittgenstein rejects what goes with 
this, the generalisability of ethical judgements, and when he spoke 
about ethics, he spoke in the first person and he considered this to be 
essential (cf. WVC, 117). 
Finally, placing value outside the world or “passing over it in silence” 
are not options that are available to us. It is only because people think 
and talk about ethical matters—make judgements regarding the right-
ness or otherwise of actions, that we have any conception of excellence 
and perfection. If morality did not affect our daily lives, have an impact 
on our world; it could not be an issue in some later life or other realm. 
Wittgenstein’s later writings help us see that if there is any value that 
Liam Hughes 
66 
does have value it must lie within what happens and the judgements we 
make on these. 
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Philosophy and Life 
Anja Weiberg 
To Ludwig Wittgenstein philosophy and life are inextricably linked, 
and ethical demands are made on both: the requirement for truthful-
ness in thought and action alike. According to Wittgenstein, truth-
fulness is the only means to prevent thought and life from becoming 
merely some artful trick, a Kunststück. To get an idea of Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of truthfulness, one first needs to go into various aspects 
of his later philosophy. Therefore, in the first part of this paper I will 
examine Wittgenstein’s understanding of terms such as world-picture, 
language, knowledge, reality, and truth. In the second part I intend to 
explain the importance of the concept of style, which in my opinion is 
central to Wittgenstein’s work, and will subsequently show how style 
provides the opportunity to avoid a relativistic position. Finally, in the 
third part I would like to outline possible requirements which may be 
expected of a philosophy after, and, in accordance with Wittgenstein. 
I. 
It was primarily in On Certainty that Ludwig Wittgenstein described 
terms like knowledge, reality, and truth to be dependent on a world-
picture, thus making them lose much of their claim to absolute right 
and turning them into relative terms embedded in cultural and social 
circumstances. It is the mark of a world-picture that it ultimately rests 
on the acceptance of certain unexamined propositions; propositions 
which become fixed in our thinking as early as the stage of primary 
language acquisition: 
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to 
these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that 
system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable 
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to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or 
convincing; it is rather held by what lies around it. (OC, 144) 
Certain propositions—those who constitute the foundations of our 
world-picture—are, as a rule, not called into question and are (pre-
cisely because they have not been acquired explicitly as something 
which cannot be questioned) difficult to doubt, if one can doubt them 
at all: “That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are 
as it were like hinges on which those turn.” (OC, 341) 
From this follows with regard to our knowledge that it cannot be 
objectified beyond our world-picture. Rather, certainty is the basis of 
our knowledge, since the foundations for this knowledge rest on the 
social acknowledgement of specific unexamined propositions: “‘We are 
quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of 
it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by 
science and education.” (OC, 298) The foundations of my world-
picture are too self-evident to be voiced or even questioned, which 
does not prove their rightness, however, because “[a]t the foundation 
of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded” (OC, 253). Our 
certainty regarding various things results not least from our answer to 
the question, whether doubt is a feasible option, and which consequences 
would follow our doubt: “From its seeming to me—or to everyone—
to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it 
can make sense to doubt it.” (OC, 2) Once we start to doubt the foun-
dations of our world-picture we are in danger of becoming unable to 
act. If I lost certainty in my being human, in the fact that there is my 
hand, that the world exists, etc., I would hardly be able to act at all. 
Wittgenstein connects those statements on the foundations of a 
world-picture time and again with the grammar of our language. In his 
Philosophical Investigations he elucidates the function of grammar in 
the following manner: “Grammar does not tell us how language must 
be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and-
such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way 
explains the use of signs.” (PI §496) Wittgenstein calls propositions, 
which deal with the foundations of our world-picture, grammatical  
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sentences or logical sentences (in order to describe a language-game) 
(cf. OC, 51, 56, 319). In contrast to empirical sentences, which we can 
test1 and which are actually tested quite often, grammatical sentences 
are those “which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empi-
rical propositions”, for we affirm them “without any special testing” 
(OC, 136; cf. OC, 88). Clearly it makes an enormous difference 
whether the articulated statement may be proven and argued about, or 
whether the proposition in question contains certainties which are 
never questioned, may not even reasonably be called into question, or, 
certainties which, once we doubt them, take us to the very limits of our 
ability to act.  
Propositions reach the status of a grammatical sentence simply by 
their being used in such a way within the frame of a world-picture and 
its connected language games. Whether a sentence takes on the role of 
an empirical sentence or a grammatical sentence cannot be verified by 
looking at it, but is dependent on the context of the respective language 
game. Not a specific characteristic of the sentence as such, but the 
question of its usage within a community and within a language-game 
is of relevance for its status. One of the examples Wittgenstein gives in 
this context is the statement “I know that I have two hands.” It is not 
common usage to verify the existence of one’s hands (it’s something 
one usually doesn’t even think about)—one takes them for granted. If, 
however, one stops being certain of their existence (i.e. because one 
doesn’t see them) one would at the same time abandon trust in the 
method of verification (i.e. looking at them). If, for example, I were to 
wake up tomorrow morning and, for reasons unknown, fail to see my 
hands, I would not doubt their existence but my eyesight. On the other 
hand, there are situations in which the sentence “I know that I have 
two hands.” makes perfect sense and can be used like an easily 
verifiable empirical sentence. Thus, for example, if someone has been 
operated on, and one is in doubt whether the operation involved an 
                                          
1 “Can” is used here in the sense that a grammatical sentence would lose its status 




amputation of the hands. If I phone that someone and he assures me of 
still having both hands, I won’t doubt him, since I assume that he has 
first-hand proof (i.e. that he has removed the bandages to take a look) 
(cf. OC, 23).  
We may thus sum up the distinction between empirical and 
grammatical propositions as follows: with empirical sentences we can 
claim knowledge, we can give grounds for this knowledge (in the sense 
that the arguments for our knowledge make it more certain), and error 
is an option. Concerning grammatical sentences we cannot talk of 
knowledge, our position is one of doubtlessness, for we exclude error 
and we cannot think of any grounds that would further our certainty: 
the proposition itself “is as sure […] for me as any grounds I could give 
for it” (OC, 111). 
Furthermore, the status of a proposition as empirical or grammatical 
is not fixed once and for all, neither are there just these two extremes of 
grammatical and empirical proposition—the transitions between them 
are fluid (cf. OC, 96). This dynamics is expressed especially clearly by 
the picture of the river bank, in which Wittgenstein begins to compare 
the foundations of a world-picture with mythology, from where he 
goes on to say: 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of 
thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters 
on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp 
division of the one from the other. (OC, 97) 
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no 
alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one 
place now in another gets washed away, or deposited. (OC, 99) 
Of course, within this way of looking at things, what we consider to be 
true is equally affected by our world-picture: “But I did not get my 
picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I 
have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.” (OC, 
94) According to Wittgenstein one has to come to the conclusion that 
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the word truth may be used in a number of ways and therefore restrict 
oneself to the description of those various uses.  
Asked about diverse theories of truth (the pragmatic theory, the 
theory of coherence, and that of correspondence) Wittgenstein gives as 
early as 1931/32 the following response:  
Philosophy is not a choice between different “theories”. It is wrong to say 
that there is any one theory of truth, for truth is not a concept. We can say 
that the word has at least three meanings; but it is mistaken to assume that 
any one of these theories can give the whole grammar of how we use the 
word; or to endeavour to fit into a single theory cases which do not seem to 
agree with it. (L, 75) 
If Wittgenstein denies at that time that truth is a term, his viewpoint 
has changed—in my opinion—by the time of his writing the 
Philosophical Investigations. Only insofar, however, as now his ideas 
concerning terms undergo a change within his conception of language-
games, a change apparent in this remark (intended to express a 
dissociation from Frege): 
One might say that the concept “game” is a concept with blurred edges.—
“But is a blurred concept a concept at all?”—Is an indistinct photograph a 
picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an 
indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what 
we need? (PI §71) 
In place of an exact definition with clear demarcations, one ought—
according to Wittgenstein—to be content with giving examples: 
One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way.—I do 
not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that 
common thing which I—for some reason—was unable to express; but that 
he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving 
examples is not an indirect means of explaining—in default of a better. For 
any general definition can be misunderstood too. [...] (PI §71) 
The above remark already hints at it: to abandon the attempt of sharply 
defining the boundaries of a word, is not to be seen as a sacrifice forced 
on one by circumstances or the lack of a better explanation: “If some-
one were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge it as the 
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one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. For I 
did not want to draw one at all.” (PI §76) Here one is immediately 
reminded of certain remarks from the Philosophical Investigations 
where Wittgenstein clearly denounces the search for the essence of 
language (cf. PI §65). In place of general explanations Wittgenstein 
proposes a deliberate reduction to descriptions, to giving examples and 
showing the (variety of) usage of words. 
If we take truth to be a term without sharp boundaries, and assert 
that the word truth is used with various meanings, moreover, that what 
we consider to be true rests on unexamined, even undoubted, foun-
dations of our world-picture, we will conclude that in respect to truth 
or falsity of propositions, Wittgenstein’s position consists in neither 
more nor less than in pointing at our ability to decide for or against a 
proposition: “Really ‘The proposition is either true or false’ only 
means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does 
not say what the ground for such a decision is like.” (OC, 200) It is 
thus only possible to talk of truth within certain limits: “I want to say: 
it’s not that on some points men know the truth with perfect certainty. 
No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude.” (OC, 404) In 
the end, the decisive moment is action itself: “Giving grounds, how-
ever, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not 
certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind 
of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game.” (OC, 204) 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein invents a number of situations 
showing us people who don’t share our certainties. Among others, 
there is the example of a meeting between George Edward Moore and 
a king who has been raised in the belief that the world originated at the 
very moment of his birth (cf. OC, 92). An example, which demon-
strates that there are not just those who share our picture of the world, 
people we would consider—hopefully just for a brief period—mad, if 
they started to doubt the longterm existence of our earth. There are the 
others, too, those who live in another world-picture with another, 
differing education. People who are not mad in the least, yet do not 
share all of our certainties. (One need not necessarily ponder the belief 
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in a longterm existence of our earth, it may be a less “grave” manner; 
see for example OC, 132: “Men have judged that a king can make rain; 
we say this contradicts all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes 
and the radio etc. are means for the closer contact of peoples and the 
spread of culture.”) 
The hope for the existence of objective characteristics to establish 
truth ought to be abandoned: “Very intelligent and well-educated 
people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it 
as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the 
former.” (OC, 336) Here we have the encounter of two people with 
differing world-pictures.  
Arguments for convincing the other of the truth of one’s own view 
of the world will, as a rule, peter out somewhere—at that moment, 
where one reaches the foundations of the respective world-picture: 
“Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with 
one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.” (OC, 
611) In this connection, Richard Raatzsch explains the relationship 
between heretics and self-appointed orthodox persons in the following 
manner: 
As Wittgenstein tells us, each man declares the other a heretic. Here »each« 
and »other« are variables for which the respective sets are those of followers 
of certain principles. In his own eyes each is orthodox, and every one who 
follows another principle is a heretic. It goes without saying that the latter 
considers himself orthodox once again. The term ‘orthodox’ cannot stand on 
its own in the world: One can, even in one’s own eyes, only ever be 
orthodox in relation to non-orthodox persons, be they either relevant non-
orthodox, like heretics, or irrelevant non-orthodox, such as fools. If there is 
only one system of belief and each and everyone believes in it, it is rather 
trivial to say that there won’t be any heretics, but it is less obvious that there 
won’t be any orthodox persons either. (Raatzsch 1999, 98) 
The interesting thing in this context is the fact mentioned by Raatzsch 
that any self-appointed orthodox person requires a fool or heretic in 
order to define himself as having the right belief. This means that 
certainty regarding my view of the world requires, first, the existence 
of human beings who don’t share this view, and second, that I consider 
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at least some of these people to be in error, that I define them as 
“heretics” rather than simply leaving it at condescendingly referring to 
them as “fools”. For I do not grant a fool the right to another opinion; 
a fool’s statements are considered too “unreasonable”, if not simply 
“mad”. The heretic’s views are much nearer to my frame of reference 
and thus it is easier for me to dissociate myself from them. 
The curious situation arises that a strong conviction regarding the 
rightness of my own view finally depends on the existence of a plura-
lity of differing views (the supporters of which will be equally con-
vinced of their rightness). Naturally, one may also be convinced of 
one’s view of the world in the absence of differing views, but it is easy 
to see that this conviction will be different from one that arises out of a 
dissociation from other views. 
II. 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as described above, reject the dogmatic 
primacy of one’s own view of the world, in favour of a construction of 
a world of plurality. Moreover, attaining the “one and only” truth 
appears to be impossible. One may assume that this would lead Wittgen-
stein to consider all values in relative terms, to hold up a certain 
arbitrariness. None of that, however: Wittgenstein takes in a particular 
position, which itself becomes possible due to the importance he 
ascribes to style. 
I want to show this in three steps: 1. By explaining the importance of 
the style of thought for Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 2. by referring to 
Hans Julius Schneider’s approach of emphasizing openness and 
movement among language-games, and 3. by presenting Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts on one’s personal style and the call for truthfulness connected 
to it. 
Conviction of one’s own opinions is not impossible in Wittgen-
stein’s view of things. Its primacy in convincing others is, however, not 
due to “better” grounds, but rather to “a kind of persuasion” (OC, 
262), a “conversion”, by which one’s opponent “would be brought to 
look at the world in a different way” (OC, 92). 
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There is the option of “propaganda”; the option, to propagate one’s 
own way of thought, to talk others into adopting one’s style of 
thinking: “I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking 
as opposed to another. I’m honestly disgusted with the other.” (LC, 
28). Its aim is to get one’s interlocutor to change his view of things.  
A usually negatively connotated term, “propaganda” deserves a 
short comment at this point: in my opinion, Wittgenstein does not use 
propaganda in its political sense, nor as a description of “convincing 
others by dishonest means” (i.e. by withholding information or by 
presenting matters in a tendentious manner), nor even by putting pressure 
on one’s interlocutor. Rather, the term “propaganda” is used precisely 
because one deals with certainties, not knowledge; the point here is to 
change a certain way of looking at things, not to correct a way of 
looking at things. Propaganda for or against a style of thinking aims at 
our view of the world (which is never simply held by individuals, but 
rather, by members of a community). In his Philosophical Investi-
gations Wittgenstein describes propaganda for a style of thinking by 
example of his own procedure:  
Well I should like you to say: “Yes, it’s true, you can imagine that too, that 
might happen too!”—But was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the 
fact that he is capable of imagining that?—I wanted to put that picture 
before him and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being 
inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this 
rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things. 
(PI §144) 
The style of thought lies at the bottom of grave decisions, like, for 
example, seeing the world as God’s creation or as having originated 
from a “nebula”—or, even the view that neither of both explanations 
may claim to be more rational, as Wittgenstein says in his Lectures 
1930-32: 
Causality stands with the physicist for a style of thinking. Compare in 
religion the postulate of a creator. In a sense it seems to be an explanation, 
yet in another it does not explain at all. Compare a workman who finishes 
something off with a spiral. He can do it so that it ends in a knob or tapers 
off to a point. So with creation. God is one style; the nebula another. A style 
Anja Weiberg 
76 
gives us satisfaction; but one style is not more rational than another. (LWL, 
104) 
At this point, two matters become apparent: first, the grave conse-
quences following from a particular style of thought, since one’s style 
of thought shapes one’s whole attitude and not only influences answers 
one may arrive at, but, prior to that, the questions one may ask oneself. 
Second, once more, the fact that explanations are in the end without 
foundation—a view that will hardly inspire most physicists and a great 
number of religious people, since, as a rule, both groups tend to consi-
der their beliefs to be well-founded and rational.2 In this connection, 
Joachim Schulte points out that Wittgenstein’s thoughts lead to the 
conclusion “that while there is no reason to believe that we may attain 
absolute knowledge, all kinds of certainty we can really reach will 
suffice for our human ends.” (Schulte 1990, 116) 
Consequently one has to give up hope of ever knowing “the truth” 
and of convincing all others by means of better arguments and grounds, 
but the option of convincing others of one’s own view of reality still 
remains (incidentally, a pre-requisite for any change of world-picture). 
This option only differs insofar, as it is less assuming, lacking dogma-
tism and avoiding the claim for absolute truth. 
Hans Julius Schneider has made an interesting point in this context. 
Against the background of investigating the education of teachers for a 
potential subject concerned with “a non-solely Christian approach to 
‘ethics, lifestyle and religious theory’” (Schneider 1999, 138) he dealt 
with the question, whether philosophical reflections might be of aid in 
convincing another person of a change in his habitual way of thinking. 
This change ought to be of a kind “that would render the new step not 
simply an additional viewpoint, an ‘enrichment’, but a modification of 
one’s whole way of thinking” (Schneider 1999, 142). Based on the 
assumption that there is no “holistic meta-language-game”, “by aid of 
which one can describe and judge all others”, Schneider in a first step 
                                           
2 Even if “well-founded” and “rational” are often defined in different ways. 
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refers to the vertical relations of language-games. 3  Here Schneider 
follows Ter Hark in giving as examples the language-games ‘to feel 
pain’, ‘to feign pain’ and ‘to feign joy’. While the language-games ‘to 
feign pain’ and ‘to feign joy’ lie in horizontal relations to each other, 
one may discern a vertical relation between ‘to feel pain’ and ‘to feign 
pain’ inasmuch, as the latter “can for logical reasons only be played 
out, once one has mastered the sensuous language-game [of feeling 
pain]” (Schneider 1999, 148). In connection to conflicts between forms 
of life Schneider considers the above reflection as relevant,  
because language-games which serve the expression of forms of life, typically 
need to be understood by comprehending vertical steps. To overlook steps 
of that kind or to ignore them leads to the so-called ‘ground floor fallacy’ (a 
term coined by Hark), i.e. illusions based on the false assumption that all 
language-games take place on one and the same logical level, thus on the one 
and only ground floor. (Schneider 1999, 148) 
Based on this subdivision of language-games, Schneider reaches the 
conclusion that conflicts among forms of life are those, where people 
who co-inhabit the same linguistic ground-floor4  undertake various 
differing vertical steps, which are in turn either rejected by, or, income-
prehensible for their respective interlocutors. At this point, Schneider 
sees a central argument in Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning the frayed 
borders and openness of language-games (cf. PI §68fff.). Schneider 
argues that these qualities show that movement between language-
games is not an exception, a peculiarity, but rather an everyday pheno-
menon, something we are all used to: 
We have thus at the centre a bigger or smaller area of succeeding common 
actions, which includes opportunities for an extension beyond its habitual 
limits, limits which most of the time are not made explicit. It seems 
important to me that Wittgenstein views this openness not as a fault, as an 
                                          
3 Schneider refers at this point to Michel Ter Harks distinction between “hori-
zontal” and “vertical” lanugage-games; cf. Ter Hark 1990, quoted after 
Schneider 1999. 
4 It has to be pointed out that Schneider’s assumption of a common linguistic 
ground-floor is not explicitly stated in Wittgenstein’s writings.  
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obstacle in the learning of language-games which ought to be explained away 
by psychological theories about (‘the incompleteness of’) speaking versus its 
more exact foundation in ‘meaning’. The ability to actively take this 
openness and to make use of it time and again, to expand the possibilities for 
action is—on the contrary—from the very beginning a main ingredient of 
any linguistic competence. (Schneider 1999, 146) 
Going back to our initial question, we now see that according to this 
interpretation various forms of life need not be fundamentally incom-
patible, conflicts between forms of life do not seem unsolveable in 
general.  
It is with a certain amount of prudence that Schneider draws his 
conclusions, pointing out that it may be at times very difficult to 
convince another person to change his style of thought, however, that 
it is vital for the general procedure of solving conflicts between forms 
of life “whether we consider a task familiar to us from everyday little 
steps, or whether we view it as a problem for which we may never find 
a solution due to philosophical reasons.” (Schneider 1999, 152) By aid 
of this starting point one may, on the one hand, avoid a dogmatic 
position, while on the other hand avoiding to see matters solely in 
relative terms. The only relativistic concession one would have to 
make, albeit a “rather harmless” one, would be the concession that one 
could not take a totally neutral position—inasmuch, as 
each of us can only ever articulate matters within the medium of that 
linguistic form in which he has learnt to move as his ‘element of life’ in the 
life he has lead so far. [...] But this kind of movement, we need to make in 
order to understand forms of life foreign to ours, is, however, deeply 
familiar to us in its simplest expression: it is the ordinary movement among 
language-games, for which we need not revert to a meta-language-game. The 
nonexistence of the latter does in no way cause any special problems. Not 
having an ‘objective’ rule does not invalidate the viewpoint we have reached 
according to our abilities, a viewpoint always valid for the respective 
moment only. (Schneider 1999, 153) 
In the end, it is about a reduction of the absolute claim regarding one’s 
own view of the world, connected with, on the other hand, more 
openness towards things that had been foreign up to now. 
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This brings me to the third part, dealing with Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on the personal style of a person. In this context, I would like to point 
out that these remarks are not treated in writings Wittgenstein 
intended to publish, but are found mainly in Culture and Value and in 
his Diaries (MT). Accordingly, one needs to be wary of connecting 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on personal style to his philosophy. 
In these remarks, Wittgenstein combines his thoughts on truth, 
knowledge and reality with a personal demand for truthfulness; a claim 
for authenticity which, in essence, makes up his usage of the word 
truth: “No one can speak the truth, if he has still not mastered himself. 
He cannot speak it;—but not, because he is not clever enough yet.” 
(CV 1939–1940, 78) What is asked for is to stop lying to oneself, to 
give up any self-deception—a way of action that demands courage. 
“Without a little courage one can’t even write a sensible remark about 
oneself.” (MT 26.4.30) Courage is not supposed to mean a special 
readiness to take risks, rather, it is—according to Wittgenstein—a sign 
of originality (cf. CV 1939–1940, 79) and “the beginnings of good 
originality are already there if [one does] not want to be something 
[one] is not […]” (CV 1947, 118). 
This demand Wittgenstein makes on himself is one of authenticity in 
life and thought. Language and action are here, as elsewhere, closely 
knit. To realize this demand, is a difficult and time-consuming process, 
in the course of which one encounters many a trap, as Wittgenstein 
expresses by complaining about his own vanity: 
When I say I would like to discard vanity, it is questionable whether my 
wanting this isn’t yet again only a sort of vanity. I am vain & and insofar as I 
am vain, my wishes for improvement are vain, too. I would then like to be 
like such & such person who was not vain & whom I like, & in my mind I 
already estimate the benefit which I would have from “discarding” vanity. 
As long as one is on stage, one is an actor after all, regardless of what one 
does. (MT 15.[11 or 12.31]) 
Wittgenstein illustrates these thoughts on one’s personal style not least 
by using a picture in which he attempts to describe himself:  
I could almost see myself as an amoral nucleus to which the moral concepts 
of other people stick easily. 
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So that, what I am saying is eo ipso never my own, since this nucleus (I 
picture it as a white dead bundle) cannot talk. Instead, printed sheets stick to 
it. These then talk; of course, not in their original state but mixed up with 
other sheets & influenced by the position into which they are brought by the 
nucleus. (MT 31.10.[31]) 
For other people, however, the state of a person may not be discerned 
as easy as by that person himself (provided he thinks about it). Once 
again, Wittgenstein makes use of a picture to describe these difficulties: 
he compares people with “balls”, some of which consist of “genuine 
gold”, some of which are on the outside covered by some “worthless 
material”, and finally some, which apart from their deceptive gilding 
contain but “a kernel of genuine gold” or else only “dirt”. 
But how difficult it is to judge such a person. One finds him out, discovering 
that the first layer is false & says: “so he is worthless” for no one believes 
that there can be falsely gilded genuine gild. Or one finds the trash under the 
false gilding & says: “Of course! That was to be expected.” But that there 
should then still be genuine gold hidden in this trash, that is difficult to 
suppose. (MT 31.10.[31]) 
This shows clearly that to recognize such distinctions in the supposedly 
alike or, to see similarities in the supposedly different is not easy at all 
and requires a lot of time. 
Furthermore, one can easily have a mistaken self-image, which 
would become apparent in one’s style: “If I perform to myself [...] then 
it’s this that the style expresses. And the style cannot be my own. If 
you are unwilling to know what you are, your writing is a form of 
deceit.” (MS 120, quoted after Rhees, 193) If one does not stop perfor-
ming, one will—according to Wittgenstein—never arrive at truth in 
the sense of truthfulness. The search for truth is thus defined by ethical 
criteria; it is not alone knowledge but most of all dealing with that 
knowledge which leads to truth: “That something occurs to you is a 
gift from heaven, but it depends on what you make of it.” (MT 
13.[10.31]) By this, language and action are inextricably linked. Life is 
to Wittgenstein indispensable prerequisite to any philosophy: “For 
first one must live,—then one can also philosophize.” (MT 1.3.[37]) 
The way of life one leads influences thought as well as one’s language: 
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“But if one lives differently, one speaks differently. With a new life one 
learns new language-games.” (MT 4.2.[37]) The language-games are not 
the only ones to change, once one leads a different life, the style, too, is 
a different one—and it is exactly by looking at the style of a person 
that one may recognise how seriously a person takes the demand for 
truthfulness. Style is where one can see whether a person’s objective in 
life is defined, for example, by comfort or amusement; or whether the 
person tends to take life “seriously” and accordingly comes to certain 
considerations or at least aims at them. Equally one may discover how 
far a gap there is between life and writing. Style is thus not just a 
rhetorical accessory, but closely linked to life and thought of a person: 
“’Le style c’est l’homme.’ ‘Le style c’est l’homme même.’ The first 
expression has cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct 
version opens up quite a different perspective. It says that a man’s style 
is a picture of him.” (CV 1949, 149f.) 
This last remark about style as a picture of man becomes clearer once 
one looks at the passage from Georges L. L. Buffon’s Discours à 
l’Académie Française (also known as Discours sur le style) from 1753, 
which Wittgenstein knew, cherished and referred to (cf. CV, 18). To 
write a good style, one ought to consider the following, according to 
Buffon: 
Enfin, si l’on écrit comme l’on pense, si l’on est convaincu de ce que l’on 
veut persuader, cette bonne foi avec soi–même, qui fait la bienséance pour les 
autres et la vérité du style, lui fera produire tout son effet, pourvu que cette 
persuasion intérieure ne se marque pas par un enthousiasme trop fort, et 
qu’il y ait partout plus de candeur que de confiance, plus de raison que de 
chaleur. (Buffon, 1939, S.72)5 
Here already it becomes apparent that there is a close connection bet-
ween Buffon’s view and Wittgenstein’s remarks on truth and authen-
                                          
5 “And finally, if one writes as one thinks, if one is convinced of that one wants to 
convince others of, this good conscience regarding oneself, which constitutes the 
reputability to others and the truth of style, will have its effect, provided, that 
this inner conviction does not show itself by too much enthusiasm, and that he 
at all times has more objectiveness than confidence, more reason than heat.” 
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ticity, on the relations between writing and life, which become visible 
in style. The fundamental motif in both is the demand for authenticity. 
Buffon places the style of a work above the “uniqueness of facts” and 
the “novelty of discoveries” (Buffon 1939, 73), which make up the sub-
ject matter of a work, since the latter is accessible to all:  
Ces choses sont hors de l’homme, le style est l’homme même: Le style ne 
peut donc ni s’enlever, ni se transporter, ni s’altérer: s’il est élevé, noble, 
sublime, l’auteur sera également admiré dans tous les temps[...] (Buffon 1939, 
73).6  
Just as with Wittgenstein, style is closely linked to the person. In 
Wittgenstein, this distinctive meaning of style shows itself among 
others in a remark on genius in which we encounter once more the 
ethical demand for life and writing of man: “Genius is talent in which 
character makes itself heard. [...] This is no mere intellectual skeleton, 
but a complete human being. That too is why the greatness of what a 
man writes depends on everything else he writes and does.” (CV 1948, 65)  
III. 
Wittgenstein’s demand for a constant examination of one’s own 
thoughts and way of life seems to me to be an interesting starting point 
for a reflection on philosophy and its philosophers. If one takes 
Wittgenstein’s remark on the inseparableness of philosophy and life 
seriously, each entirely “theoretical” or purely academic philosophy 
(provided such a thing is possible at all, if not, at least each philosophy 
considered, or else, aimed at by its proponents as purely “theoretical” 
or academic) would be a kind of deceit or delusion. A philosophy of 
that kind is lacking life. If life or philosophy is lacking truthfulness, 
each remains plain artifice, as Wittgenstein explains regarding ethics: 
“An artful ethical trick is something that I perform for others, or also 
                                          
6 “These matters are outside of man, the style is man himself. The style can thus 
neither disengage, move to another place nor alter; provided it is elevated, noble, 
sublime, the writer will be honoured at all times.” 
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only for me (myself), in order to show what I can do.” (MT 7.[11 or 
12.31]) Philosophy and life alike are connected to an ethical criterion. 
The connection called for between language and action is therefore not 
characterised by thematic requirements, requirements of subject matter, 
but by an attitude towards and a way of dealing with them. Not which 
topic one treats is of primary importance, but how one deals with it.  
It may well take some time and effort, but a reader can discern, 
based on a philosopher’s writing, on his style, how close the link 
between thinking and living actually is, and how often the philosopher 
tackles the question of authenticity of his thinking and life respectively 
draws conclusions from this question. In short: the style of a philoso-
phy shows how much of it is “authentic” and how much remains skill-
fulness, or an “artful trick”. 
To philosophize on the basis of Wittgenstein’s thoughts is, as shown 
above, certainly not reduced to a relativism which is neither capable of 
any standpoint nor a basis for consistent steps or actions. Wittgenstein 
nowhere mentions an equality of world-pictures. The point he does 
criticize, however, in connection with dealings with proponents of 
differing world-pictures, is the tendency to judge other world-pictures 
using the standards (norms) of one’s own world-picture (see in this 
context also Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer). 
Two central themes may be made out: on the one hand, Wittgen-
stein’s abandoning the search for an essence (of language), abandoning 
the search for “ultimate” truth, in favour of a conscious reduction to 
descriptions rather than general explanations; on the other hand, a 
rigorous claim for authenticity in the life and thought of the individual. 
These two themes combine to the following view of a possible way to 
philosophize: the objection consists in—as much as possible—making 
transparent what is given, looking at things from a different point of 
view, and continually adding other aspects and perspectives. It is 
exactly this conscious reduction to close examination and description 
of the given, like the pointing toward and showing of alternative per-
spectives, which contains an ethical component: this way of action is a 
way to distance oneself from jumping to conclusions and theoretical 
constructions, a way to avoid rash and dogmatic judgements. Com-
Anja Weiberg 
84 
bining philosophy and life, together with the demand for authenticity 
of both, would involve, if taken seriously, that one’s capacity for 
thought remains open, since no rigid and equally constricting theory 
functions as one’s objective. Instead, the plurality of thoughts and 
experiences offered by life would influence not only life itself and one’s 
view of life, but also thought, which in turn would result in a constant 
questioning, confirming, negating, adding to, or, modifying one’s way 
of thinking. 
A constant openness for hitherto unknown matters would be called 
for—an openness even for the unpleasant and frightening. Even if in 
the end one sticks to one’s disapproval (which will quite often be the 
case), at least one knows what one’s talking about (which is, sadly, not 
too often the case), because one would have made the attempt of an 
unbiased approach to another view of the world. It is unquestionably 
true that this procedure will time and again run into obstacles, be it 
that the other refuses a dialogue, be it because one’s findings are so 
repulsive that one does not want to, or, cannot continue to deal with 
the matter, be it that there are differences too big to one’s own views. 
Still, it seems to me that one ought to agree with Schneider’s statement 
that an important element of solving practical conflicts consists in our 
view of a task as being of a kind that is “familiar to us from everyday 
little steps”, rather than seeing us opposite of “a problem for which we 
may never find a solution due to philosophical reasons.” (Schneider 
1999, 152) 
Moreover, we should be aware right there that the existence of other 
world-pictures does not only have the function of altering one’s con-
victions, but equally, that of strengthening them. One the one hand, we 
have no right to dogmatically claim the truth of our own view of the 
world, in order to supposedly gain the right of imposing our view on 
others (“supposedly”, because from the assumption that one holds the 
only correct view of the world, it does not simply follow that others 
ought to share this view). The idea of a generally binding set of rules 
which has to be followed always and everywhere, containing precise 
orders concerning what ought to be right or wrong, good or evil, is an 
idea clearly refuted by Wittgenstein.  
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On the other hand, one is not reduced to relativism, leaving all views 
equally valid—it is precisely by pointing toward alternatives, by 
demonstrating the fact that other perspectives exist, that one gains the 
opportunity of changing the views of people, their styles of thought.  
However, this requires far more of me, I have no automatic right to 
lean back (convinced of being in the possession of truth) and certainly 
no automatic right to suppress persons of a different opinion. Rather, I 
am expected to continually challenge my thoughts and actions by 
questioning them. In this context one ought to point out that authen-
ticity is not a status one attains to keep. Truthfulness has to be gained 
anew each day, it is a neverending process. 
In conclusion, one may emphasize the following: within the 
framework of sharing collective world-pictures, or, living in them (and 
the clearly emerging importance of acknowledgement, acceptance, as a 
basis for our insight, our knowledge), our personal contribution may 
be seen in two respects: first, in acknowledging plurality in a way that 
does not exclude other world-pictures and their proponents from the 
outset, that does not from the very start judge them as good or evil, 
pleasant or unpleasant, but rather maintains a maximum of openness 
for other views and pays them respect also insofar, as one pays atten-
tion to the various styles of thinking and living, attempts to uncover 
the foundations of each form of speaking and acting, the context in 
which they occur. The style of thought and life is not a rhetorical 
addendum, a nice, but unnecessary accessory, but something which 
penetrates and shapes a person collectively as well as individually. The 
second contribution consists in constantly questioning one’s own point 
of view. On the one hand, this enables me, regarding myself, to realize 
other perspectives and possibly change my point of view. On the other 
hand—quite pragmatically—I may thus, regarding other persons, 
manage to present my point of view with greater conviction—in 
Buffon’s sense—and maximize my chances of talking them into 
changing their style of thought. 
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Sense of Ethics and Ethical Sense1 
Jens Kertscher 
Ma tâche ne consiste pas à construire l’éthique; 
J’essaie seulement d’en chercher le sens. 
Emmanuel Levinas 
Man has to awaken to wonder […]. 
Science is a way of sending him to sleep again. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
To approach Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics from an academic 
standpoint is likely to frustrate the reader, whose learned expectation 
still makes it difficult to appreciate the sense of those remarks.2 We 
have grown accustomed to associate ethics with a fixed canon of 
questions, emerging from problems and methods within the history of 
philosophy, which defines what ethics involves and promises suitable 
modes of discourse. Along these lines, ethics is typically understood, 
especially in the modern context, where the discipline implies the 
reflection and justification of existing norms, with specific reference to 
their legitimacy and general validity. To accept actions as morally valid, 
in so far as they depend on others’ demands, it is not enough to invoke 
an arbitrary existing norm. Rather, it is necessary to supply reasoning 
                                          
1 My thanks are due to Ulrich Arnswald for numerous intensive discussions that 
shed light on the way to approach Wittgenstein’s ethics. The present study 
would not have emerged without these discussions. 
2 Alongside several cryptic propositions in Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s remarks are 
largely contained in the diary entries parallel to the development of Tractatus, in 
the Lecture on Ethics (1929), as well as minutes of conversations with Wittgen-
stein reproduced by Rush Rhees (1970). 
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that matches expectations, such as they shape the task of ethics, to 
justify a moral principle, not merely in relation to the actions and 
moral code of a community, but to mankind as a whole. In the recent 
history of ethics, for example, these moral principles were represented 
by freedom (Kant), the principle of utility (utilitarianism), or justice 
(Rawls). These principles were to yield the concrete and morally valid 
rules for action and their suitability for consensus-building was to be 
made transparent. 
Wittgenstein declared such a theoretical programme in ethics as 
lacking all prospects. In a conversation with Moritz Schlick he 
remarked, apodictically: 
It is a priori certain that whatever definition of the good may be given—it 
will always be merely a misunderstanding to say that the essential thing, that 
what is really meant, corresponds to what is really expressed (Moore). 
(WVC, 69) 
Not only did Wittgenstein reject the academic stance on ethics, along 
with its methods and discourses, but he evidently also despised them: 
I regard it as very important to put an end to all the chatter about ethics—
whether there is knowledge in ethics, whether there are values, whether the 
good can be defined, etc. (LE, 13) 
Wittgenstein could clearly do no other than treat objectivity in ethics 
as a philosophical discipline as a failed attempt to discuss questions and 
problems that are at one step removed from the formation of objective 
concepts. His asceticism with regard to moral philosophy, which was 
rather paradoxically based on an ethical motivation, could be contested 
by the fact that there is a legitimate interest to remain accountable for 
those moral convictions that are relevant to everyday living, as well as 
to those value judgements, which we make almost by force of habit. If 
we take it for granted that philosophy is to account for our common 
use of certain concepts and ideas in plenty, the outcome of Wittgen-
stein’s categorical rejection of these entities is bound to strike us as 
unsatisfactory. 
Primarily, however, it is not only his distaste for ethics as an acade-
mic discipline that makes it difficult to appreciate Wittgenstein’s ethics, 
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but rather his unorthodox conception of the sense of ethics. According 
to Wittgenstein, ethical questions belong to metaphysics. Ethics is 
“[…] the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth 
living, or into the right way of living.” (LE, 5) Every attempt to answer 
this question in generally valid terms implies, in Wittgenstein’s view, 
an abuse of language, especially the value-ridden expressions that occur 
in ethical discourses. Wittgenstein argued that, on that basis, an ethical 
theory is impossible in the sense of a science of the right action. Suppo-
sing that Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the scientific foundation of ethics 
were to be accepted, what role remains for ethics? The following analy-
sis defends the thesis that, above all, Wittgenstein opposed a particular 
approach to moral philosophical speculation: namely, those models 
that rely on examples of scientifically fashioned solutions in the para-
digm of rationally justified norms. The sense of ethics, that is, its 
proper place in human life, cannot be captured by traditional methods 
of a normative and rational science. Logically to follow this aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s thought is perhaps to suggest reasons why he associates, 
as a matter of course, ethics alongside mystics. Thus, as will be demon-
strated, ethics is ineffable. While Wittgenstein may well locate ethics 
beyond the reach of science, his programme is neither positivistic nor 
leaning towards reductionism. Rather, his aim is fundamentally to 
change the picture that philosophers make of ethics. 
The purpose of this study is neither to claim Wittgenstein as a 
supporter of a particular ethical theory, nor to develop an independent 
approach to ethics by an analysis of his writings. At the same time, the 
following reflections are based on my conviction that Wittgenstein’s 
work includes insights that help overcome a series of what I see as 
weak alternatives, which currently dominate some areas of debate in 
ethics. Above all, I refer to the choice between universalism and parti-
cularism, or the distinction between a rigorous approach, as governed 
by rational thought in the manner of Kant, and a type of pluralism 
with relativistic implications. Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics—as to 
be shown—cuts across these alternatives. In that case, the relevance of 
his views is due to the fact that he ushered in an innovative discourse 
on ethical matters that implies a reassessment of the existing paradigm 
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of modern universal and rational tenets. The focus of the present dis-
cussion is not on a new system, not on an innovative and watertight 
reasoning that is, in any case, hardly likely to be in short supply in 
future. Rather, the emphasis is on a different route to what is generally 
regarded as an ethical problem. 
Briefly to characterize at this point this alternative route in key 
phrases would be to accept Wittgenstein’s turn to the individual case, 
the necessity of accepting plurality and contradiction as irreducible, as 
well as to highlight his emphasis on speech in the first person singular. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s later insights into forms of life and his 
views on certainty permit a critique of the view that a system of norms 
can only be regarded as rationally valid and therefore adequate for the 
claims of free individuals, whenever that system is based on a reason-
able, that is to say, a compelling approach to all those whose behaviour 
may be deemed as rational action. 
II. 
Firstly, the task is to determine which prevailing view of ethics 
Wittgenstein rejects. To this end, it is valuable to place Wittgenstein’s 
views in the context of several approaches that govern contemporary 
debate. Not only can Wittgenstein’s ideas be highlighted in sharper 
relief against the prevailing paradigm, but above all, this route to his 
thought shows how some philosophers rely on Wittgenstein as a basis 
for their work, without really departing from the model that Wittgen-
stein himself contested. In that case, Wittgenstein is clearer than those 
who follow in his footsteps, whereas he himself drew conclusions from 
the irreducible plurality of life forms and language games. 
Amongst the most frequently discussed examples of a universalistic 
approach is the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. In dialogue with 
Hilary Putnam, Habermas recently gave a brief summary of his aims: 
Those moral judgements are ‘right’, in so far as they earn universal respect, 
meaning that, in a rational discourse with virtually ideal conditions, they 
could meet with the approval of all those concerned. (Habermas 2000, 560) 
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In this way, Habermas’s reflections resemble the tradition of ethics as a 
universalistic proposition that dates from Kant. For Kant, the issue of 
individual good was, ultimately, an empirical question, so that no 
generally valid rules of behaviour could be established, such as for 
instance, for the individual’s path to the happy or good life. By con-
trast, the moral conduct that we demand of our partners is to be 
grounded by gaining a firm grip on rationality and pure reason. In the 
same vein, Kant explained the absolute meaning of ethical duties, by 
interpreting the so-called propositions of moral duty (Sollenssätze), or 
rather, in Kant’s terminology, the categorical imperative, as rational 
rules that the individual actor accepts, by the strength of his own 
decision-making. According to this view, it is irrational to act contrary 
to a categorical imperative. The refashioning of this programme in 
discourse ethics runs as follows: 
The program of justification pursued by discourse ethics sets itself the task 
of deriving from suppositions of rationality […] a rule of argumentation for 
discourses in which moral norms can be justified. It attempts to show that 
moral questions can be decided rationally as a general rule. (Habermas 1993, 
31f.) 
Furthermore, such an approach is incontestable, for otherwise, it is not 
clear what distinguishes “[…]the argumentative practices of justification 
from other practices that are regulated merely by social convention.” 
(Habermas 1996, 15) Following Wittgenstein’s thoughts, at least three 
assumptions underpinning the universalistic view are to be called into 
doubt. 
In the Lecture on Ethics, it is clear that Wittgenstein vehemently 
opposes a distinction of ethics and individual morality that is implicit 
to the universalistic viewpoint. On that score, Wittgenstein approaches 
the basic question of ethics in an essentially more general and value-
neutral context than Kant, such as putting “[…]before […] a number of 
more or less synonymous expressions each of which could be substi-
tuted for [Moore’s, J.K.] definition[…]” (LE, 4) The concept of the 
meaning of life that Wittgenstein then resorts to is in fact intrinsically 
more neutrally framed, in so far as he does not diminish the question of 
life conduct or the enquiry “into what is really important” (LE, 5), as a 
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matter of the individual well being, as for instance, in the one-sided 
sense of Kant. Rather, by allowing for ways of life that are not 
necessarily compatible with the individual well being, Wittgenstein 
appears both to call to mind the sense question as a basic facet of ethical 
enquiry and, furthermore, to make no distinction between that enquiry 
and the moral philosophical approach to good and morally compelling 
actions. Ethics, that is, also as moral philosophy, refers to the sense 
question and, therefore, meaning or sense plays a leading role in the 
discourse of ethics. To be sure, a distinction between the sense matter—
in Wittgenstein’s perception, the basic question of ethics—and the 
moral quality of action is possible, but there is no distinction on prin-
ciple. Even assuming that such a distinction were made, in Wittgen-
stein’s view, it would not suffice for the foundations of a universalistic 
theory, replete with its general criteria for evaluating actions and 
describing situations in which morally compelling decisions emerge. 
Such a general theory without preconceived ideas of the good life is in 
any case impossible because a formal moral principle implies a material 
understanding of the Good, or human happiness, not compatible with 
any arbitrary individual idea of the right way of living.3 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein argued against universalisms that the 
study of ethical questions is not possible without considering the 
individual personality and the concrete situation in which an ethical 
crisis confronts the individual in a specific way.4 The conflicts that 
emerge in this context, such as for instance, amongst various directions 
and projections of the good life, or between an individual striving for 
happiness and moral needs, can therefore not be solved in a way that is 
universally binding. The remarks on ethics in the Tractatus and the 
                                          
3 Even within a universalist and formal moral philosophy, the question must 
always be asked what idea of the right way of living is appropriate. That was 
recently demonstrated by Ursula Wolf (cf. Wolf 1999, 15). 
4 If Wittgenstein’s conversations with various people about ethical themes, as 
documented by Rush Rhees, are also taken into account, there can be no doubt 
that he would have dismissed the idea that a moral problem consists in 
discovering what the Good actually is in each respective case (cf. Rhees 1970, 
98f.).  
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associated diary entries already allude to this viewpoint. In these 
sources, we find: “What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the 
world.” (NB, 5.8.16). Not the action as a describable, worldly fact is to 
be qualified as ethical, but the individual intentions of the subject, in 
whose actions that ethical dimension is expressed. For that reason, 
Wittgenstein can also state in Tractatus that the will cannot be called 
the vehicle of the ethical (cf. TLP 6.423). In this context, the 
connection between the ethical dimension and the action would be 
associated with “the meaningfulness of action in the world, or the 
experience of a loss of meaning in this action” (Kroß 1993, 133).5 This 
association is, however, entirely contingent. Only insofar as the subject 
evaluates his actions according to ethical categories, thus lending mea-
ning to the world, does a connection emerge between the world of the 
subject and the world that is given as a finite entity.6 Wittgenstein also 
remained consistent to this view in his later works, although here, the 
metaphysical subject of Tractatus has “adopted the figure of ‘I-saying’ 
as grammatically special, as expressing certainty” (Kroß 1993, 142). 
Wittgenstein’s reconnection of language with life forms in their 
relation to language games, as significant in his late philosophy, was more 
compelling as a critique of universalism than his emphasis on the 
relationship between individuals and their ethical judgement and 
action. Those authors who followed Wittgenstein’s lead found a basis 
to oppose the efforts of universalist theorists, seeking to underpin a 
generally valid canon, free of historical or cultural contexts and, instead 
of that, gain an anchor in value judgements and decisions in real world 
scenarios. In that case, the starting point is the indefatigable plurality of 
life forms, language games and the cultural and moral traditions that 
flow into them. Advocates of these possibilities such as Richard Rorty 
and Michael Walzer insist at the same time that this view implies no 
                                          
5 The connection between the metaphysical subject and the ethical quality of action 
is extensively examined by Kroß (1993, 127-136). Cf. also Arnswald 1998, 54f. 
6 Cf. NB, 8.7.16: “The world is given me, i.e. my will enters into the world 
completely from outside as into something that is already there.” Cf. also NB, 
15.10.16: “Things acquire ’significance’ only through their relation to my will.” 
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relativism, in so far as that represents a theory, by which all ethical 
value systems can be either proved true or false.7 That position can 
only be contradictory and easily refuted in a theoretical sense (cf. 
Putnam 1992, 178). Whoever accepts or passes judgement on a specific 
ethics as true implies something about his life conduct. A theoretical 
statement on the superiority of his ethics is not yet achieved. To give 
reasons and to make moral judgements are activities documenting an 
individual’s life conduct or actions, or those of a community,8 or else, 
life styles rooted in them that give meaning to possible or real actions. 
Every philosophical interpretation of action already rests on the 
assumption of such individual opinions, so that acting represents an 
incontestable precondition for any philosophical or ethical interpret-
tation of reality (Kroß 1993, 141). Not relativism, but pluralism, in the 
sense of accepting diverse answers to value judgements in ethics is 
therefore a measured response to the requirements of universalism. 
In this regard, Michael Walzer spoke of a ‘moral minimalism’ (cf. 
Walzer 1994). By that, he means a central residue of moral principles 
“in terms of a (thin) set of universal principles adapted (thickly) to 
these or those historical circumstances” (Walzer 1994, 4). In unison 
with the late Wittgenstein, Walzer’s assumption is that moral systems 
are culturally integrated, only adopting a universal character in quite 
specific situations, “when moral language is turned to specific pur-
poses” (Walzer 1994, 4), as for instance, in crisis situations—Walzer 
had the 1989 Prague demonstrations in mind. These situations produce 
partial common interests and solidarities. In other words, minimal 
morality implies a basic store of principles and norms that recur at 
particular times and in special situations and may be recognized by 
                                          
7 Richard Rorty expressed this as follows: “This view is often referred to 
dismissively as ‘cultural relativism.’ But it is not relativistic, if that means saying 
that every moral view is as good as every other. [...] It is one thing to say, falsely, 
that there is nothing to choose between us and the Nazis. It is another thing to 
say, correctly, that there is no neutral, common ground to which a philosophical 
Nazi and I can repair to argue out our differences.” (Rorty 1993, 44). 
8 For that reason, the documentary value of Wittgenstein’s ethics has been 
referred to, cf. Bouveresse 1994, 103. 
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actors of various cultural, historical and linguistic backgrounds (cf. 
Walzer 1994, 17). In Walzer’s view, however, it would be a mistake to 
isolate this minimal morality from its cultural context, in the hope of 
one day achieving an objective, trans-cultural code. On the contrary, 
the code is irreducibly bound with particular meaning and semantically 
loaded and is always linked to specific morals, as they were developed 
in specific historical and cultural contexts. For that reason, a minimal 
morality cannot be the theoretical basis, to be deduced and anchored to 
specific and materially substantive morals, but merely seen as a slice of 
those circumstances (cf. Walzer 1994, 18). Like the late Wittgenstein, 
Walzer’s focus is not on the search for justifications, but on divided 
viewpoints and lifestyles that first facilitate a language game, that is, 
even make a particular form of practical reflection possible (PI §241f.). 
The life forms in which actors circulate, who act morally and reflect on 
their actions, are fed by a dense network of equally pre-contractual 
agreements, common interests, rules for participation that, taken toge-
ther, constitute a way of life that has grown historically: 
Minimalism […] is less the product of persuasion than of mutual recognition 
among the protagonists of different fully developed moral cultures. (Walzer 
1994, 17) 
Rorty’s and Walzer’s differently weighted appropriations of Wittgen-
stein’s pluralistic views make it possible to criticize the universalistic 
ideal of justification, since they place at the forefront of debate an 
irreducible premise, lacking a common historical root, that engenders a 
multiplicity of different life forms and language games anchored in 
their midst.9  In that way, it is clear that authors who support the 
paradigm of justification base their assumptions in ethics on an 
inadequate view of the problem: what should direct the interest of the 
ethicists is not the question of justification, but growing aware of the 
                                           
9 Against Rorty, it can also be mentioned in this connection that, quite unlike 
Wittgenstein, he never questions the life form of western, liberal democracies 
and he thinks about moral progress exclusively in the sense of the uni-
versalization of this life form. In this view, Rorty is at one with Habermas, who 
otherwise remains his adversary. Cf. Rorty 1994, 983. 
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peculiarities and differences of lifestyles that are to be accepted as such. 
The concern expressed by some universalists against this alternative of 
giving up any sort of moral judging, if no rational foundation can be 
found for that process,10 is just as much a sign of an incorrect approach 
to the problem as the opposite claim: namely, that in this case, any 
course of action would be morally feasible, or every value system of 
equal merit. By contrast, to follow Wittgenstein is to remember that a 
particular ethics can only be defended, in so far as it forms an integral 
part of a form of life. The arguments to be brought in their favour are 
as much our own as the language used in that process is also our own. 
Indeed, only in that way can it be made plain what the justification of a 
particular norm or moral judgement is to mean. To understand, for 
instance, what is intended by someone who gives such weight to a 
moral judgement that he claims its value exceeds every context, it is 
necessary to know the relevant context in which the claim was made, to 
whom the claim was addressed, how it was expressed and received, 
how reactions were etc. The entirety of these practices and reactions of 
the linguistic and non-linguistic kind belong to a particular language 
game that the actors actually control, yet without the game resting on a 
metaphysical guarantee, like reason. No rational structure is available 
that points beyond the contexts in which individual languages are used 
and that underpins the related purpose still further; and, moreover, 
according to Wittgenstein, such a structure is superfluous. Likewise, as 
our language game is neither rational nor irrational, but merely there, 
like life itself,11 so too, is the language we use in our moral discourses, 
in Wittgenstein’s view, lastly only governed by the fact that we rely 
upon something.12 
                                          
10 Tugendhat (1995, 22) is exemplary: “And we could no longer judge morally, if 
we could not keep hold of the inherently objective, that is, personally irrelative 
standard in moral, as in all judgements.” 
11 Cf. OC, 559; cf. also the interpretation by Putnam (1992, 176ff.). 
12 OC, 509: “I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts 
something, (I did not say ‘can trust something’).” 
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III. 
The ongoing chain of thoughts, in the present study, on the relation-
ship between certainty and life form enables a deeper investigation of 
the question how Wittgenstein’s views assist with an illustration of the 
boundaries of ethics, as measured by a modern conception of that 
discipline. Wittgenstein’s commentaries on the concept of rules are 
especially relevant in this regard. The relevance of rules in ethics results 
from the fact that moral norms in ethical discourse are to be 
represented as a particular class of practical rules, according to which, 
specific ways of acting can be described as obligatory.13 
If the description in Philosophical Investigations is followed, two 
decisive lines of argument can be highlighted as relevant to this case. 
Firstly, Wittgenstein insisted that following a rule is not an interpret-
tation in the sense of theoretical activity, in which a general rule of 
thumb can be applied to individual cases. The perception of rule-follo-
wing as interpretation leads to a regression of rules for rules.14 This 
perception of rule-following must therefore be given up in language 
games. Wittgenstein is very direct about this matter: “That is not what 
we ought to say, but rather: every interpretation, together with what is 
being interpreted, hangs in the air; the former cannot give the latter any 
support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.” (PI 
§198) Interpretation alone cannot determine sense, as is the salient 
point of this argument; and, hence, it follows that not every course of 
action can be equated with a rule. The linguistic remark “rule” is rather 
to be brought into line with a way of reacting that has been learned; 
and, in turn, that acquired knowledge is embedded in a suitable mode 
of action. In this case, Wittgenstein used the example of route marks, 
allied to the course of action, in order to follow the direction that they 
                                          
13 Cf. for a basic survey Tugendhat 1995, 42ff. 
14 Cf. PI §86; cf. also Z 229: “But an interpretation is something that is given in 
signs. It is this interpretation as opposed to a different one (running diffe-
rently).—So when we wanted to say ‘Any sentence still stands in need of an 
interpretation’, that meant: no sentence can be understood without a rider.” 
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show: “I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and 
now I do so react to it.” (PI §198) 
Wittgenstein’s response to the possible objection that recourse to an 
embedded way of acting only provides a causal and no normative 
explanation for rule-following, is the reference to existing habits. The 
resulting characterization of rule-following as a practice neatly summa-
rizes the embedding of using rule-expression with ways of action that 
they determine (cf. PI §198f., §202). That is Wittgenstein’s second 
decisive view on the question of following rules. The manner of using a 
linguistic expression has no immediate equivalent in grammatical form. 
That tells us as little as interpretation about the right way to use an 
expression without any doubt. In that sense, following rules is a 
practice and to understand rules means to know how to practice a 
technique: “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. 
To understand a language means to be master of a technique.” (PI §199) 
The link between rule expression and use in a particular context, which 
is fixed by routine practice, is itself a normative process, yet without 
necessarily relying upon an interpretation because of that routine. On 
the contrary, in the language game of practicing, it is not yet a use to 
follow a rule. The only course of action is therefore to oppose the 
practiced link of expression and use. In that case, however, another 
game is already being played: 
You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the 
right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing 
another game; and if you follow grammatical rules other than such-and-such 
ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no, you are speaking of 
something else. (Z 320) 
The use of linguistic expressions must therefore be understood as an 
inter-subjective practice, as a custom, or even an institution. In that 
sense, the use hardly differs from games like chess. 
Rule application always takes place on the basis of practice of usage 
and, in that way, the process is continued. Usage alone is a criterion to 
test if someone actually follows the rule. For that reason, rule-
following not only implies an understanding of rule expression, but 
also of uses that are appropriate for the rules, or as Wittgenstein writes: 
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“If language is to be a means of communication there must be agree-
ment not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgments.” (PI §242) The connection of definitions and judgements 
that is alluded to here depends on the internal link between rule and 
application. Therefore, the agreement of individuals in language, that is, 
in their active use of linguistic mechanisms in language games is no 
agreement “in opinions but in form of life” (PI §241). By that, 
Wittgenstein means the respective association of activities and actions 
in language games, amongst those language games, and in human life as 
a whole. 
If Wittgenstein’s perception is correct, that a consensus of opinion is 
based on a consensus in language, and in turn, a consensus of life form, 
then this assumption also has consequences for understanding the 
anchorage of ethical norms. The argument implies, namely, that 
consensus must already exist in the judgements themselves, before the 
rules that hold sway in discourse ethics can even be effective in society. 
Wittgenstein’s explanation of rule following suggests that it is inadequate 
to achieve consensus in the definition of a terminology. Rather, what is 
necessary is a further consensus of the manner of its application. Yet 
that way is only made manifest in the practice of rule-following, which 
in turn, constitutes a way of life. Even rules of discourse, therefore, 
only consist of a complexity of practices that are relative to the life 
form. For that reason alone, they are recognized as such and followed 
as rules. With Wittgenstein’s description, rules of discourse cannot be 
viewed as procedural, first giving rise to rules of a specific moral code, 
and to a degree, applied as special cases. Rules devised from such 
theories for ethical-practical discourses are  
[…] simply abstracted from, and not very far from, contemporary demo-
cratic culture. If no such culture existed, this particular version of a minimal 
morality would not even be plausible to us. (Walzer 1994, 13) 
Even discourse ethicists, such as Habermas, work with rules that imply 
material and ethical preconceptions. Various social practices lead to 
particular moral ideas, for instance, the practice of government carries 
“ideas about the responsibility of governors toward the governed” 
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(Walzer 1994, 15). However, these ideas only function with specific 
cultural systems that, in turn, yield independent and varying forms. 
The kind of consensus on these practices that exists in such a system is 
not the result of a rational consensus building, but is rather created by 
a common way of life. Only this common aspect facilitates the iden-
tification of valid norms; and it can be described as a complex process 
of participation in socially diverse practices, language games and 
discourses that provide the context for what may be called in this sense 
the basis of a line of argument: 
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place 
already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and 
doubtful point of departure for all arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of 
what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, 
as the element in which arguments have their life. (OC, 105) 
Language and modes of argument are rooted in behavioural patterns 
that are neither rational nor irrational, but precede any kind of 
intellectual process: “Language did not emerge from some kind of 
ratiocination.” (OC, 475) Here, too, the limits of a way of thinking that 
is based on the paradigm of justification are made plain, for the 
identification with specific practices is not vouchsafed by reasoning, 
but is rooted in the way of action that is inherent to the language game: 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the 
end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a 
kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game. (OC, 204) 
It is essential, to recognize this aspect, if the peculiarity of Wittgen-
stein’s illustration is to be correctly assessed and its limits to be 
correctly described:“Where two principles really do meet which cannot 
be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool 
and heretic.” (OC, 611) And immediately following that remark: “I 
said I would ‘combat’ the other man, - but wouldn’t I give him 
reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes 
persuasion.” (OC, 612) Emphasis on the limits of justification not only 
magnifies the limits of a rationalistic ideal of communication, as based 
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on consensus, but it also prevents false notions of homogeneity in life 
forms that are distinct and separate. At this point, another aspect comes 
into play that is preferably neglected in discussions about life forms 
and rules.15  The agreement about which Wittgenstein speaks in his 
elucidation of the rule concept is not to be treated as though the rules 
of everyday action bring to light an implicit contextual knowledge and 
common procedures that are shared by all members of the society in 
question. Rather than searching for such common elements, Wittgen-
stein invites a perception of language as “a complicated network of 
similiarities overlapping and criss-crossing […]”. (PI §66), for which he 
uses the expression “family resemblances” (PI §67). This method of 
comparing and contrasting phenomena in their vital functions is meant 
to liberate from static and hypostatic considerations.16 By pitting the 
family resemblance against the ideal of identity, Wittgenstein holds up 
a different method to the quest for unity that is meant to culminate in 
respect for the irreducible plurality and diversity of life forms and, so 
too, for the ways in which ethical discourses can be conducted. In 
Wittgenstein’s view, there is no single, possibly more rational approach 
than other ways of following a rule:  
Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; 
we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one 
way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is 
right? (PI §206)17 
                                          
15 On this point, authors like Michael Walzer differ from Wittgenstein, as Walzer 
typically emphasizes identities and common interests (cf. Walzer 1994, 7-8, 16). 
The unquestionable condition of homogeneity also describes approaches that, 
acknowledging Aristotle, intend to establish ethics on the reflection of tested 
ethical practices. Cf. also the basic work of Schnädelbach (1986). Kambartel’s 
critique of ethical pluralism also relies on this condition of a homogeneous, 
common life form (cf. Kambartel 1986, 98). 
16 Cf. AWL, 34: „One of the ways of looking at questions in ethics about good is 
to think that all things said to be good have something in common, just as there 
is a tendency to think that all things we call games have something in common.” 
17 Cf. also Z 430: “Our language game only works, of course, when a certain agree-
ment prevails, but the concept of agreement does not enter into the language-
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This question emerges in every deep-seated moral conflict and, so 
Wittgenstein, it cannot be answered by reference to the so-called right 
interpretation of the rule that is meant to comprise the conclusion of a 
rational discourse. On the whole, rules function so well in social 
practice because they are not static and do not leave an open field for 
interpretation. Hence, in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
already warns in his first discussion of the rule concept to overlook the 
diverse functions of rules within language games: “it can be said that 
what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in 
the game.” (PI §53) 
IV. 
The illustrations of the connection of rule-following, language game 
and life form have shown how several of Wittgenstein’s views permit a 
correction of existing perceptions, questions and methods in practical 
philosophy and suggest alternative approaches. Wittgenstein’s way of 
discussing philosophical problems has proved fruitful for ethics, since 
it is possible to call into question these hastily ordered theoretical 
approaches that falsely promote unity in the diversity of ethical discourse. 
In conclusion, Wittgenstein’s method and its relevance for ethics is to 
be more closely considered. An aspect of his thought that was briefly 
mentioned in the introduction is to be highlighted: namely, the exclu-
sion of ethics from empirical life in favour of a mystical interpretation. 
In that way, greater attention is to be paid to the thesis, as mentioned 
in the introduction, that Wittgenstein rejected as a matter of principle 
the over-theoretical and scientific appropriation of ethical questions. 
The distinctions between Wittgenstein’s early position on ethics, in 
Tractatus, in the Lecture on Ethics and in his late works have so far not 
been mentioned here. 18  Rather, the working premise was a basic 
                                          
game. If agreement were universal, we should be quite unacquainted with the 
concept of it” 
18 On the fate of ethics in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, cf. the detailed 
discussion in Barrett 1991, 227ff. 
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approach to ethical questions that runs through Wittgenstein’s collec-
ted works (although in his later writings he no longer explicitely 
considered ethical questions at all). That approach was Wittgenstein’s 
mistrust of scientific attitudes and theoretical models in ethics.19 His 
Lecture on Ethics is a work of transition. To be sure, this text still 
visibly depends on the world-view of Tractatus; and yet, it also points 
forward to the method of grammatical analysis of contexts of words 
and their uses, as is characteristic of his later philosophy (Weiberg 
1998, 57f). Had Wittgenstein been consistent about applying the 
method of Philosophical Investigations to his Lecture on Ethics, then he 
would have concentrated on describing the role that value expressions 
and ethical judgements play in actions in individuals’ lives. In that case, 
he would presumably have omitted to depict these ways of speech as 
inauthentic (uneigentlich) expressions for a thing, namely, for a unified 
conception of ethics as metaphysics, religion and aesthetics.20 In view 
of this shift of method, his Lecture on Ethics itself could fall under 
suspicion as metaphysics, since the focus is on the distinction of an 
absolute, inexpressible ethical sphere and a limited sphere in which 
language refers to facts alone. However, closer scrutiny of Wittgen-
stein’s analysis of ethical language use in his Lecture on Ethics, yields 
another perspective that gives precedence to the thought of the 
ineffability of ethics and in that case, the actor is at once, as it were, 
pre-empted in his most original responsibility. 
Wittgenstein anchors moral language usage to a pre-eminent way of 
applying the basic vocabulary of ethics. A myriad of applications is 
plausible for these words, yet for Wittgenstein, they have an elevated 
                                          
19 Weiberg arrives at this result (1998, 58f.) The orientation by scientific methods 
and problem solving was, according to Wittgenstein, a main source of concep-
tual confusion: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science 
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness.” (BB, 18). 
20 See Bouveresse (1994, 103): “It is [in the late philosophy, J.K.] no longer a ques-
tion of the inauthentic (uneigentlich) language of ethics missing something like 
the essence of its object.” 
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meaning, if they are used in an absolute grammatical sense, that is, 
without recourse to prescribed goals of action or measures of 
evaluation. This manner of application qualifies them as ethical terms 
and Wittgenstein seems to imply that they are then always used as 
equivalent according to the form, if they emerge in sentences that 
contain such absolute ways of application. Wittgenstein is therefore 
able to identify the moral judgements with the absolute application of 
these words, to dissociate them from judgements about facts (cf. LE, 
5ff.). His analysis yields the result that expressions such as “good” or 
“duty” have no clear sense, since they are non-relative predicates. Nor 
can it be seen how an action is absolute, that is, without justification, if 
relative to something else. It is also unclear, how something to be 
preferred is to be justified by any other means than relative to a wish, 
that is, relative to something that is, in turn, an act of preference (cf. 
Tugendhat 1995, 51). To adopt Wittgenstein’s example, you can talk of 
“a right” road in a relative sense, namely, relative to a particular goal, 
“and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the 
right road apart from such a predetermined goal.” (LE, 7) The idea of 
an absolutely right road “which everybody on seeing it would, with 
logical necessity, have to go” (LE, 7) is, however, as nonsensical as 
talking about an “absolute good” or “the good in itself”. Each notion is 
based on a false idea of a state of affairs, in so far as it forces a particular 
way of action as a logical necessity that has itself “the coercive power of 
an absolute judge” (LE, 7). Wittgenstein drew the consequence that the 
absolute claim raised in ethical judgements – whether as propositions 
of duty or of the absolute good – place them on a higher plane than 
mundane statements of fact. As a result, ethics cannot be put into 
words and is transcendental (cf. TLP 6.421). The linguistic nonsensical 
“duty in itself” is, as with all talk of “absolute values” or an “absolute 
good”, an expression of a vain attempt to transcend what can be 
expressed in a language that makes sense (LE, 11f.). 
Wittgenstein intensifies this view of ethical language still further, by 
locating ethics in the vicinity of mystical and religious experiences, as 
in Tractatus. To be sure, the link between the investigations of ethical 
language use, as in propositions of duty, and linguistic expression that 
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he called mystical experiences, is not immediately transparent. You 
could talk of absolute experiences of value that rise above every 
conceptual determination. Wittgenstein counts a feeling for the 
facticity of the world amongst them, a feeling of absolute security and 
of being guilty (cf. LE, 8ff.). The flow of the argument further implies 
that by excluding ethics from empirical facts, Wittgenstein intends to 
point to its theoretical ineffability. Thus, justice cannot be done to 
Wittgenstein’s unearthing of an ineffable realm of ethics, if one refers 
to logical analysis, neither one that reduces ethics to a series of factual 
statements, nor one recreating a special empirical function, such as 
expressing feelings, or persuading the adoption of practical actions.21 
What is literally essential is the element of nonsense: 
[…] not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe 
what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant 
description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of 
its significance. (LE, 11) 
The sense of ethics and its higher meaning for humanity is manifest, as 
Wittgenstein asserts, in the fact that it cannot be designated an object of 
scientific research, since no principles, no theoretical tasks, no process 
of universality or analysis is adequate. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein’s 
thesis of the ineffability of the ethical realm is no example of a 
positivistic attitude of superiority, intent on contesting the meaning of 
ethical questions with linguistically logical arguments. The need to 
confront ethical questions, above all, on the basic level of the right 
conduct of life, is rather a testament to human conduct as such. An 
individual way of life can neither be legitimized by scientific ethics nor 
merely dismissed by a logical and empirically motivated philosophy of 
language. 
To take into account Wittgenstein’s remarks, as already stated, on 
the relationship between subject, ethical will and world, as in Tractatus, 
it is possible to treat the absolute experiences of value described in the 
Lecture on Ethics as an attempt, albeit indirectly, to point to the irre-
                                           
21 The interpretation of ethical statements as expression of feelings or as orders 
dates back to Alfred Jules Ayer (cf. Ayer 1936, 111). 
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ducible character of ethics as it is relative to each individual. The 
reference is indirect, since even the experiences Wittgenstein describes 
are based on a characteristic misuse of language. The misuse lies in 
employing expressions in an absolute sense, when only a relative usage 
makes sense. Towards the close of his Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein 
therefore shifts into the use of the first person and invites the reader to 
recall similar experiences of this kind. 
The emphasis on the function of the basic ethical vocabulary, in the 
light of this interpretation, would be less of an approach to a possible 
theory of moral language still to be achieved, than an indication of the 
inherently indeterminate nature of ethical speech. All talk of a unified 
interpretation, conforming to rules, is pointless. There can be no such 
interpretation with the aid of ethical values for actions that are 
unconnected to the particular situation and the identity of the actors 
involved. What someone says whilst describing individual actions is 
related to his attitude to his obligations, intentions or even relation-
ships to others (cf. Cavell 1999, 325). In that case, diverse and contra-
dictory motives collide and lead to conflicts that give rise not so much 
to the question of which action is now objectively appropriate, but 
rather the more urgent question of our self-perception and knowledge 
of another, that is, also the question of our responsibility: “[T]he trunk 
and branch of responsibility are what you are answerable for. And 
where your conduct raises a question, your answers will again be 
elaboratives.” (Cavell 1999, 312) This perspective on the behaviour of 
actors who evaluate their own and others’ actions in a moral light, first 
studied by Wittgenstein, was described by Stanley Cavell by the 
concepts of justification and responsibility. To treat another individual 
in the right way, to pay him his due, implies an appeal to his own self-
consciousness, particular status, evaluation of his situation and 
demands upon him: “The problems of morality then become which 
values we are to honor and create, and which responsibilities we must 
accept, and which we have, in our conduct, and by our position 
incurred.” (Cavell 1999, 325) Not the search for a justification of one’s 
actions, which might well be accepted by any rational being, but rather 
growing aware of responsibility, in the sense of an assurance of per-
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sonal and another’s standpoint in their respective contexts, such 
elements characterize Wittgenstein’s confrontation with ethical 
questions, according to this view (cf. Cavell 1999, 312). 
The “re-personalization” 22  of morality that occurred with the 
rehabilitation of individual responsibility also includes the recognition 
of the restricted relative nature of the individual standpoint and an 
insight into the risks associated with every decision and evaluation. 
Even the reference to a general rule is no escape route. A positive 
weighting of material values, or even formal rules of behaviour, would 
suggest a certainty that would turn the moral content on its head, by 
depriving the actor of his sense of responsibility. To forego a positive 
moral discourse is one way to deal with this situation. To make deci-
sions, to fulfil moral judgements and to defend standpoints are all 
actions performed by individuals who cannot rely upon metaphysical 
guarantees. Every application of a rule – as illustrated by our previous 
emphasis on rule-following – involves a step into open territory that is 
only possible because the actor always relies upon something: 
I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts 
something, (I did not say ‘can trust something’). (OC, 509) 
The addition in parenthesis denotes a decisive difference from a way of 
thinking that seeks certainty in the form of rational justifications; and 
by drawing attention to the particular uncertainty that lies in every act 
of trust and precedes every rational justification within the language 
game. 
The element of uncertainty in every act is, nonetheless, necessary, in 
order for the actor to trust in his own sense of responsibility. Uncer-
tainty, ‘the undecidable’23, and responsibility therefore shift into a line 
of association that is obscured by any ethics that set store by the 
possibility of a rational consensus. Paradoxically enough, such irratio-
nal aspects are part of the rationality of the moral sphere. They depend, 
as Gerhard Gamm put it, on the fact “that in the destruction of 
                                          
22 The expression is attributable to Bauman (1993, 34). 
23 Cf. further Derrida 1992, 24-26. 
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reasons, we become free to take over responsibility for others” (Gamm 
2000, 246). The transcendental dimension of ethics, as postulated by 
Wittgenstein, would then not only be intended (in the sense of beyond 
the natural order (transcendent) but also in the Kantian sense of trans-
cendental, as a condition for the possibility of responsible action.24 
V. 
The leading thesis of these discussions was that Wittgenstein’s thoughts 
on ethics offer a possible alternative to the predominance of the 
traditional paradigm of practical philosophy. Wittgenstein’s approach 
to ethical questions leads not only to a critique of the ideal of rational 
justification of norms. Instead, his approach promotes a critical assess-
ment of traditional ethical theories. These theories not only over-
simplify because they conceal the variety of moral discourses, but also 
because they are based on the idea of the homogeneity of ethical life 
forms. On this count, incidentally, Aristotleans join forces with their 
Kantian counterparts. No matter whether they pay service to Ethos, or 
to communities of discourse, either way, notions of identity and 
homogeneity about Wittgenstein’s emphasis on difference are what 
prevail. The task of considering moral expressions and actions, as 
schooled by Wittgenstein’s thought, would be to bring this aspect of 
difference decisively into the forefront of debate. The quest for a 
unified theory to assist the process of differentiation, – a process that 
every morally competent actor must know –, would be substituted by 
a grammatical investigation and description of language games in which 
ethical expressions emerge. That change of approach is to recognize the 
                                          
24 Similar ideas are referred to by Derrida: “The undecidable remains caught, 
lodged, at least as a ghost – but an essential ghost in every decision, in every 
event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of 
presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology that would assure us of the 
justice of a decision.” (Derrida 1992, 24f.) Derrida incidentally associated his 
studies on the “mystical ground of authority” with Wittgenstein’s mystics (cf. 
Derrida 1992, 14). 
Sense of Ethics and Ethical Sense 
109 
contexts in which expressions are employed and to become aware of 
actual events, regardless of arbitrary theoretical demands, when a moral 
debate is ongoing, or in cases of moral judgements and action. 
Furthermore, the shift would lead to a reorientation from the mode of 
justification and determination to the mode of description and conti-
nual interpretation. It is not a vain hope for this approach to achieve 
greater sensitivity towards the variety of voices from which an ethical 
sense is borne; and, equally, towards the inherently indeterminate and 
ambivalent character of moral discourses in modern societies that are 
irreversibly pluralistic. In this regard, a reminder is not only apt, since 
every material or formal general moral code, as well as every run of the 
mill consensus of a moral majority, unavoidably threatens to suffocate 
those voices that are not willing or able to be convinced and to appro-
priate a moral code. 
Even if this rudimentary programme were to be held appropriate 
and, considering that the philosophical self-enlightenment of the 
individual’s relation to the world no longer offers metaphysical guaran-
tees, the person who confronts ethical questions is, nonetheless, not 
relieved of the need to answer them in a decisive way in his unique and 
concrete situation, and without laying claim to a comprehensive 
philosophical explanation. All that such a person can be advised in 
view of his individual life, after all, leads to the trivial endeavour of 
solving practical problems that arise on a pragmatic, case by case basis. 
 
Translated by Suzanne Kirkbright 
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The Convergence of God, the Self, and the World in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
John Churchill 
I. Clearly Wrong 
In this paper I aim to explain a peculiar aspect of the picture of logic, 
language, and the world in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In that picture, 
logic and language limn the domain of sense, which corresponds to the 
world of facts, and exclude the domain of nonsense, occupied by 
philosophical explanations of logic, by aesthetics, by ethics, and by all 
talk about God, meaning, and value—a domain properly consigned to 
silence. What Wittgenstein says about this latter domain is a parti-
cularly elegant amalgam of insights and themes from an astonishing 
variety of sources. And yet—this is the peculiar aspect—it clearly 
cannot be correct. Seeing that it cannot be correct, and understanding 
why it cannot be correct are the two aims of my explanation. 
In a nutshell, the explanation is this: Wittgenstein’s picture demands 
a convergence of three concepts: God, the self, and the world. Attrac-
tive as this convergence may be, to certain sorts of pure mystics, it 
cannot be correct. If God, the self, and the world were all the identical 
selfsame thing, all our beginning intuitions—the otherness of the 
world and of God, and our own individuation, would be inexplicable. 
But in a matter of this sort, as Wittgenstein himself says in Zettel, 
“slow cure is all important” (382). One reason the slow cure is impor-
tant is that it will assist our seeing that this convergence is also implicit 
elsewhere in the Western philosophical tradition. That, in turn, will 
lead to a deeper appreciation of the way in which Wittgenstein’s 
rejection of this element of the world-view of the Tractatus is also a 
rejection of a central feature of much of the philosophical tradition. 
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I aim to show that the Tractatus stands, perhaps alone with 
Spinoza’s Ethics, as the purest and most unrelenting effort to articulate 
a world-picture in which logic entails a mystical union of the self with 
the world and with God. As such, the Tractatus, along with the Ethics, 
stands as monumental evidence that this perspective, worked out 
systematically and thoroughly, cannot produce a consistent or a liveable 
conception of the place of human being in the world. The perspective 
presupposed and worked out in each work is not that of a human 
being, merely, but of a human being who approaches union with God, 
a God who is at the same time identical with the world itself. And this 
is not a perspective a human being can indwell. But showing this will 
require some discussion. Let us enter the slow cure. 
At a philosophical conference in Louisville, Kentucky, several years 
ago, a listener to a paper on the Tractatus asked, in a grumpy tone, 
“Why study something that is clearly wrong?” The answer, surely, is 
that we can learn from important mistakes. But the notion that some 
philosophical position could be “clearly wrong” has interestingly 
multiple senses. A claim could be clearly wrong in being obviously 
mistaken. We might hold a position to be clearly wrong in this sense 
without suggesting that we can state how it is wrong. Wittgenstein 
holds that there is no self, and yet that “I am my world.” Even if we 
don’t know how to refute him, and can’t say just where his argument 
went astray, we may say, with justification, “That can’t be right!” Let 
us call this status  “obviously wrong.” Second, a claim could be clearly 
wrong in the sense that it is perspicuously clear how it’s wrong. When 
we see that Wittgenstein’s commitment to atomism is premised on the 
idea that every proposition must have an absolutely determinate sense, 
and that he adopted this stricture from Frege, we may rightly feel that 
we have seen just how the position has gone wrong. Let us call this 
status “perspicuously wrong.” Third, there is a sense in which some 
claims are clearly wrong in that they transparently and cogently open 
to our view the way in which other claims—perhaps whole domains of 
inquiry and explanation—are wrong as well. If we become convinced 
that the problems of perspective exhibited in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
show—in their clarity—what is wrong with any such attempt, this 
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realization can offer a panoramic view of a whole sea of error. We 
could call this status “importantly wrong.” 
My claim is that Wittgenstein’s view of God, the self, and the world 
in the Tractatus is clearly wrong in the first and second senses, and that 
a due consideration of the character of his great mistake can let us see it 
as wrong in the third sense as well. Wittgenstein’s mistake is a “great” 
one in two senses: it is a big, grave mistake, but it is also an important 
one. There is no put-down in this diagnosis. Some philosophical 
mistakes are tremendously important, as he acknowledged in Zettel: 
“In a certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling philoso-
phical mistakes, they contain so much truth” (460). If Wittgenstein is 
obviously, perspicuously, and importantly wrong, the Tractatus may 
constitute a reductio argument, the reductio ad absurdum of ratio-
nalism. It will, though, show us less how to avoid and disdain an error, 
than how to recognize and cope with one of the enduring tendencies 
and most alluring temptations of philosophical reflection. Wittgenstein 
lived to diagnose his own tendency and to struggle, in his later work, 
against the temptation. Clarity about the fundamental problem with 
the Tractatus—its ultimate conflation of God, the self, and the 
world—is a necessary prodadeutic to understanding Wittgenstein’s 
later work. 
In his Preface he acknowledges that on the logical side his precursors 
are Russell and Frege. But beyond that, he gives stark discouragement: 
“[…] [T]he reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indif-
ference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been antici-
pated by someone else.” We cannot share his indifference, because the 
implications of understanding even his mistakes depend on our seeing 
their relation to the often momentous projects that other philosophers 
have undertaken. And so the multiple roots of Wittgenstein’s thought 
in the Tractatus have been amply documented. As is shown in Janik 
and Toulmin’s Wittgenstein’s Vienna, he drew, for example, from the 
cultural milieu of late Habsburg Vienna. In the English-speaking world 
he drew from Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore, and others. 
Continental philosophers who influenced him include Tolstoy and 
Dostoyevsky. He certainly drew freely from Schopenhauer. 
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A closer look at these influences will assist us in grasping Wittgen-
stein’s conception of his problems. Paul Engelmann writes of 
Wittgenstein’s “unreserved admiration and respect” for Tolstoy (1967, 
79), an admiration manifest in Wittgenstein’s predilection for spiritual 
simplicity, his tendency to seek out common and lowly positions—
cottager in Norway and Ireland, gardener, village school teacher, 
hospital porter—and his distaste for the trappings of donnish prestige 
at Cambridge. Georg Henrik von Wright writes of Tolstoy’s “strong 
influence on Wittgenstein’s view of life” (1972, 10), and Wittgenstein 
himself wrote to Ludwig von Ficker that Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief 
virtually kept him alive at points during the war (Monk 1990, 132). 
What does this Tolstoyan influence amount to? Brian McGuinness 
has noted that the passage 6.4311-6.4312 in the Tractatus closely 
parallels Tolstoy’s contention that true life is non-temporal and is lived 
in a continuous present. From Tolstoy he drew the idea that spiritual 
truth must be simple, that it must be accessible without learning, and 
that it is most likely to be embodied in the humblest among humanity. 
This set of ideas strikes, of course, a familiar chord in traditional 
Christian thought, and with it comes an imperative to regard complexi-
ties of thought as obstacles to be overcome. This is one of the roots of 
the doctrine of ineffability: if the most adequate doctrines are the 
simplest, ultimately they cannot even be spoken, and thus are not 
doctrines at all. The best spiritual testimony is to be found, silently, in 
the good lives of plain people. This lesson must have gained strong 
reinforcement in Wittgenstein’s affirmation of Dostoyevsky’s Alyosha 
Karamazov, whose quiet virtue distinguishes him from his brothers, 
one lost in dissipated living, the other in philosophical quandaries. 
Russell’s influence was not limited to logic. In 1913, Russell 
published in The Hibbert Journal, a now-famous article called “Mysti-
cism and Logic.” In this essay, well-analyzed by Brian McGuinness in 
his article “The Mysticism of the Tractatus,” Russell outlines a parti-
cular strand of mystical thought with a long philosophical pedigree. Its 
distinctiveness is two-fold. First, it is rooted in doctrines of logic, and 
second, whatever its particular occasion of expression, it has four 
consistent tenets: (1) the underlying unity of everything; (2) the unrea-
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lity of time; (3) an overarching absolute value that subsumes all other; 
and (4) the availability of an experience of insight in which the first 
three tenets are disclosed. Russell finds this pattern in a variety of 
religious and philosophical traditions; he published this article shortly 
after Wittgenstein’s association with him. Perhaps then it is not sur-
prising to find all these tenets in the Tractatus. Russell’s “logical mysti-
cism” is the pattern to which the mysticism of the Tractatus is cut. 
It is also highly likely that Wittgenstein was influenced in the deve-
lopment of ethical themes in the Tractatus by direct or indirect contact 
with George Edward Moore, the Cambridge philosopher whose 
Principia Ethica (1903) set the tone of discussion about value for a 
generation of English intellectuals including most famously the Blooms-
bury group—Leonard and Virgina Woolf, Lytton Strachey, John 
Maynard Keynes, and others, tightly connected with intellectual 
currents at the Cambridge college, Trinity, where Russell and Wittgen-
stein collaborated. Michael Hodges has developed this likelihood, 
pointing out that Moore’s intuitionism called for a wordless, defini-
tionless, immediate recognition of value. 
But of all the influences on the suppressed metaphysics of the 
Tractatus (as distinct from the logic), the most obvious and direct is 
that of Schopenhauer. The themes Wittgenstein sets out to develop in 
the Notebooks are drawn with, initially, little modification from The 
World As Will and Representation. Wittgenstein undertakes in those 
Notebooks to explore the problem of the individuation of the self to 
whom the world is presented, the relation between the will as 
subjectively experienced in one’s own body and the metaphysical will 
as the inner nature of all reality, and the sense in which there is truth in 
solipsism. All of these are characteristically Schopenhauerian versions 
of common philosophical problems. Even the convergence of God, the 
self, and the world is already evident in these early thoughts. Taking a 
page from Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein already articulates the idea that 
oneself is the microcosm, and “I am my world” (NB, 12.10.16). While 
at the same time, “my will is the world-will” (NB, 17.10.16). The affi-
nity for solipsism is traceable to Schopenhauer’s influence (cf. NB, 
23.5.15), and the dismissal of scepticism about the existence of an 
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external world as a non-question (TLP 6.51) is a virtual echo of Schopen-
hauer: “After an examination of the [...] real character of sense percep-
tion, the question itself was bound to disappear, because there was no 
longer any meaning in it” (1969, I, 16). 
Despite this clear and immediate derivation of problems and 
development of strategies from Schopenhauer, it is still the case that the 
sort of solution the Tractatus embodies takes Wittgenstein into the 
mainstream tradition of philosophical mysticism, where his great 
likeness is with Spinoza. That comparison awaits us in a later section of 
this paper. 
II. I Am My World 
Wittgenstein’s solution to the problems of philosophy—all of them—
was to show them to be non-problems. A clear view of the logic of 
language and of its relation to the world would show that the questions 
of philosophy are pseudo-questions, nonsensical expressions which 
have no answers because they ask nothing. The vanishing of these 
pseudo-problems takes away the possibility of saying anything 
meaningful about philosophy, ethics and aesthetics, value, God, the 
self, or the meaning of life or of the world. He accomplishes this result 
between two remarkable bookend propositions: “The world is all that 
is the case.” (TLP 1), which opens the Tractatus, and “What we cannot 
speak about, we must pass over in silence.” (TLP 7), which closes the 
book. 
In our admiration of the logical elegance of his maneuvers, we 
cannot forget that the project grew from a sensibility anchored by 
staunch adherence to the principle that sense must be determinate—
that is, that at bottom the world and language must have absolutely 
sharp edges. It is easy to see the appeal of this commitment: it is the 
Law of the Excluded Middle, the world of “Yes or No,” “On or Off.” 
Terry Eagleton’s script of the Derek Jarman film Wittgenstein places 
the following words in the mouth of a character based on the 
economist John Maynard Keynes, who says of Wittgenstein, 
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There was once a young man who dreamed of reducing the world to pure 
logic. Because he was a very clever young man, he actually managed to do it. 
And when he’d finished his work, he stood back and admired it. It was 
beautiful. A world purged of imperfection and indeterminacy. Countless 
acres of gleaming ice stretching to the horizon. So the clever young man 
looked around the world he had created, and decided to explore it. He took 
one step forward and fell flat on his back. You see, he had forgotten about 
friction. The ice was smooth and level and stainless, but you couldn’t walk 
there. So the clever young man sat down and wept bitter tears. But as he 
grew into a wise old man, he came to understand that roughness and 
ambiguity aren’t imperfections. They’re what make the world turn. He 
wanted to run and dance. And the words and things scattered upon this 
ground were all battered and tarnished and ambiguous, and the wise old man 
saw that that was the way things were. But something in him was still 
homesick for the ice, where everything was radiant and absolute and 
relentless. Though he had come to like the idea of the rough ground, he 
couldn’t bring himself to live there. So now he was marooned between earth 
and ice, at home in neither. And this was the cause of all his grief. (Eagleton 
1993, 142) 
But let us explore that world of ice. The world is all that is the case. 
What can be the case are facts, and facts have a definable nature: they 
are composed of objects. Objects correlate with names; names combine 
into propositions; propositions depict possible facts, and the totality of 
possible propositions—the exhaustive extent of what can be said—
composes the whole of language. Language and the world, then, are 
two great, articulated systems, each mirroring the other, coextensive in 
their bounds. Outside those bounds there is nothing, and there nothing 
can be said. 
Both the propositions of language and the facts of the world are 
structured according to logical form. To speak of logical form is to 
speak of the possible propositional combinations of the representatives 
of objects, and hence, about the possible combinations of objects 
themselves in states of affairs. This correlation of language with the 
world must be based at an atomic level, where absolutely simple signs 
are arrayed relative to each other in elementary propositions in ways 
that mirror the logical form of elementary facts—the arrangement of 
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their unanalyzably simple constituents, or objects. It is essential to a 
proposition that it have a determinate sense, capable of being true or 
false. And if sense is to be determinate, analysis must come to an end: 
therefore there must be simple constituents of propositions and of the 
facts they depict. 
A proposition shows its sense; that is, in its form it depicts the fact 
that is the case if it is true. And it says that “This is how things stand.” 
Wittgenstein distinguishes clearly between what language says, which 
is, again, “This is how things stand.” (cf. TLP 4.5), and what a 
proposition shows, which is how they do stand. This distinction is 
important because “What can be shown cannot be said.” (cf. TLP 
4.1212) And while language is restricted to saying, in effect, “It’s like 
this,” the “this” being a reference to what the proposition shows, 
propositional language cannot say how things stand; nor can it say how 
it shows it. So there is no science of logic, no discourse of philosophy. 
But the Tractatus itself of course is exactly that. 
So the Tractatus is composed of propositions which are, by its own 
standards nonsense. But instead of an embarrassment, the self-destruct-
tive bent of Wittgenstein’s doctrines is a touch of consummating 
elegance. In reaction to the threat of infinite regress of metalogical expla-
nations posed by Russell’s theories of logic, Wittgenstein proposed 
that logic must take care of itself. And that doctrine itself disappears so 
that logic may, in fact, do so. 
Like logic itself, all the problems of philosophy vanish into the realm 
of the ineffable. For example, scepticism disappears: “Scepticism is not 
irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts 
where no questions can be asked.” (TLP 6.51) And solipsism, with 
which Wittgenstein toyed for largely Schopenhauerian reasons, is 
strangely affirmed. But it amounts to nothing other than realism. Since 
the world is all that is the case, there can be no subject beholding it, so 
he affirms realism; i.e., the disappearance of the subject. On this reading 
there is no subject, and solipsism offers no substantive alternative to 
realism. But Wittgenstein says that what the solipsist wants to say is 
correct. What does he mean? 
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The self, as he describes it, is not essentially correlated with any 
human body: “[…] [M]y body [...] [he writes] is a part of the world 
among others[…]” (NB, 2.9.16), and “[w]hoever realizes this will not 
want to procure a pre-eminent place for his own body[...]” The self of 
this solipsism is a transcendent metaphysical subject—albeit a 
vanishing one—with which the totality of facts—reality, the world—
is coordinated. 
Along with this vanishing of the self, Wittgenstein insists that within 
the limits of language and the world, everything is valueless. On the 
linguistic side this assertion means that “It is impossible for there to be 
propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42), while in the world “everything 
happens as it does happen: in it no value exists, and if it did exist, it 
would have no value.” (TLP 6.41) A purported ethical proposition—
since it would have to mention a value and since that value could not 
obtain as an object in a fact—would contain a nonsensical sign. Such a 
purported proposition could not have a proper logical form, and would 
be itself nonsensical. 
Having disavowed any special standing or preferential consideration 
for the human body coordinated with the solipsistic subject, and 
having banished value from the world, Wittgenstein produces a curious 
set of remarks about happiness. It consists in a certain attitude toward 
the facts, namely, the attitude of wonder at the existence of the world. 
“It is not how things stand in the world that is mystical,” he writes, 
“but that the world exists” (TLP 6.44). The factuality of the world, 
then, is the beginning point of the mystical. But for the “fact” that the 
world exists to have a mystical significance, there must be a substantive 
solipsistic self outside the world for whom it has that significance, and 
in whose will—of attunement or agreement with the facts—that 
significance inheres. There must be a self for whom “the world of the 
happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man” (TLP 
6.43). This view of the world sub specie aeterni depends on the status of 
the metaphysical subject at the limits of the world—the self of 
transcendental idealism. In this way the whole realm of the mystical 
depends, for its integration into the mainstream of the Tractatus, on the 
correctness of this substantive solipsism. This must be what Wittgen-
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stein means in writing: “[…] [W]hat the solipsist means is quite correct, 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest” (TLP 5.62). 
It seems as if Wittgenstein’s discussion of happiness pertains to the 
psychological states of an embodied subject, a human being in the 
world. But this picture, to which we seem repeatedly driven, is ruled 
out by his assimilation of the phenomenal self into the world of facts. 
We then gravitate toward another picture—a transcendent metaphysi-
cal self to whom the world appears, capable of an attitudinal will that 
may affirm or struggle with it. But this picture is also ruled out, 
because it posits something beyond the facts, and violates the basic 
dictum that “The world is all that is the case.” Neither picture is consi-
stent with Wittgenstein’s fundamental system, and yet both are appa-
rently required to make sense of what Wittgenstein says about value, 
the will, and happiness. The combination cannot be reconciled. But 
Wittgenstein’s vision would be true only for a subject that was the sole 
observer of the world, and a pure intellect, a subject who was, while 
retaining an individuated perspective, also, in a sense, the world’s 
consciousness of itself. If we begin with the individuated subject, 
everything about it—body and perspective—must get pushed out into 
the world of facts until we are left with a point of view held by no 
one—the vanishing solipsistic subject of the Tractatus. And what we 
are left with is the world—everything. Only the God of pantheism 
could be construed as the self of Wittgenstein’s mysticism. 
The idea of God is the idea of a standpoint that brings everything 
into a single field and thus renders an intelligible totality—a whole. 
This standpoint corrects all partial perspectives by completing them, 
and in a determinate way fixes every individual thing and the totality as 
what it is. God is, then, that perspective from which things appear as 
they are. But a substantive God, regarding the world from the outside, 
would raise new problems. First of all, an extramundane God, like an 
extramundane self, would be something being the case beyond the 
world. Second, we should ask whether such a God has a representation 
of the world. If so, where is it? If it is in the world, then the world 
contains a perfect replica of itself—an impossibility. Or if that repre-
sentation is not in the world, then we have another violation of the 
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basic itself that the world contains all that there is. And if the world is 
not represented to God, then in what sense does God apprehend the 
world? God’s representation of the world, and thus God’s own being 
as an omniscient subject, can only be the very being of the world itself. 
Just as the self of solipsism collapses without remainder into the world, 
so the God of the omniscient perspective collapses in—as it were from 
the other side—without remainder. “The world is all that is the case.” 
(TLP 1) 
This analysis clarifies the manifold problem of understanding how 
there is a subject, while at the same time there is no subject, and yet 
somehow also the subject is identical with the totality of the facts as a 
whole—the world, while, further, the facts themselves in that same 
totality are God. The world in its logical order as a whole simply is God 
and the self is the same. That is why the self—divorced from the body 
and from an individuated perspective—vanishes, and yet persists as a 
sole, limiting perspective, and in that role tends toward absorption into 
both the world itself and into a God’s perspective on the world. 
Similarly, logical clarity about the order of the world, seeing it sub 
specie aeterni, as a whole limited by logic, simply is seeing its sense; i.e., 
seeing what the world shows, which is just that it is there. This awareness 
solves the problems of the will and of happiness, since there is, from 
this vantage point, nothing to say about value. There is just the world 
of facts, laid out in their inevitability. 
It is important to see that this solution is a version of the classical 
mystical perspective. It entails that the self is one with the world and 
with God. Accordingly, there is in this perspective the problem how to 
assert this unity in a way that evades both unintelligibility and false-
hood. Beyond that, the mystical solution provides a vantage point from 
which it is hard to see or explain how we could have been deluded in 
the first place: who is it who is unclear about logic, in the Tractatus? 
Finally, the solution, however appealing intellectually and spiritually, 
leaves the embodied human subject in a position that is very hard to 
account for conceptually, and impossible to live out. It will be instruct-
tive to compare this philosophical predicament with the view of God, 
self, and the world in Spinoza’s Ethics. 
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III. The Very Love With Which God Loves Himself 
The likeness of the Tractatus to Spinoza’s Ethics was first noted by 
George Edward Moore. In the discussions surrounding the publication 
of the book in England and its translation into English by C.K. Ogden, 
Wittgenstein’s advocates in that country discussed various titles. After 
consideration of simply Philosophy, and Philosophical Logic, the Latin 
title was suggested by Moore. Superficially, the Tractatus has an orga-
nization that is reminiscent of the Ethics. Short, numbered entries 
arranged in a tightly constructed logical order, using extreme conden-
sation of expression in a style intended, in its rigor, to echo the 
precision of mathematical reasoning. Each deals with absolutely 
elemental concepts: substance, attribute, being, and logic, world, 
object. And each moves from a logical consideration of what—in the 
most elemental sense—there is, to a set of dicta regarding the relation 
of the individual to God and the world as a whole, linking logic with 
mysticism. Both Spinoza and Wittgenstein produce systems in which 
clarity of logical insight yields an apprehension of ultimate meaning, 
the sense of things of which mystics have spoken. 
Spinoza’s core thought is that there can be only one substance, an 
infinitude we call God, or Nature. Mind and body are not substantial 
categories, but attributes which the mind perceives as constituting the 
essence of substance. But they are not different orders of being. 
Spinoza must be taken at his word in remarks like this: “The idea of the 
body and the body itself, that is, the mind and body, are one and the 
same individual, which is now conceived under the attribute of 
thought, and now under the attribute of extension.” (Ethics, Pt. II, 
Prop. XXI, Note.) This remark is typical of a dominant thread in 
Spinoza, emphasizing the substantial identity of things perceived under 
the attribute of thought (as mind) and under the attribute of extension 
(as body); that is, emphasizing that they are the same thing, perceived 
under different essences. It is in this spirit that Spinoza can assert the 
identity of God and Nature. This is the burden of Prop. VII in Pt. II: 
“The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things.” He means not just that there are two isomorphic 
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orders, but that there is only one ordering of things, perceived in one 
way as bodies and in another as ideas. It is with this in mind that we 
must approach his account of the formation of adequate and inadequate 
ideas, the activity and passivity of the mind, and their relation to the 
emotions and to happiness. 
The aim is to understand Spinoza’s idea of the intellectual love of 
God which makes it conceptually impossible to hope that God should 
love in return (Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XIX), because it is, in fact, the very 
love with which God loves himself (Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXVI). The 
route to this comprehension is through the doctrine of knowledge. 
Spinoza holds that there is no contingency in the nature of things, 
but that all things are determined and necessitated in their being 
(Ethics, Pt. I, Props. XXIX, XXXIII). Consequently, an adequate 
knowledge of things must consist in knowing them in their deter-
mination and necessity; that is, in relation to their causes. And as this 
sort of knowledge is an activity of reason (Ethics, Pt. II, Prop. XLIV, 
corollary), with regard to such knowledge the mind is active. The 
mind, then, is active in entertaining ideas of things in their necessary 
causal order (i.e., as eternal); that is, the mind is active in having 
adequate ideas. Inadequate ideas, on the other hand, are suffered by the 
mind. So the growth of knowledge in the acquisition of adequate ideas 
correlates with the growth of the mind’s rational activity. This correla-
tion is important, among other reasons, in its relation to the origins of 
the emotions. 
An emotion, Spinoza says, is a modification of the body. If we are 
the cause, it is an action, and a source of joy. If another is the cause, it is 
a passion, and a source of suffering (Ethics, Pt. III, Prop. I). He passes 
immediately from this stipulation to this corollary: “Hence it follows 
that the mind is more or less subject to passions according as it has 
more or less inadequate ideas, and, on the other hand, to more action 
the more adequate ideas it has.” The route, then, from the unhappiness 
of suffering to the happiness of action is the progress from undergoing 
the passion of inadequate ideas to undertaking the activity of enter-
taining adequate ones, and since the having of adequate ideas is seeing 
them according to reason, that is to say, in their necessary and eternal 
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causal order, it follows that the life of knowledge in reason is the happy 
life. Or to put it another way, happiness is seeing the world sub specie 
aeternitatis. 
The implication of this scheme emerges early in the Ethics. Already 
in Pt. II Spinoza writes: 
“The human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and thus 
when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say 
nothing else than that God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as 
he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he 
constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea.” The 
thought emerges again explicitly late in the text: “Our mind, in so far as 
it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by 
another eternal mode of thinking, and this one again by another, and so 
on to infinity: so that they all constitute at the same time the eternal 
and infinite intellect of God.” (Ethics Pt. V, Prop. XL, Note) 
To sum this up, Spinoza’s system, then, is one in which the indivi-
duated mind and the individuated body are substantially identical—
the same thing—considered once under the aspect of ideas and once as 
among extended things. The whole order of things is substantially one, 
as God or as Nature. And the individual mind, growing in its 
understanding of the rational order of things, participates in the mind 
of God. If it could grow infinitely in knowledge, it would be that 
mind. Thus its love for God cannot be returned, for the love of God is 
not a different love: “The mental intellectual love towards God is the 
very love of God with which God loves himself [...] in so far as he can 
be expressed through the essence of the human mind considered under 
the species of eternity” (Ethics, Pt. V, Prop. XXXVI). 
The individuated human mind must come to a realization—with the 
growth of its action and happiness, its entertainment of adequate ideas 
and its apprehension of the world under the aspect of the eternal—of 
its identity with the mind of God. What’s the problem here? 
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IV. Importantly Wrong 
The likeness of this outcome to Wittgenstein’s is too striking to be 
coincidental. The explanation for the likeness is that both Wittgenstein 
and Spinoza attempt with exemplary rigor to work out a fully analyzed 
account of the relation of reason—the mind’s possession of adequate 
ideas, for Spinoza, and for Wittgenstein, the structure of propositions 
and their semantic relation—to the world. Both, in so doing, arrive at 
conclusions which identify the world, in the eternity and necessity of 
the logical relations of its constituents, with God, and the knowing self, 
in so far as it achieves adequate understanding, enters into this complex, 
making it a unified triad of world, self, and God. And for both 
Wittgenstein and Spinoza the unity of the triad is the fulfilment that 
resolves life’s problems. 
Spinoza, of course, evoked outrage from the orthodox of all stripes, 
being expelled from the Amsterdam synagogue with elaborate curses, 
despised by Catholic and Protestant alike, and suffering the most ironic 
of indignities—being excoriated as an atheist by David Hume. 
Wittgenstein evoked only puzzlement, perhaps most of all from the 
brisk, science-minded philosophers who had expected him to share 
their atheism and their general disdain for religious thought. But both 
drew the reactions they did because they articulated the traditional 
essence of mysticism: the ideas that all—call it world or God—is 
ultimately one, and that one’s self is somehow identical with that great 
unity. 
There is, of course, another problem with this mysticism. How can 
we understand the assertion of the identity of the individual with the 
world and with God. If the self is unified with God and the world, 
how is it that we begin with a perspective that is individuated and 
partial? Why is there unclarity about logical form? How is it possible 
that there are inadequate ideas? There must be some truth in indivi-
duation in order for error to be possible, in order for there to be such a 
thing as striving toward a realization of the truth. And once truth is 
articulated and gained, how it is that our perspective remains indivi-
duated and partial? How can the world, having waxed with meaning, 
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wane again? How, having seen the world sub specie aeternitatis, can I 
remain plagued with partial knowledge? I believe that much of the tor-
tuous detail work in Spinoza’s Ethics and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is 
the attempt to weave continually back into the individuated perspective 
from a progression of thought that is headed out toward unity with 
God. 
That detail work is tortuous because the perspectives cannot be 
made to coincide. For the perspectives to coincide the individuated 
perspective would have to remain its individuation (and thus be one 
perspective among many, a part of the whole) while at the same time 
being the universal perspective itself. Leaving aside the problem of 
imagining what “the universal perspective” could possibly be, we can 
see that for the two to coincide would be this: that the big picture 
contains itself, in itself, as one part among many. In Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein entertains the idea of a city that contains in 
a central square a map of itself. Suppose that this map contains a 
depiction of the square, and of the map itself, within which would have 
to be a depiction of the square and the map again, within which [...], 
and so on infinitely. What this shows is that under the rigor of fully 
explicit analysis, the idea of a whole containing itself as one of its parts 
yields a vicious infinite regress. That is to say, it is logically impossible. 
And that means that it is incoherent to suppose that a perspective can 
assume the viewpoint of God while retaining any semblance of indivi-
duation as an item within the world that is depicted. The standpoint 
cannot be attained because it is logically impossible. 
Furthermore, unavoidable facts of everyday life offer constant remin-
ders that the philosopher views the world from a partial, individuated 
perspective. This problem is insuperable for anyone who attempts to 
live out the world-picture of either book, as Wittgenstein attempted 
with the Tractatus. Perhaps the most revealing comment on the 
unliveability of the Tractatus is Wittgenstein’s confession in a letter to 
Paul Engelmann: “I am in a state of mind that is terrible to me […] it is 
the state of not being able to get over a particular fact” (Engelmann, 
33). If the self has vanished, and all particular facts are valueless, how 
could this predicament occur? 
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Let me now try to state the problem more generally, and in so doing 
show that Spinoza and Wittgenstein are importantly wrong in the same 
way. There is a fundamental conceptual problem: it consists in the 
attempt to articulate a system in which the perspective from which the 
system is developed is an item in the system itself. The perspective of 
the system will be prone to the absurdities of self-reference. It must 
depict itself as an item within its own act of depiction: it must contain 
itself. Both Wittgenstein and Spinoza attempt to finesse this contradic-
tion by inconsistently moving from one standpoint to the other and 
back again—that is, from the standpoint of the individuated human 
subject, body and all, to the standpoint of the transcendent, non-
individuated subjectivity of God, while attempting—both of them—
to reconcile the inconsistency by bringing both subjects into identity 
with the world itself. 
How does this show that they are importantly wrong? The inclina-
tion they manifest clearly—so clearly that it becomes actually possible 
to see how it is wrong—is the inclination to portray our apprehension 
of the world on the model of a subject who surveys it from no parti-
cular perspective—from everywhere and nowhere, a perspective which 
is not essentially related to a particular, embodied, culturally and 
historically conditioned human being. It is what Thomas Nagel has 
called “the view from nowhere”. And its corrective is the perspective 
of the later Wittgenstein, locating our rationality in the context of “the 
natural history of humanity,” not in the abstract thought of a lone 
subject yearning for union with the world and God. 
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‘Objectively there is no truth’ – Wittgenstein and 
Kierkegaard on Religious Belief 
Genia Schönbaumsfeld 
Kierkegaard’s influence on Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief 
was profound, but this hasn’t so far been given the attention it 
deserves. Although Wittgenstein wrote comparatively little on the 
subject, while the whole of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre has a religious theme, 
both philosophers have become notorious for refusing to construe 
religious belief in either of the two traditional ways: as a ‘propositional 
attitude’ on the one hand or as a mere ‘emotional response’ with no 
reference to the ‘real world’ on the other. This refusal to play by the 
orthodox dichotomies, as it were, has led to gross misrepresentation of 
their thought by numerous commentators. Neither Wittgenstein nor 
Kierkegaard has been immune to allegations of both ‘relativism’ and 
‘fideism’, although neither charge could be wider of the mark. It is not 
that Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard reject the role that reason has to 
play in both religion and philosophy, but that they try to undermine 
from within certain common assumptions about the nature of both 
religious faith and the point of philosophical activity that make us 
believe that the traditional dichotomies exhaust all the available 
options.  
What I hope to show in this paper is that more sense can be made of 
Wittgenstein’s controversial remarks on religion, if we juxtapose them 
with Kierkegaard’s religious thought, especially that of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym,1 Johannes Climacus, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
The focal point of this paper is going to be the attempt to read what 
little Wittgenstein has to say about this topic through the lens of 
                                          
1 Given space constraints, I cannot address the problem of how to read Kierke-
gaard’s pseudonyms here. 
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Climacus’ claim that ‘objectively there is no truth; an objective know-
ledge about the truth or the truths of Christianity is precisely untruth.’ 
I will begin by giving a brief exposition of Climacus’ views, will then 
sketch out what Wittgenstein has to say on the matter and will then 
attempt to bring the two together. In the remainder of the paper I will 
assess the implications of Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s conception 
as well as address some of the problems that their account might be 
said to engender. 
I. Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
Climacus is well known for claiming in the Postscript that in religious 
matters ‘truth is subjectivity’. What he means by this is that because for 
him, as for Wittgenstein, the question of faith is not an ‘objective’, 
‘empirical’ issue which can be resolved by appeal to evidence, historical 
or otherwise, we have to concentrate instead on the ‘existential’ or ‘per-
sonal’ significance that this question has for us. This is what Climacus 
means by ‘subjectivity’—i.e. pertaining to the ‘subject’—and this has 
nothing to do with relativism or ‘irrationalism’, as commentators often 
suppose. Climacus says:  
The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into some-
thing accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing 
something. The way to objective truth goes away from the subject, and 
while the subject and subjectivity become indifferent, the truth becomes 
indifferent, and that is precisely its objective validity, because the interest, 
just like the decision is subjectivity. (Kierkegaard 1992, 193)  
In other words, precisely because religious belief does not, on this 
view, consist of assenting to propositions, it follows that in order to 
resolve the question of faith I must be infinitely interested in it as an 
existing person, not as a lofty scholar. For religious belief, on this 
conception, is something much more fundamental than simply being of 
the opinion that God exists. Therefore, even if evidence could be had, 
then on Climacus’ and Wittgenstein’s view, it would no longer be 
religious belief, and the belief in the Last Judgement, for example, 
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would not be fundamentally different from the secular belief that one 
will be put into prison for certain crimes. Of course the very concept 
of ‘belief’ would then become obsolete too, as, on this conception, it 
makes no sense to say that I believe in something that is, as it were, 
before my ‘very eyes’. That is, in a world where ‘God’ could ‘empiri-
cally manifest’ himself, our concept of a ‘God’ to be believed in would 
lose its point. Climacus puts it like this:  
Without risk, no faith. Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion 
of inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am able to apprehend God 
objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have 
faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it that I hold 
fast to the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I 
am out on 70,000 fathoms of water and still have faith. (Kierkegaard 1992, 
204)  
What Climacus means by ‘objective uncertainty’ isn’t, therefore, empi-
rical uncertainty, but rather the kind of uncertainty that accrues to 
making certain ‘existential’ choices. The ‘70,000 fathoms of water’ do 
not refer to the extreme degree of ‘empirical uncertainty’, then, but to 
the intellectual and existential risk you take when you stop pondering a 
question ‘objectively’ and rather want to resolve it by making a deci-
sion, i.e. by changing the way you live in the relevant way. What 
Climacus is consequently referring to is the risk of commitment—and 
that is always a risk, be it in the religious domain or in other walks of 
life where you cannot remain dispassionate and disinterested (what 
Climacus means by ‘objectivity’). Where something can be resolved 
objectively, however, faith, on this view, becomes conceptually impos-
sible and passion becomes madness. Hence, someone, says Climacus, 
who clings to something finite that could be settled objectively with 
the passion appropriate only to faith is on the brink of insanity (which 
is just what happens in the case of religious fanatics or religious funda-
mentalists). 
According to Climacus, taking God to be amenable to some kind of 
empirical investigation or thinking that some sort of ‘direct’ relation-
ship with Him is possible, is really nothing more than paganism. As he 
puts it:  
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If God had taken the form, for example, of a rare, enormously large green 
bird with a red beak, that perched in a tree on the embankment and perhaps 
even whistled in an unprecedented manner—then our partygoing man 
would surely have had his eyes opened. […] All paganism consists in this, 
that God is related directly to a human being, as the remarkably striking to 
the amazed. (Kierkegaard 1992, 245)  
Therefore, if it is the latter that people take Christianity to be, then, for 
Climacus, they are either pagans in disguise or hypocrites. 
Consequently, on Climacus’ conception, Christianity is not a philo-
sophical theory and the apostles are not a little professional society of 
scholars. This means that the question of whether to have faith in 
Christ (the Incarnation, what Climacus calls the ‘absolute paradox’) 
only genuinely arises for someone who wants to be a Christian, not for 
someone who is merely pondering this issue from an ‘objective’ point 
of view:  
Objectively there is no truth; an objective knowledge about the truth or the 
truths of Christianity is precisely untruth. To know a creed by rote is paga-
nism, because Christianity is inwardness. (Kierkegaard 1992, 224)  
Hence, the attempt to relate to Christianity ‘objectively’, as if to a meta-
physical theory, is the worst possible misunderstanding. As Climacus 
says: 
Suppose that Christianity does not at all want to be understood; suppose 
that, in order to express this and to prevent anyone, misguided, from taking 
the road of objectivity, it has proclaimed itself to be the paradox. Suppose 
that it wants to be only for existing persons and essentially for persons 
existing in inwardness, in the inwardness of faith, which cannot be expressed 
more definitely than this: it is the absurd, 2  adhered to firmly with the 
passion of the infinite.’ (Kierkegaard 1992, 214) 
The emphasis on ‘existence’ is crucial here, because Climacus believes that 
it is impossible for any finite, existing being to apprehend truth sub 
specie aeterni (which is just what the Hegelians against which Kierke-
                                           
2 By ‘absurd’ Climacus means something resistant to ‘objectification’ (and 
consequently ‘mediation’). 
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gaard was reacting denied). The reason why Climacus is emphasizing 
the finitude of human beings is, I think, because it is an awareness of 
finitude that tends to draw people out of and away from themselves, as 
it were, in the search of an objective point of view—of the God’s eye 
view. Christians are just as finite as anybody else. Therefore Christians 
too exhibit this tendency, and this is why the figure of Christ 
represents a continuing challenge even from the perspective of the 
Christian way of living. The challenge, or the on-going struggle, is 
continually to reaffirm oneself, as a Christian, as someone with the 
relevant unconditional commitments, sustained in the face of the 
temptations to objectivity with which one’s finitude presents one. 
Thus, getting away from seeing the Incarnation as an intellectual or 
philosophical problem is not something that one can do once and for 
all. Rather, it is something that one has to keep on doing, and it is in 
that process that the authentically Christian relation to the under-
standing (and indeed to the relation between faith and the under-
standing) can be recognized. 
From the non-Christian perspective, then, the paradox cannot be 
understood. From the Christian perspective, the paradox is Christ, the 
God-Man, the ‘sign of contradiction’, who is a mere human being to 
non-believers but God to the faithful. But precisely because Christ is 
such a ‘sign of contradiction’, whether He is in deed God, is not 
something that can be settled by theoretical means and consequently 
faith does not consist of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the ‘thesis’ that ‘Christ 
is the Son of God’. When Climacus therefore speaks of the paradox as 
‘absolute’, what he means is that only an existential (‘subjective’) 
response to the question is possible in the sense that I either become a 
follower of Christ or I reject Him: offence or faith. No theoretical 
ground is available here to determine whether the ‘thesis’ or its 
converse is philosophically defensible or not. And as long as I am in 
the faith and have an existence-relation to Christ, the very idea that I 
should regard my religious commitment as commitment to a 
theoretical claim which may stand in the need of proof, will strike me 
as ludicrous and absurd. In moments of doubt, however, which are 
generally moments of detachment, I may indeed begin to see my faith 
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in such terms, and from such a perspective it may seem to me that 
Christianity is a bizarre metaphysical doctrine about the ‘two natures’ 
of Christ3, say. But this is a temptation, a sign that I am beginning to 
lose my faith, not the ‘correct’, because ‘objective’, point of view. Thus, 
the difficulty of becoming a Christian consists, among other things, of 
the ever-present struggle against the temptation to view the claims of 
Christianity objectively—a struggle so intense that Climacus calls it a 
‘martyrdom’.  
II. Culture and Value and On Certainty  
In Culture and Value Wittgenstein makes the following remark: 
Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring 
this about; but I don’t mean visions and other forms of sense experience 
which show us “the existence of this being”, but, e.g., sufferings of various 
sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an 
object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, 
thoughts—life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the 
concept of “object”. (last italics mine) (CV 1950, 86) 
What Wittgenstein is suggesting here by drawing an analogy between 
the concept ‘God’ and the concept ‘object’ is that the former functions 
more like the formal concept ‘object’ (Gegenstand) than like a word 
referring to a particular thing, such as a table, chair, white elephant or 
what have you. In other words, the two concepts are grammatically 
similar, according to Wittgenstein, in the sense that they would both 
make for nonsense when employed in the subject-place of ontological 
assertions: it would make as little sense, on Wittgenstein’s view, to 
assert (or to deny) that objects exist as it does to assert (or to deny) that 
God exists. The reasons for this, initially perhaps rather baffling, claim 
are as follows: contrary to Moore, who insisted on the truth of this 
proposition against the sceptic, Wittgenstein thinks that the propo-
sition ‘there are physical objects’ is a piece of philosophical nonsense, 
                                           
3 Of course I can also have moments of being, as it were, ‘existentially’ offended 
at Christ à la Nietzsche.  
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as, according to him, it is not an empirical proposition for which one 
could have evidence. Wittgenstein says: 
But can’t it be imagined that there should be no physical objects? I don’t 
know. And yet “there are physical objects” is nonsense. Is it supposed to be 
an empirical proposition? – And is this an empirical proposition: “There 
seem to be physical objects”? (OC, 35) 
In order for the proposition ‘there are physical objects’ to make sense, 
it would have to be possible to know or to explain what would have to 
be the case if there were no physical objects. Should the proposition 
make sense, then it would have to be a kind of hypothesis, for which 
one could have evidence. But what would such evidence look like? 
Moore held the view that it is possible to infer ‘there are physical 
objects’ from the proposition ‘here is a hand’, but this was an illusion. 
For the latter means no more than that a hand is a physical object, and 
far from being an ontological hypothesis, this, according to Wittgen-
stein, is no more than a grammatical proposition that tells us what kind 
of thing a hand is. If this were an ontological hypothesis, then we 
would have to be able to indicate what would count as evidence for it, 
what as evidence against it, how the question could be settled beyond 
any reasonable doubt. But it is just this that is impossible, for we 
cannot explain what would be different if there were no physical 
objects, and, consequently, we also cannot explain what is the case 
when physical objects do exist. Furthermore, it is even less possible to 
give criteria for what would have to be the case if physical objects only 
seemed to exist, but do not actually do so (the classical sceptical 
scenario). All of this indicates that the proposition ‘there are physical 
objects’ is not an empirical one. No sense-perception or impression of 
an object (such as a hand) can lead us to the conclusion that there are 
physical objects, for the concept of ‘physical object’ is not a theoretical 
one, nor is it employed in the same way as the concept of a particular 
object. Therefore it makes sense to say ‘there are frogs’ or ‘there are no 
unicorns’, as the opposite of these sentences also makes sense, but not 
to say ‘there are physical objects’.  
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In other words, it only makes sense to doubt whether there are 
physical objects, if it also makes sense to assert it. But it only makes 
sense to assert it, if, at least in principle, there exists a means of settling 
the question. In the case of physical objects in general, we have no such 
means. For we might, for example, have evidence for the existence of 
life on Mars, but we couldn’t have evidence for the existence of 
physical objects in general, as neither ‘sense-data’ nor Quinean ‘surface 
irradiations’ constitute such evidence. Pace Moore, I don’t infer the 
existence of an object from the sense-impression. Of course I know 
that someone or something is present inasmuch as I see them. But to 
see an object is not a ‘surface irradiation’ or ‘sense-datum’ and although 
it involves perceptual stimuli, I am ignorant of them and make no 
inferences from them. That is to say, perceiving an object is not 
evidence for its existence in the way that fingerprints, for example, are 
evidence for someone’s having been at the scene of a crime. Conse-
quently, there is no such thing as ‘demonstrating’ that my hand exists. 
Of course, there are cases where it makes sense to speak of having 
evidence for the existence of something—life on Mars, distant planets, 
Great Pumpkins etc.—but where it is a matter of being directly confron-
ted by something in ordinary circumstances, such as by a hand, say, it 
does not make sense, since in such cases doubt is logically excluded: 
talk of evidence is only meaningful if there is also logical space for 
being wrong and here there is none. As Wittgenstein says: 
If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he 
declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard 
him as demented. (OC, 155)  
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard therefore agree that it is a mistake to 
want to demonstrate God’s existence. In Climacus’ words:  
To demonstrate the existence of someone who exists is the most shameless 
assault, since it is an attempt to make him ludicrous, but the trouble is that 
one does not even suspect this, that in dead seriousness one regards it as a 
godly undertaking. […] A king’s existence or presence ordinarily has its own 
expression of subjection and submissiveness. What if one in his most maje-
stic presence wanted to demonstrate that he exists? Does one demonstrate it, 
then? No, one makes a fool of him, because one demonstrates his presence 
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by the expression of submissiveness. […] And thus one also demonstrates 
the existence of God by worship—not by demonstrations. (Kierkegaard 
1992, 545f.)  
Two objections to this conception might suggest themselves at this 
point. First, we would not regard someone who was not religious as 
demented and second, if it makes sense to speak of having evidence for 
non-directly-perceivable things, then, given that on Climacus’ view, 
God is not directly perceivable, why can we not talk of inferring the 
existence of God in the way we might infer the existence of black 
holes, say? I will take these objection in turn. 
(i) Objection One 
While someone who pronounced the opposite of those propositions 
that Moore declares certain would be regarded as demented, someone 
who declared the opposite of what the religious person affirms, would 
not. This is indeed so, but this isn’t fatal to Wittgenstein’s account. For 
of course Wittgenstein holds in On Certainty that declaring either 
Moore’s propositions or their converse certain is misconceived. If it is 
the case that ‘there are physical objects’ is grammatical and not 
empirical, then neither the proposition nor its converse can be affirmed 
or denied. For grammatical remarks are neither true nor false, as they 
assert nothing (no state of affairs). Rather, they function as conditions 
of sense (rules) without which the form of life they are grammatical to 
would become unintelligible or lose its point. What Wittgenstein is 
therefore saying when he says we would regard someone as demented 
who affirmed the opposite of what Moore said is that if someone said 
this and actually meant it—i.e. wasn’t just, say, engaging in a philo-
sophical dispute about realism—then this person would become 
unintelligible to us and we could no longer understand him or make 
any sense of him. 
Naturally, in the religious case, we are confronted with ‘pluralism’ in 
the sense that there is not just one way of looking at human life. That is 
to say, while losing one’s religious faith would neither wholly under-
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mine one’s ability to act in and think about the world, nor leave that 
ability entirely unaltered, denying that there are physical objects would 
(either undermine one’s ability or leave it completely unaltered). In this 
respect there is indeed a significant disanalogy between the concept 
‘God’ and the concept ‘object’. But this is compatible with the view 
that Wittgenstein’s analogy nevertheless shows something important, 
namely, that just as one can’t make an inference from the existence of 
tables and chairs to the existence of physical objects, so one can’t make 
an inference from the existence of the universe (or of religious 
experience etc.) to the existence of God. ‘There is a God’ is 
consequently just as little an ontological (hypo)thesis as ‘there are 
physical objects’. So there are no a priori reasons why a community 
should possess the concept of ‘God’, any more than a society need have 
our abstract concept of ‘physical object’. That is to say, a tribe could 
perfectly well have the concepts ‘chair’, ‘turnip’, ‘pigeon’ etc. and treat 
these things in the way that we do without thinking that they all have 
one property in common, namely, that they are all physical objects.  
Does asserting any of this deny ‘the reality of God’—something that 
‘orthodox’ Christians are often worried about? Not at all. Wittgenstein 
and Kierkegaard are only saying that the ‘reality of God’ is not on a 
par with the ‘reality of empirical objects’ and that consequently, it 
makes no sense to approach God ‘objectively’—as if relating to an 
empirical concept or to a metaphysical theory. Hence, it is only if we 
desire the ‘reality of God’ to be akin to that of (super-)empirical 
objects (something that both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard would call 
conceptually confused) that their account could legitimately be accused 
of denying anything. 
(ii) Objection Two 
There are two possible responses to the second objection. First, ‘evi-
dence’, in the religious case, does not play the role it usually does when 
we are dealing with evidence for the existence of empirical objects. 
Second, if it made sense to ask for evidence of God’s existence, then the 
proposition ‘God exists’ would have to be a hypothesis for which we 
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would have to be able to specify what would, at least in principle, count 
as confirmation or disconfirmation of it. But this is just as impossible 
as in the ‘there are physical objects’ case. 
What Wittgenstein is trying to bring out by way of the analogy is 
that, just as we cannot infer the proposition ‘there are objects’ from the 
proposition ‘here is a hand’, in the case of religious belief it is also not a 
matter of making inferences from certain sense-perceptions. For religious 
experiences do not stand to the proposition ‘there is a God’ as, say, 
satellite pictures of the earth (or of Loch Ness monsters, black holes or 
what have you) stand to the proposition ‘the earth is round’ (as 
Wittgenstein says, we did not learn the concept ‘God’ by being shown 
pictures of him, nor ‘could’ we be shown pictures of him and the 
nature of this ‘could’ is logical). There simply is nothing that we would 
ordinarily call an ‘evidential basis’ here. Would seeing Christ rise from 
his grave constitute such evidence? But if we are not religious, would 
we be seeing Christ as opposed to, say, some bizarre and hitherto 
unexplained phenomenon? 
The main reason why I think that Wittgenstein would want to insist 
that ‘God exists’ is grammatical is that, if we are not religious already, 
nothing would count as ‘evidence for the existence of God’ for us, even 
if we could, per impossibile, have any. For we could always explain 
even the most outlandish events simply as strange natural phenomena. 
This is also the reason why no one, even in principle, bothers to mount 
a search for God (which would really be the sensible thing to do, if one 
thinks that ‘there is a God’ is similar to ‘there is a Loch Ness monster’). 
That this idea seems ludicrous, even funny, shows, I think, that 
language is idling when we try to construe religious belief analogously 
to empirical beliefs.  
Furthermore, it is possible to describe what would be different, or 
what would have to be the case, if there were unicorns, or if there were 
a Loch Ness monster, but not how it would be if there were a God, or 
how it would be if God existed. For nothing would change in the 
world if God existed—at least nothing that would be cashable out in 
propositions. This is, I think, the significance of Wittgenstein’s remark 
in the Tractatus that ‘God does not manifest himself in the world’ 
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(TLP 6.432). Of course the world of the religious person is in some 
sense a different world to that of the atheist, just as Wittgenstein said in 
the Tractatus that the world of the happy person is a different world to 
that of the unhappy. But this ‘difference’ does not show up on a 
‘propositional’ level—the empirical world remains the same and yet 
the atheist would say other things about it than the religious person. 
Wittgenstein says:  
God’s essence is supposed to guarantee his existence—what this really 
means is that what is at issue here is not the existence of something.  
Couldn’t one actually say equally well that the essence of colour guarantees 
its existence? As opposed, say, to white elephants. Because all that really 
means is: I cannot explain what ‘colour’ is, what the word ‘colour’ means, 
except with the help of a colour sample. So in this case there is no such thing 
as explaining ‘what it would be like if colours were to exist’.  
And now we might say: There can be a description of what it would be like 
if there were gods on Olympus—but not: ‘what it would be like if there 
were such a thing as God.’ And to say this is to determine the concept ‘God’ 
more precisely. (CV 1949, 82) 
The reason why it is possible to describe what it would be like if 
there were Gods on Mount Olympus is because in pagan religions the 
deities are on a par with other empirical objects, just vastly more 
powerful. There is therefore no grammatical difference between talk of, 
say, Poseidon and talk of an ordinary human being, except that 
Poseidon has super-human powers. But this is ultimately not qualita-
tively different from encountering, say, a new species from a distant 
planet who have powers surpassing our own. In Christianity (and 
other monotheistic religions) talk of God is not like that, however. The 
grammar of the word ‘God’ does not function analogously to talk of 
some empirical object, as any state of affairs in the world is taken by 
the religious person to be compatible with God’s existence (and the 
converse is probably true of the atheist). One could perhaps therefore 
say that during the transition from paganism to Christianity the word 
‘God’ underwent a grammatical shift and changed from being some 
kind of super-empirical concept to a grammatical one. When some-
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thing becomes a grammatical remark, of course, it is ex hypothesi 
impossible to describe what the world would have to be like, were the 
grammatical remark to be true, as grammatical remarks function as 
conditions of sense and cannot therefore themselves be either true or 
false.  
III. Implications of Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s Conception 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard agree that religious belief is non-rational: 
it is neither reasonable nor unreasonable, as faith is not the result of 
philosophical deliberation or the consequence of weighing up empirical 
evidence. But in this respect the religious form of life is not, in the end, 
so very different from other language-games or forms of life, for as 
Wittgenstein says in On Certainty, ‘You must bear in mind that the 
language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not 
based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there—
like our life.’ (PI §559) Faith cannot be objectively justified (for if it 
could, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard would agree, it would eo ipso not 
be faith), but ultimately, what Wittgenstein is saying in On Certainty is 
that none of the concepts that lie at the heart of our forms of life can be 
so justified. In this respect use of the word ‘object’ can no more be 
justified than use of the word ‘God’, and yet the employment of these 
terms need not, for all that, be in the least arbitrary. As Wittgenstein 
keeps reiterating: life forces these concepts on us.4  
                                          
4 Now in the case of physical objects one might think that one is more ‘forced’ 
than in the religious case, although I am not entirely sure what that is really 
supposed to mean. If this means only that physical objects can be perceived, but 
God cannot and direct perceivability is the criterion of ‘forcedness’, then 
Wittgenstein would agree (as would any religious person) that in the case of 
physical objects one is more ‘forced’. If it means that one cannot in all 
seriousness doubt that there are physical objects, while one can doubt whether 
there is a God, then, naturally Wittgenstein, I take it, would also agree. If one, 
however, takes this to imply that therefore the former is more ‘true’ and more 
‘certain’ than the latter, then I think that Wittgenstein would object. For as he 
has argued, neither belief is a hypothesis and even if it were one, there would not 
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While it seems fairly clear, however, how life forces the concept of 
‘object’ on us, it is far from clear how this happens in the case of God. 
Given that Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard have both repudiated all 
‘objective’ approaches to religion, one might wonder how one can 
come to have faith at all. In Practice in Christianity Anti-Climacus per-
haps gives a rather surprising answer to this question which Climacus 
had left hanging in the Postscript:  
But if the essentially Christian is something so terrifying and appalling, 
how in the world can anyone think of accepting Christianity?” Very simply 
and, if you wish that also, very Lutheranly: only the consciousness of sin can 
force one, if I dare to put it that way […], into this horror[…]. Considered in 
any other way Christianity is and must be a kind of madness or the greatest 
horror. (Kierkegaard 1991, 67)  
Now Wittgenstein doesn’t speak of ‘consciousness of sin’, but in the 
foregoing quotation from Culture and Value he says that life can 
educate one to a belief in God and he cites, for example, ‘sufferings of 
various sorts’. 
What Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard seem to be saying here is that 
the shape of one’s life and the experiences one has can teach one a use 
for certain religious concepts. This is why all of Kierkegaard’s pseudo-
nyms keep stressing the existential (i.e. ‘subjective’) dimension of faith. 
Being religious means living life according to the Christian teachings 
and examining one’s life according to the Christian categories. One 
simply has to find these concepts appropriate in despite of any problems 
they may cause, as Anti-Climacus keeps emphasizing. It is only within 
the life of a religious person, then, that religious concepts become 
properly meaningful. Taken out of context, as it were, these concepts 
cannot but strike one as part and parcel of some obsolete metaphysical 
doctrine. How one therefore comes to have faith must, in the end, 
remain a ‘subjective’ matter. Just as there is no ‘recipe’ for how to live, 
                                           
be any absolute justification for it. As he puts it: “Well, if everything speaks for 
an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may 
designate it as such. – But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? – 
With this question you are already going round in a circle.” (OC, 191) 
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there is no ‘recipe’ for how to have faith. This is ultimately the signifi-
cance of Climacus’ remark that as regards Christianity ‘objectively 
there is no truth’. 
IV. Conclusion 
By way of concluding, I will briefly address a criticism that is frequently 
made of both Wittgenstein’s and Kierkegaard’s conception of religious 
belief. Many commentators have taken the foregoing to imply that 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard are equally guilty of reducing religion to 
simply living life in a certain way, which, they think, can do no justice 
to what religious people actually believe. This, I think, is erroneous 
and in part a result of being mesmerized by two exhaustive seeming 
dichotomies: either religious beliefs can be cashed out propositionally 
(realism) or they reduce merely to taking up a certain kind of attitude 
(anti-realism). However, there are many domains of discourse, where 
this stark either/or is simply inappropriate, ethics and aesthetics also 
being cases in point. 
I think that one of the main motivating factors behind Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy is to show that there is no such thing as ‘simply living 
life in a certain kind of way’ as opposed to ‘believing certain things’. 
Genuine beliefs can never be divorced from the consequences they have 
in one’s life. That is why Wittgenstein, for example, holds that idealism 
or global scepticism is really a non-starter, for all it reduces to, in the 
end, is talking in a certain way without this making any practical 
difference at all. As Wittgenstein says:  
For there are people who say that it is merely extremely probable that water 
over a fire will boil and not freeze, and that therefore strictly speaking what 
we consider impossible is only improbable. What difference does this make 
in their lives? Isn’t it just that they talk rather more about certain things than 
the rest of us do? (OC, 338) 
Beliefs and the forms of life which are their home cannot be divorced 
from each other. There is no such thing as believing something in 
vacuo—without a context—unless one thinks that believing is tanta-
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mount to holding a certain mental image before one’s mind.5 Conse-
quently, it is not the case that Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard deny that 
religious people believe different things to non-religious people—far 
from it. What they are denying, however, is that any sense can be made 
of those beliefs completely independently of the form of life which 
gives them sense. That is to say, stating that Christians believe, for 
example, in the forgiveness of sins, is, as yet, not to have said anything 
apart from, as Climacus would undoubtedly say, reciting a formula by 
rote.  
In this respect it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein, contrary to 
Kierkegaard, who, on all accounts of him, was obsessed by his ‘sins’, 
nevertheless could not become a genuinely religious person. So, it 
seems that Anti-Climacus’ claim that only ‘consciousness of sin’ can 
force one into Christianity leaves something rather fundamental out. It 
is not only consciousness of sin that is necessary, but also the belief 
that one’s sins will ultimately be forgiven by Jesus Christ, the 
Redeemer.6 It appears to be the latter that Wittgenstein could not bring 
himself to accept. As Wittgenstein puts it:  
I read: “No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost.”—
And it is true: I cannot call him Lord; because that says nothing to me. I 
could call him the ‘paragon’, ‘God’ even—or rather, I can understand it 
when he is called thus; but I cannot utter the word “Lord” with meaning. 
Because I do not believe that he will come to judge me; because that says 
nothing to me. And it could say something to me, only if I lived completely 
differently. (CV 1937, 33) 
This quotation, I think, illustrates very well that Wittgenstein does not 
hold that religious people don’t believe different things to non-reli-
gious people. Consequently, he is not advocating some form of ‘anti-
realism’ about religion. However, he does agree with Kierkegaard that 
the Christian teaching addresses primarily the individual’s life and the 
                                          
5 I cannot go into the reasons why Wittgenstein takes this to be a misguided 
conception of belief here. For a detailed exposition, see my A Confusion of the 
Spheres, chapter four. 
6 This is an issue that Anti-Climacus discusses in The Sickness unto Death. 
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way the individual thinks about and assesses his life, not the mind of 
the speculative philosopher, as ‘formal’ proofs or ‘evidence’ (if there 
could, per impossibile, be such things) would never exert motivation 
enough for a life-change as drastic as that required by Christianity. 
Therefore, both philosophers would agree that the way of ‘objectivity’ 
leads only into darkness, or, what for Climacus would amount to the 
same, reduces Christianity to paganism7.  
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EUKLID -  Studien 1
The essays collected in this volume explore some of the themes that have been at the 
centre of recent debates within Wittgensteinian scholarship. This book is an attempt to 
express the difficult nature of ethics, mysticism and religion, their problematic status in 
the modern world, and the possible justifications for ethical and religious commitment. 
Naturally, it also discusses some of the main ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. His very 
personal and often aphoristic way of writing cannot simply be restated or interpreted. 
However, his philosophy is in need of interpretation, and interpretations are — as we all 
know — often rather controversial.
The collected contributions aim, therefore, at bringing new insight into the essence of 
Wittgenstein‘s ethical and religious beliefs by understanding his concepts of thought 
and language in a more detailed way. In opposition to what we are tentatively inclined 
to think, the articles of this volume invite us to understand that our need to grasp the 
essence of ethical and religious thought and language will not be achieved by metaphy-
sical theories expounded from such a point of view, but by focusing on our everyday 
forms of expression. The articles have in common an understanding of Wittgenstein as 
not proposing metaphysical theories, but rather showing us the way to work ourselves 
out of the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing. Thus, the authors 
show from a Wittgensteinian perspective that the standard modern approaches to ethics 
cannot justify traditional moral beliefs.  
The volume includes contributions by Ulrich Arnswald, John Churchill, Liam Hughes, 
Jens Kertscher, Dieter Mersch, Genia Schönbaumsfeld and Anja Weiberg.   
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